Vimy Ridge And Passchendaele Analysis
Assignment Four
Vimy Ridge and Passchendaele: The Social Impact
On Canada in 1917
Canada had an undisputed contribution to the Great War having committed over 600,000 of its population of 8 million. Canada engaged in some of the most famous battles of the war such as the Second Battle of Ypres, the Battle of the Somme, The Battle of Arras, The Third Battle of Ypres, and the British Expeditionary Force’s Last Hundred Days. At the end of the war, Canada proudly celebrated her soldiers, their sacrifices, and their triumphs. Canada has a special relationship with the Battle of Arras, however. The large British campaign that was an overall failure, costing the lives of over 159,000, was the overarching action that engaged the Canadian Corps at Vimy Ridge. There the Canadians successfully capture their objectives and proved the only Allied success in the entire Arras campaign. Almost instantly, Canadians on the home front began to rejoice in the triumph of the Canadian contingent overseas. Ever since, the memory of Vimy Ridge has lived in legend and mythology. No other action during the war would incite such social significance as Vimy. Canada participated in the evermore violent and …show more content…
costly Third Battle of Ypres at Passchendaele. There they achieved the same degree of victory but against harsher conditions and more dangerous defences. Nevertheless, Passchendaele would have the opposite affect that Vimy had on Canada. To better understand this phenomenon, Vimy Ridge and Passchendaele must be examined on a number of factors.
The military significance and the overall cost to achieve those objectives in both actions need to be addressed. The reception of the news of each action in the context of the social situation in Canada will provide insight to how triumphant mythology and sober shock resulted. The political influences on the staging of each action also factor into the phenomenon of Vimy praise and Passchendaele mourning. Once these factors are brought to light, Vimy Ridge and Passchendaele as social significances are clearly the products of the sociological extremes experienced between the spring and fall of
1917.
The Battle of Arras was the prelude to French action further south. The larger strategy of the French determined that the risks of doing nothing exceeded those of taking action. The aim was to alleviate pressure off the French’s future assault and build morale in resuming the offensive.1 The Arras campaign assigned Vimy Ridge, north of Arras, to the Canadian Corps. It was one of many high features controlled by the Germans that offered an advantage to its defenders as the ridge commanded a wide view of the Allied lines. It would be one of many objectives of the Battle of Arras. The Canadians carefully planned their assault of Vimy Ridge, and the Corps commander, General Byng, ensured that every soldier knew the plan from start to finish and rehearsed the operation extensively prior to 9 April 1917. On the 9th of April, the Canadians began their assault along with the rest of the British Expeditionary Force towards the objectives. Within a matter of hours, the Canadians captured their immediate objectives on the ridge but at the cost of 7,707 casualties inflicted in the assault.2 The rest of the Battle of Arras did not go so well and the British failed to meet their objectives. Vimy would eventually be lost to the Germans well after the Canadian assault, and little to no momentum would be gained fro the Battle of Arras.
The Battle of Vimy Ridge cost Canada more than 10,500 casualties with 3,598 of the men killed in action. The 9th of April became the bloodiest day in Canadian military history with 7,707 Canadian casualties in a matter of hours.3 The 1st of July 1916, the 19th of August 1942, and the 6th of June 1944 combined would not trump that appalling statistic.4 Such news of the casualties should have had the home front up in revolt against campaigns like the one fought at Vimy. The Second Battle of Passchendaele did not have a day bloodier than the 9th of April, but after nearly 16,000 killed or wounded over fifteen days, Prime Minister Sir Robert Borden conveyed to the British Prime Minister Lloyd George that “if there is ever a repetition of Passchendaele, not a Canadian soldier will leave the shore of Canada so long as the Canadian people entrust the Government of my country to my hands.”5 On the contrary, despite the losses suffered at Vimy, Borden was exultant and noted in his diary that the newspapers in Canada would be singing in praises of the Canadian Corps.6 So how could the home front shadow the death toll of Vimy with its triumph? The answer is partly found in the method the information was delivered to Canadians and in the socio-political situation in Canada in early 1917. News about Vimy Ridge began hitting the newsstands in Canada as early as the 10th of April 1917. Headlines read “Famous Ridge the Scene of Many Gory Battles Was Stormed and Carried by Warriors from Canada,”7 and “Brilliant Canadian dash signal for armies left and right to advance,”8 suggesting the Canadian Corps led the assault in the Battle of Arras. Even the Quebec paper, Le Devoir, dedicated its first page to news of the assault.9 There was much emphasis placed on the previous failures of the French and British to take the ridge and was further highlighted that the Canadians on Vimy was the only real success of the Battle of Arras. The number of German prisoners taken by Canadians was stressed and newspapers claimed they made up one third of the total prisoners captured.10 News and reports revered the Canadian Corps commander, Byng, the employment of new tactics, and the accuracy of the artillery. For the Canadian and soldier alike, the Battle of Vimy Ridge was a psychological impetus. The official announcement from the Canadian War Records Office described