References: Avant, D. (2004). The Privatization of Security and Change in the Control of Force. International Studies Perspectives 5 (2), pp. 153-157 Avant, D. (2006). The Privatization of Security: Lessons from Iraq. Orbis, Vol. 50 (2), pp. 327-42 Avant, D. (2006). The Implications of Marketized Security for IR Theory: The Democratic Peace, Late State Building, and the Nature and Frequency of Conflict. Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 4 (3), pp. 507-528 Bergner, D. (2005). The Other Army. The New York Times, 14 August 2005 Burge, R.A. (2008). Effectiveness and Efficiencies and Private Military Companies. Naval Postgraduate School Thesis Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives (2007). BLACKWATER USA Hearing. Serial Number 110-89 Cushman, J.H. (1993). 5 G.I.’s Are Killed as Somalis Down 2 U.S. Helicopters. The New York Times, 4 October 1993 Davis, J.R. (2002). Fortune’s Warriors: Private Armies and the New World Order. Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre Evans, S.S. (2006). There When You Need Them? Defining Reliability in Army Contracting for Operation Iraqi Freedom. U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project Greenwald, R. (2006). Iraq for Sale: The War Profiteers. A Documentary by Brave New Films Haufler, V. (2004). International Diplomacy and the Privatization of Conflict Prevention. International Studies Perspectives 5(