that the Canadians have acquired merit, though there was no mention to the amount of casualties.11 News about the casualties was kept comparatively silent from the public though rang loudly within the government. In the wake of Vimy, Major-General Willoughby Gwatkin warned Borden the rate of voluntary recruitment in Canada could only reinforce two divisions in the field.12 But in early 1917, the war was appreciated as fickle and that victory is often as costly as defeat.13 In the case of the Battle of Arras, the offensive cost 159,000 British and around 130,000 German casualties. In contrast, the 10,500 Canadian casualties appeared light and Vimy proved to be the only real success of the entire campaign. The attention it received from Canadian news was mirrored by British reports to distract from the overall losses and convey the message that the Allies had had the first significant success since the stalemate in 1914.14 The Vimy successes, quickly being coined a triumph, were even further heightened by Canada’s neighbours to the south, the Americans. The New York Tribune wrote of Vimy, “No praise of Canada’s achievement could be excessive. The valour of the Canadian soldier shines with an unquenchable and undimmed brightness.”15 Though not forgotten, the Canadian sombre sacrifices were adumbrated by the jubilant victory at Vimy Ridge. Vimy Ridge is widely studied and there is much literature about the Canadians action, especially by Pierre Berton and D.J. Goodspeed. Factual in their approaches, there is a consistent theme of national pride. The French historian and philosopher, Ernest Renan said, “Nations are made by doing great things together.”16 This theme is revisited by famed Canadian historian Desmond Morton in his work on Vimy and is also found in the works by Goodspeed and Berton. However true Renan’s statement may be, Vimy Ridge stands on his principle and its legend outstretches its history. Phrases such as “birth of a nation” or “Canada’s coming of age” are misleading but nevertheless forever associated with Vimy Ridge. The significant impact Vimy had on Canada as an autonomous and influential nation is difficult to prove. Canada’s autonomy from Britain spanned from Confederation in 1867, the Statute of Westminster in 1931, and final autonomy being reach with the Constitution Act in 1982. During that period, Canada fought the Boer War, two world wars, the Korean War, and countless peacekeeping operations and NATO missions. Vimy Ridge did not have a role in any constitutional change in Canada but it certainly had a sociological impact as early as the 10th of April 1917. There were key ingredients that made Vimy Ridge such a euphoric victory for Canadians: the Canadian Corps fought as a formation, they seized of a tactical advantage or high ground, and they were unmatched in success in the overall Allied campaign. This combination of factors is not unique to Vimy Ridge and was again repeated in a little over six months later in the Third Battle of Ypres. Within that campaign, the Canadians participated in the Second Battle of Passchendaele, and like Vimy, it had a militarily strategic and social significance. Historian Norman S. Leach described Passchendaele as Canada’s other Vimy Ridge.17 So why was Passchendaele not immortalized in the same manner as Vimy Ridge? The military significance of Passchendaele compared to Vimy Ridge needs to be examined to provide context for the reception of the battle by the Canadian people. Though the war had not changed overly between the winter of 1914 and the spring of 1918, subtle changes in tactics and technology would make the difference in how some of the seemingly repetitive offensive transpired. For instance, the French changes to platoon tactics and integrated artillery support prior to the Battle of Arras helped enable the Canadian success on Vimy Ridge.18 Similar changes would occur before Passchendaele but in the German Camp. The prelude to the Third Battle of Ypres campaign began on the Messines ridge. The British detonated nineteen mines beneath the ridge killing around 10,000 Germans and all but level the entire ridgeline.19 The British captured the German positions in a matter of minutes and the assault was a success. The intent of the Messines ridge campaign was to shift the German focus away from the Ypres Salient. Unfortunately for the Allies, the German high commander, General Ludendorff, became suspicious of Allied movements and appointed his most competent defence specialist, Lossberg, as chief of staff of the Fourth Army in Flanders.20 Lossberg enhanced the German defences from three lines to five lines, placing his counter-attack forces further behind the frontline. They were heavily equipped with Mark 08/15 machineguns,21 which would give the Second Battle of Passchendaele a far more dangerous dynamic than at Vimy Ridge. Dominating the Allied front with spurs and heights that created killing fields for attacking soldier, Passchendaele Ridge proved tactically significant in the hands of the Germans.22 The sweeping fields of machinegun and artillery fire from the ridge had the British at a disadvantage and General Haig saw that its capture would not only relieve the pressure on the British army, but also turn the advantage against the Germans.23 The portion of the ridge General Haig required the Canadians was at the village that lent its name to the ridge. The Canadian sector of the ridge was 3,000-meter across and enabled the Canadians to concentrate their forces in the assault. Of course this also enabled the Germans to concentrate theirs.24 The ground was familiar to the Canadians and, moreover, to General Arthur Currie. Currie was promoted and took over the Canadian Corps after Vimy Ridge. He was disturbed by the prospects assaulting the Germans in Ypres again.25 Canada’s famed general raged against Passchendaele and questioned its value, “Let the Germans have it – keep it – rot in it … It isn’t worth a drop of blood.”26 His open disagreement with the plan forced General Haig to meet with Currie and explain the importance of the battle for morale and to alleviate the French.27 By Haig’s definition, the military significance of the Third Battle of Ypres and Passchendaele was the exact same as the Battle of Arras and Vimy Ridge: alleviate the French and enhance morale. On 26 October 1917, the Canadian Corps commenced their “second Vimy Ridge” and utilized the bite-and-hold tactic that they had used at Vimy.28 The 3rd and 4th Canadian Divisions assaulted and attempted to capture assault positions for subsequent phases. The engagement left them unsuccessful and 2,600 casualties. On 30 October, the same two divisions assaulted the same positions.29 They established their preliminary positions but suffered another 2,300 casualties.30 Currie deliberately took the following week to repair roads, move guns forward and prepare for the final phase on 6 November. In the third phase, the Canadian Corps successfully captured Passchendaele but encountered four days of constant counter-attacks and bombardment from Lossberg’s enhanced defensive. On 10 November, the Canadian secured all of their objectives and marked the final day of the Third Battle of Ypres campaign. The battle claimed 15,654 Canadian casualties over the fifteen days of bitter and bloody fighting.31 The final result of the Third Battle of Ypres was almost a complete reflection for the Canadians as what had happened in the Battle of Arras and Vimy. The Canadians made victory a “thorough” endeavour and were again the only real success of the campaign. For the British, Passchendaele was “a horror show of defeat and destruction”32 and the Canadian victory was again used to prop-up morale across the British Expeditionary Force. Tim Cook suggests the Canadian victory went so far as to save Sir Douglas Haig’s job as commander-in-chief. Despite its surface similarities, Passchendaele received contrary reception by the soldiers, generals, politicians, and Canadian public than Vimy Ridge. The soldiers were demoralized by the brutal conditions they endured during the battle. The late October and early November weather and unusually heavy rains turned Passchendaele into nothing more than mud pit and soaking open coffin.33 The 4th Canadian Division commander, General Watson summarized Passchendaele as, “Wastes of mud, destroyed houses, roads torn up by constant shelling and above all, the vile weather conditions, that made life a burden.”34 The conditions were coupled with brutal hand-to-hand combat and high casualties on both sides. However, the senior leadership felt no better about the campaign. Currie recounted:
“I carried my protest to the extreme limit, to an extent, which the Canadian people do not realize, and which I believe would have resulted in my being sent home had I been other than the Canadian Corps Commander. I pointed out what the casualties were bound to be, and asked if a success would justify the sacrifice? I was ordered to go on and make the attack.”35
The Canadian government echoed Currie’s distain for Passchendaele. Borden shared Curries concerns to the Imperial War Office and the British Prime Minister and decreed that another action such as Passchendaele would see the end of Canadian support to the war effort.36 News home about Passchendaele also had a grimmer, or more realistic, tone. The headlines did not celebrate Canadian soldier triumph in naïve jubilance but were soberly juxtaposed with the killed in action lists. A day after Vimy, the news hit the stands in vibrancy but Passchendaele was slower and solemnly factual. The 26 October phase of the battle did not make it into papers until three or four days later. The Calgary Harold inaccurately reported the first phase of Passchendaele as “Canadians’ Recent Success Vividly Described”37 and “Another Mile is Gained From the Huns.”38 The casualty lists that permeated the newspaper began to cast the shadow on military operations and exhaust the public. For Canada, 1917 observed the growth of the fruits of victory but also the perils of defeat; in other words, the public was growing exhausted of the war as early as November 1917.39 Also during that year was a period of political turbulence for Prime Minister Robert Borden and his conservative government. The opposition, led by French Canadian Wilfred Laurier, and the Quebec population grew increasingly critical of the war. Canada observed the growth of its contribution to overseas service from around 30,000 in 1914 to over 400,000 in 1917, with the overall size of the Canadian forces growing to over 600,000 by 1918.40 The war had dedicated over 7.5% of Canada’s population of 8 million to soldiering. Overall, 15% of Canadian males or 32% of eligible male population served in the Canadian forces.41 The rate of attrition of Canada’s Corps by spring of 1917 put strain on recruitment and there was an inadequate rate of replacements for the Corps.42 Vimy Ridge marked the first victory to mitigate that situation while Passchendaele negated or reinforce the recruitment situation. This recruiting and rate of attrition dilemma harassed Borden in an election year and his consideration of conscription only served to exasperate his political situation.43 Passchendaele’s resulting 16,000 casualties brought Borden’s Conscription Crisis to the precipice one month before his federal election on 17 December 1917.44 However, the “Khaki Election,” as it became known as by the public to suggest it was an election in support of the soldiers and war, armed Borden with the majority necessary to pass the Military Service Act and initiate conscription.45 With Canada’s soaring casualty rates, political tension, and less than jubilant news from the front, Passchendaele was destined to receive a more critical reception. The ridge and its tactical significance was almost identical to Vimy and was captured and held in the same manner, but arguably against greater odds given Lossberg’s enhanced defensive. However the public stage in late 1917 was overtaken by killed in action lists and the federal election. Borden interpreted Passchendaele as an attack on his vital ground. The consensus for morale would be grim until mid 1918 with jubilance only returning in November 1918.46 Canada has rightfully celebrated her soldiers, their sacrifices, and their efforts as heroes during the war and well after Armistice Day. April 1917 proved an opportunity for Canada to recognize victory and celebrated it with such triumph that the phrases used to describe the achievement would echo through generations of Canadians. Heroes were certainly discovered at Vimy Ridge and four Canadians were awarded the highest honour in the British Empire, the Victoria Cross. Private Milne, Lance-Sergeant Sifton, Private Pattison, and Captain MacDowell became emblems of Canadian pride in the spring of 1917 and embodied the valiant efforts put forth the entire Canadian Corps.47 In contrast, the Second Battle of Passchendaele more than doubled the amount heroism as nine Canadians won the Victoria Cross. Lieutenant Shankland, Private Holmes, Major O’Kelly, Private Kinross, Sergeant Mullin, Major Pearkes, Lieutenant McKenzie, Private Barron, and Private Robertson would be immortalized as heroes but would not receive the same triumph or reflection as their four predecessors.48 It is misleading to think that Passchendaele was not recognized for its positive social significance. It was simply overshadowed by other factors that ensured it did not take on the mythological heights of Vimy Ridge. Following Passchendaele many officials celebrated the Canadians as a force to be reckoned with and their words have also carried through generations. British Prime Minister David Lloyd George stated, “Whenever the Germans found the Canadian Corps coming into the line they prepared for the worst.”49 General Watson reflected on the Canadian effort:
“It need hardly be a matter of surprise that the Canadians by this time had the reputation of being the best shock troops in the Allied Armies. They had been pitted against the select guards and shock troops of Germany and the Canadian superiority was proven beyond question. They had the physique, the stamina, the initiative, the confidence between officers and men (so frequently of equal standing in civilian life) and happened to have the opportunity.”50
Such descriptions of respect rippled through the Allied armies and Sir Douglas Haig placed the Canadian Corps at the spearhead of the final offensive as shock troops in late 1918, achieving wild military successes. The Vimy Ridge victory came at precisely the right time for Canadians and for Canada’s politicians. The thirty-two month period without an Allied victory began to weigh on the public and Vimy Ridge broke that curse, mitigating the number of soldiers committed to the war effort. That is the underlying factor that ensured Vimy would be hurled into Canadian legend for the next hundred years. The military significance of Vimy Ridge was not dissimilar to any of the high features and ridgelines that the Allies and Germans stubbornly struggled over for four years in Flanders. Its capture provided, or failed to provide, the same advantages as Hill 70, Hill 62, the Somme, or Passchendaele Ridge. It was the social significance that makes Vimy Ridge standout amongst those other engagements. The news of success fell upon eager ears and the lack of details on the conduct or aftermath of Vimy were swiftly replaced by exuberant idolization of the Corps and the first Allied victory since the winter of 1914. The official history was obfuscated by legend and crept into the works of esteemed historians such as Berton and Goodspeed. More critical historiography by authors such as Tim Cook, Sandra Gwyn, and John Grodzinski have since dispelled much of the myth, but it continues to outstretch modern historiography. Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper demonstrated the endurance of the myth at the 90th anniversary of Vimy by referring the Battle of Arras as the “birth of the Canadian nation.”51 Passchendaele followed Vimy with similar qualities in a military context. As mentioned above, the ridge was of equally questionable value to the Allied campaign in the Third Battle of Ypres. However the fighting was even more brutal as the Canadians fought through thicker German defences and repelled waves of Lossberg’s heavily armed counter-attack forces. The bite-and-hold combat given the advances in Lossberg’s defence made Passchendaele a superiorly impressive military feat to that of Vimy. Over a million artillery shells fill into the Canadian’s 3,000-meter frontage and, along with the weather, created the most horrendous conditions of the entire war. The imagery of Passchendaele would be the subject of many British war artists and become emblematic of the war as a whole.52 The solemn reality of the war, its horrors, and its costs would be embodied by Passchendaele ensuring its place well beneath Vimy Ridge as a source of nationalism. The comparison between Vimy Ridge and Passchendaele is important to illustrate the negligible military significance of both operations and the contrasting social significance between an early 1917 operation and a late 1917 engagement. It is clear that 1917 was a desperate year for all involved with the war, overseas and at home, as the war’s end was no longer in sight. However similar in military nature, Vimy Ridge and Passchendaele embossed the two extremes in the social climate during 1917. Vimy Ridge will forever capture the glory of the Great War, and Passchendaele will forever capture the sorrow and horrors of the Great War.
Bibliography
Bercuson, David J. The Fighting Canadians, Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers Ltd., 2008
Bothwell, Robert. The Penguin History of Canada, Toronto: Penguin Group, 2006
Calgary Harold, 30 October 1917
Calgary Harold, 10 November 1917
Champ, Joan. “Impact of the First World War on Saskatchewan’s Farm Families,” Western Development Museum, 2005
Cook, Tim. The Madman and the Butcher: The Sensation Wars of Sam Hughes and General Arthur Currie. Toronto: Penguin Group, 2010
Cook, Tim. Shock Troops: Canadians Fighting the Great War 1917-1918, Toronto: Penguin Group, 2008
Le Devoir, 10 April 1917
Granatstein, J.L. Canada’s Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002
Grodzinski, John R. “The Use and Abuse of Battle: Vimy Ridge and the Great War Over the History of the First World War,” Canadian Military Journal, http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol10/no1/12-grodzinski-eng.asp, retrieved 31 Jul 13
Gwyn, Sandra. Tapestry of War, Toronto: Harper Collins Publishers Ltd, 1992
Stevenson, David. Cataclysm, The First World War as Political Tragedy, New York: Basic Books, 2005
Halifax Herald, 10 April 1917
Inglis, Dave. “The Introduction of the Vimy Myth,” Simon Fraser University, 1995
LAC, CP, v.5 file 15, Currie to Rattray, 22 April 1920
Leach, Norman S. “Passchendaele: Canada’s Other Vimy Ridge,” Canadian Military Journal, http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo9/no2/09-leach-eng.asp, retrieved 31 Jul 13
McCarthy, C. The Third Ypres: Passchendaele, the Day-By-Day Account, London: Arms & Armour Press, 1996
Morton, Desmond. A Military History of Canada. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd, 2007
Morton, Desmond. “Significance of Vimy Ridge,” The Vimy Foundation, https://www.vimyfoundation.ca/significance, retrieved 31 Jul 13
Nicholson, G.W.L. Official History of the Canadian Army in the First World War: Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919, Ottawa: Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1962
Official Announcement by the Canadian War Records Office on the Battle of Vimy Ridge, April 1917, http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/vimy_warrecordsoffice.htm, retrieved 31 Jul 13
Saturday Night, 21 April 1917
The Star, “The enduring mythology of Vimy,” 9 April 2007
Statistics Canada, “Number of Casualties in the First World War, 1914 to 1918, and the Second World War, 1939 to 1945,” Canada Yearbook, 1948
Terraine, John. “Variants of the Offensive: Underground.” In White Heat: The New Warfare, 1914-18. London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1982
Vancouver Sun, 10 April 1917
The Vimy Foundation, “Victoria Cross Recipients: Courage and Valour at Vimy Ridge,” https://www.vimyfoundation.ca/Victoria, retrieved 1 Aug 13
Watson, David, Memoire on the Canadian Effort at the Third Battle of Ypres, 1917, http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/ypres3_watson.htm, retrieved 29 Jul 13
Vimy Ridge and Passchendaele: The Social Impact
On Canada in 1917
Canada had an undisputed contribution to the Great War having committed over 600,000 of its population of 8 million. Canada engaged in some of the most famous battles of the war such as the Second Battle of Ypres, the Battle of the Somme, The Battle of Arras, The Third Battle of Ypres, and the British Expeditionary Force’s Last Hundred Days. At the end of the war, Canada proudly celebrated her soldiers, their sacrifices, and their triumphs. Canada has a special relationship with the Battle of Arras, however. The large British campaign that was an overall failure, costing the lives of over 159,000, was the overarching action that engaged the Canadian Corps at Vimy Ridge. There the Canadians successfully capture their objectives and proved the only Allied success in the entire Arras campaign. Almost instantly, Canadians on the home front began to rejoice in the triumph of the Canadian contingent overseas. Ever since, the memory of Vimy Ridge has lived in legend and mythology. No other action during the war would incite such social significance as Vimy. Canada participated in the evermore violent and …show more content…
costly Third Battle of Ypres at Passchendaele. There they achieved the same degree of victory but against harsher conditions and more dangerous defences. Nevertheless, Passchendaele would have the opposite affect that Vimy had on Canada. To better understand this phenomenon, Vimy Ridge and Passchendaele must be examined on a number of factors.
The military significance and the overall cost to achieve those objectives in both actions need to be addressed. The reception of the news of each action in the context of the social situation in Canada will provide insight to how triumphant mythology and sober shock resulted. The political influences on the staging of each action also factor into the phenomenon of Vimy praise and Passchendaele mourning. Once these factors are brought to light, Vimy Ridge and Passchendaele as social significances are clearly the products of the sociological extremes experienced between the spring and fall of
1917.
The Battle of Arras was the prelude to French action further south. The larger strategy of the French determined that the risks of doing nothing exceeded those of taking action. The aim was to alleviate pressure off the French’s future assault and build morale in resuming the offensive.1 The Arras campaign assigned Vimy Ridge, north of Arras, to the Canadian Corps. It was one of many high features controlled by the Germans that offered an advantage to its defenders as the ridge commanded a wide view of the Allied lines. It would be one of many objectives of the Battle of Arras. The Canadians carefully planned their assault of Vimy Ridge, and the Corps commander, General Byng, ensured that every soldier knew the plan from start to finish and rehearsed the operation extensively prior to 9 April 1917. On the 9th of April, the Canadians began their assault along with the rest of the British Expeditionary Force towards the objectives. Within a matter of hours, the Canadians captured their immediate objectives on the ridge but at the cost of 7,707 casualties inflicted in the assault.2 The rest of the Battle of Arras did not go so well and the British failed to meet their objectives. Vimy would eventually be lost to the Germans well after the Canadian assault, and little to no momentum would be gained fro the Battle of Arras.
The Battle of Vimy Ridge cost Canada more than 10,500 casualties with 3,598 of the men killed in action. The 9th of April became the bloodiest day in Canadian military history with 7,707 Canadian casualties in a matter of hours.3 The 1st of July 1916, the 19th of August 1942, and the 6th of June 1944 combined would not trump that appalling statistic.4 Such news of the casualties should have had the home front up in revolt against campaigns like the one fought at Vimy. The Second Battle of Passchendaele did not have a day bloodier than the 9th of April, but after nearly 16,000 killed or wounded over fifteen days, Prime Minister Sir Robert Borden conveyed to the British Prime Minister Lloyd George that “if there is ever a repetition of Passchendaele, not a Canadian soldier will leave the shore of Canada so long as the Canadian people entrust the Government of my country to my hands.”5 On the contrary, despite the losses suffered at Vimy, Borden was exultant and noted in his diary that the newspapers in Canada would be singing in praises of the Canadian Corps.6 So how could the home front shadow the death toll of Vimy with its triumph? The answer is partly found in the method the information was delivered to Canadians and in the socio-political situation in Canada in early 1917. News about Vimy Ridge began hitting the newsstands in Canada as early as the 10th of April 1917. Headlines read “Famous Ridge the Scene of Many Gory Battles Was Stormed and Carried by Warriors from Canada,”7 and “Brilliant Canadian dash signal for armies left and right to advance,”8 suggesting the Canadian Corps led the assault in the Battle of Arras. Even the Quebec paper, Le Devoir, dedicated its first page to news of the assault.9 There was much emphasis placed on the previous failures of the French and British to take the ridge and was further highlighted that the Canadians on Vimy was the only real success of the Battle of Arras. The number of German prisoners taken by Canadians was stressed and newspapers claimed they made up one third of the total prisoners captured.10 News and reports revered the Canadian Corps commander, Byng, the employment of new tactics, and the accuracy of the artillery. For the Canadian and soldier alike, the Battle of Vimy Ridge was a psychological impetus. The official announcement from the Canadian War Records Office described that the Canadians have acquired merit, though there was no mention to the amount of casualties.11 News about the casualties was kept comparatively silent from the public though rang loudly within the government. In the wake of Vimy, Major-General Willoughby Gwatkin warned Borden the rate of voluntary recruitment in Canada could only reinforce two divisions in the field.12 But in early 1917, the war was appreciated as fickle and that victory is often as costly as defeat.13 In the case of the Battle of Arras, the offensive cost 159,000 British and around 130,000 German casualties. In contrast, the 10,500 Canadian casualties appeared light and Vimy proved to be the only real success of the entire campaign. The attention it received from Canadian news was mirrored by British reports to distract from the overall losses and convey the message that the Allies had had the first significant success since the stalemate in 1914.14 The Vimy successes, quickly being coined a triumph, were even further heightened by Canada’s neighbours to the south, the Americans. The New York Tribune wrote of Vimy, “No praise of Canada’s achievement could be excessive. The valour of the Canadian soldier shines with an unquenchable and undimmed brightness.”15 Though not forgotten, the Canadian sombre sacrifices were adumbrated by the jubilant victory at Vimy Ridge. Vimy Ridge is widely studied and there is much literature about the Canadians action, especially by Pierre Berton and D.J. Goodspeed. Factual in their approaches, there is a consistent theme of national pride. The French historian and philosopher, Ernest Renan said, “Nations are made by doing great things together.”16 This theme is revisited by famed Canadian historian Desmond Morton in his work on Vimy and is also found in the works by Goodspeed and Berton. However true Renan’s statement may be, Vimy Ridge stands on his principle and its legend outstretches its history. Phrases such as “birth of a nation” or “Canada’s coming of age” are misleading but nevertheless forever associated with Vimy Ridge. The significant impact Vimy had on Canada as an autonomous and influential nation is difficult to prove. Canada’s autonomy from Britain spanned from Confederation in 1867, the Statute of Westminster in 1931, and final autonomy being reach with the Constitution Act in 1982. During that period, Canada fought the Boer War, two world wars, the Korean War, and countless peacekeeping operations and NATO missions. Vimy Ridge did not have a role in any constitutional change in Canada but it certainly had a sociological impact as early as the 10th of April 1917. There were key ingredients that made Vimy Ridge such a euphoric victory for Canadians: the Canadian Corps fought as a formation, they seized of a tactical advantage or high ground, and they were unmatched in success in the overall Allied campaign. This combination of factors is not unique to Vimy Ridge and was again repeated in a little over six months later in the Third Battle of Ypres. Within that campaign, the Canadians participated in the Second Battle of Passchendaele, and like Vimy, it had a militarily strategic and social significance. Historian Norman S. Leach described Passchendaele as Canada’s other Vimy Ridge.17 So why was Passchendaele not immortalized in the same manner as Vimy Ridge? The military significance of Passchendaele compared to Vimy Ridge needs to be examined to provide context for the reception of the battle by the Canadian people. Though the war had not changed overly between the winter of 1914 and the spring of 1918, subtle changes in tactics and technology would make the difference in how some of the seemingly repetitive offensive transpired. For instance, the French changes to platoon tactics and integrated artillery support prior to the Battle of Arras helped enable the Canadian success on Vimy Ridge.18 Similar changes would occur before Passchendaele but in the German Camp. The prelude to the Third Battle of Ypres campaign began on the Messines ridge. The British detonated nineteen mines beneath the ridge killing around 10,000 Germans and all but level the entire ridgeline.19 The British captured the German positions in a matter of minutes and the assault was a success. The intent of the Messines ridge campaign was to shift the German focus away from the Ypres Salient. Unfortunately for the Allies, the German high commander, General Ludendorff, became suspicious of Allied movements and appointed his most competent defence specialist, Lossberg, as chief of staff of the Fourth Army in Flanders.20 Lossberg enhanced the German defences from three lines to five lines, placing his counter-attack forces further behind the frontline. They were heavily equipped with Mark 08/15 machineguns,21 which would give the Second Battle of Passchendaele a far more dangerous dynamic than at Vimy Ridge. Dominating the Allied front with spurs and heights that created killing fields for attacking soldier, Passchendaele Ridge proved tactically significant in the hands of the Germans.22 The sweeping fields of machinegun and artillery fire from the ridge had the British at a disadvantage and General Haig saw that its capture would not only relieve the pressure on the British army, but also turn the advantage against the Germans.23 The portion of the ridge General Haig required the Canadians was at the village that lent its name to the ridge. The Canadian sector of the ridge was 3,000-meter across and enabled the Canadians to concentrate their forces in the assault. Of course this also enabled the Germans to concentrate theirs.24 The ground was familiar to the Canadians and, moreover, to General Arthur Currie. Currie was promoted and took over the Canadian Corps after Vimy Ridge. He was disturbed by the prospects assaulting the Germans in Ypres again.25 Canada’s famed general raged against Passchendaele and questioned its value, “Let the Germans have it – keep it – rot in it … It isn’t worth a drop of blood.”26 His open disagreement with the plan forced General Haig to meet with Currie and explain the importance of the battle for morale and to alleviate the French.27 By Haig’s definition, the military significance of the Third Battle of Ypres and Passchendaele was the exact same as the Battle of Arras and Vimy Ridge: alleviate the French and enhance morale. On 26 October 1917, the Canadian Corps commenced their “second Vimy Ridge” and utilized the bite-and-hold tactic that they had used at Vimy.28 The 3rd and 4th Canadian Divisions assaulted and attempted to capture assault positions for subsequent phases. The engagement left them unsuccessful and 2,600 casualties. On 30 October, the same two divisions assaulted the same positions.29 They established their preliminary positions but suffered another 2,300 casualties.30 Currie deliberately took the following week to repair roads, move guns forward and prepare for the final phase on 6 November. In the third phase, the Canadian Corps successfully captured Passchendaele but encountered four days of constant counter-attacks and bombardment from Lossberg’s enhanced defensive. On 10 November, the Canadian secured all of their objectives and marked the final day of the Third Battle of Ypres campaign. The battle claimed 15,654 Canadian casualties over the fifteen days of bitter and bloody fighting.31 The final result of the Third Battle of Ypres was almost a complete reflection for the Canadians as what had happened in the Battle of Arras and Vimy. The Canadians made victory a “thorough” endeavour and were again the only real success of the campaign. For the British, Passchendaele was “a horror show of defeat and destruction”32 and the Canadian victory was again used to prop-up morale across the British Expeditionary Force. Tim Cook suggests the Canadian victory went so far as to save Sir Douglas Haig’s job as commander-in-chief. Despite its surface similarities, Passchendaele received contrary reception by the soldiers, generals, politicians, and Canadian public than Vimy Ridge. The soldiers were demoralized by the brutal conditions they endured during the battle. The late October and early November weather and unusually heavy rains turned Passchendaele into nothing more than mud pit and soaking open coffin.33 The 4th Canadian Division commander, General Watson summarized Passchendaele as, “Wastes of mud, destroyed houses, roads torn up by constant shelling and above all, the vile weather conditions, that made life a burden.”34 The conditions were coupled with brutal hand-to-hand combat and high casualties on both sides. However, the senior leadership felt no better about the campaign. Currie recounted:
“I carried my protest to the extreme limit, to an extent, which the Canadian people do not realize, and which I believe would have resulted in my being sent home had I been other than the Canadian Corps Commander. I pointed out what the casualties were bound to be, and asked if a success would justify the sacrifice? I was ordered to go on and make the attack.”35
The Canadian government echoed Currie’s distain for Passchendaele. Borden shared Curries concerns to the Imperial War Office and the British Prime Minister and decreed that another action such as Passchendaele would see the end of Canadian support to the war effort.36 News home about Passchendaele also had a grimmer, or more realistic, tone. The headlines did not celebrate Canadian soldier triumph in naïve jubilance but were soberly juxtaposed with the killed in action lists. A day after Vimy, the news hit the stands in vibrancy but Passchendaele was slower and solemnly factual. The 26 October phase of the battle did not make it into papers until three or four days later. The Calgary Harold inaccurately reported the first phase of Passchendaele as “Canadians’ Recent Success Vividly Described”37 and “Another Mile is Gained From the Huns.”38 The casualty lists that permeated the newspaper began to cast the shadow on military operations and exhaust the public. For Canada, 1917 observed the growth of the fruits of victory but also the perils of defeat; in other words, the public was growing exhausted of the war as early as November 1917.39 Also during that year was a period of political turbulence for Prime Minister Robert Borden and his conservative government. The opposition, led by French Canadian Wilfred Laurier, and the Quebec population grew increasingly critical of the war. Canada observed the growth of its contribution to overseas service from around 30,000 in 1914 to over 400,000 in 1917, with the overall size of the Canadian forces growing to over 600,000 by 1918.40 The war had dedicated over 7.5% of Canada’s population of 8 million to soldiering. Overall, 15% of Canadian males or 32% of eligible male population served in the Canadian forces.41 The rate of attrition of Canada’s Corps by spring of 1917 put strain on recruitment and there was an inadequate rate of replacements for the Corps.42 Vimy Ridge marked the first victory to mitigate that situation while Passchendaele negated or reinforce the recruitment situation. This recruiting and rate of attrition dilemma harassed Borden in an election year and his consideration of conscription only served to exasperate his political situation.43 Passchendaele’s resulting 16,000 casualties brought Borden’s Conscription Crisis to the precipice one month before his federal election on 17 December 1917.44 However, the “Khaki Election,” as it became known as by the public to suggest it was an election in support of the soldiers and war, armed Borden with the majority necessary to pass the Military Service Act and initiate conscription.45 With Canada’s soaring casualty rates, political tension, and less than jubilant news from the front, Passchendaele was destined to receive a more critical reception. The ridge and its tactical significance was almost identical to Vimy and was captured and held in the same manner, but arguably against greater odds given Lossberg’s enhanced defensive. However the public stage in late 1917 was overtaken by killed in action lists and the federal election. Borden interpreted Passchendaele as an attack on his vital ground. The consensus for morale would be grim until mid 1918 with jubilance only returning in November 1918.46 Canada has rightfully celebrated her soldiers, their sacrifices, and their efforts as heroes during the war and well after Armistice Day. April 1917 proved an opportunity for Canada to recognize victory and celebrated it with such triumph that the phrases used to describe the achievement would echo through generations of Canadians. Heroes were certainly discovered at Vimy Ridge and four Canadians were awarded the highest honour in the British Empire, the Victoria Cross. Private Milne, Lance-Sergeant Sifton, Private Pattison, and Captain MacDowell became emblems of Canadian pride in the spring of 1917 and embodied the valiant efforts put forth the entire Canadian Corps.47 In contrast, the Second Battle of Passchendaele more than doubled the amount heroism as nine Canadians won the Victoria Cross. Lieutenant Shankland, Private Holmes, Major O’Kelly, Private Kinross, Sergeant Mullin, Major Pearkes, Lieutenant McKenzie, Private Barron, and Private Robertson would be immortalized as heroes but would not receive the same triumph or reflection as their four predecessors.48 It is misleading to think that Passchendaele was not recognized for its positive social significance. It was simply overshadowed by other factors that ensured it did not take on the mythological heights of Vimy Ridge. Following Passchendaele many officials celebrated the Canadians as a force to be reckoned with and their words have also carried through generations. British Prime Minister David Lloyd George stated, “Whenever the Germans found the Canadian Corps coming into the line they prepared for the worst.”49 General Watson reflected on the Canadian effort:
“It need hardly be a matter of surprise that the Canadians by this time had the reputation of being the best shock troops in the Allied Armies. They had been pitted against the select guards and shock troops of Germany and the Canadian superiority was proven beyond question. They had the physique, the stamina, the initiative, the confidence between officers and men (so frequently of equal standing in civilian life) and happened to have the opportunity.”50
Such descriptions of respect rippled through the Allied armies and Sir Douglas Haig placed the Canadian Corps at the spearhead of the final offensive as shock troops in late 1918, achieving wild military successes. The Vimy Ridge victory came at precisely the right time for Canadians and for Canada’s politicians. The thirty-two month period without an Allied victory began to weigh on the public and Vimy Ridge broke that curse, mitigating the number of soldiers committed to the war effort. That is the underlying factor that ensured Vimy would be hurled into Canadian legend for the next hundred years. The military significance of Vimy Ridge was not dissimilar to any of the high features and ridgelines that the Allies and Germans stubbornly struggled over for four years in Flanders. Its capture provided, or failed to provide, the same advantages as Hill 70, Hill 62, the Somme, or Passchendaele Ridge. It was the social significance that makes Vimy Ridge standout amongst those other engagements. The news of success fell upon eager ears and the lack of details on the conduct or aftermath of Vimy were swiftly replaced by exuberant idolization of the Corps and the first Allied victory since the winter of 1914. The official history was obfuscated by legend and crept into the works of esteemed historians such as Berton and Goodspeed. More critical historiography by authors such as Tim Cook, Sandra Gwyn, and John Grodzinski have since dispelled much of the myth, but it continues to outstretch modern historiography. Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper demonstrated the endurance of the myth at the 90th anniversary of Vimy by referring the Battle of Arras as the “birth of the Canadian nation.”51 Passchendaele followed Vimy with similar qualities in a military context. As mentioned above, the ridge was of equally questionable value to the Allied campaign in the Third Battle of Ypres. However the fighting was even more brutal as the Canadians fought through thicker German defences and repelled waves of Lossberg’s heavily armed counter-attack forces. The bite-and-hold combat given the advances in Lossberg’s defence made Passchendaele a superiorly impressive military feat to that of Vimy. Over a million artillery shells fill into the Canadian’s 3,000-meter frontage and, along with the weather, created the most horrendous conditions of the entire war. The imagery of Passchendaele would be the subject of many British war artists and become emblematic of the war as a whole.52 The solemn reality of the war, its horrors, and its costs would be embodied by Passchendaele ensuring its place well beneath Vimy Ridge as a source of nationalism. The comparison between Vimy Ridge and Passchendaele is important to illustrate the negligible military significance of both operations and the contrasting social significance between an early 1917 operation and a late 1917 engagement. It is clear that 1917 was a desperate year for all involved with the war, overseas and at home, as the war’s end was no longer in sight. However similar in military nature, Vimy Ridge and Passchendaele embossed the two extremes in the social climate during 1917. Vimy Ridge will forever capture the glory of the Great War, and Passchendaele will forever capture the sorrow and horrors of the Great War.
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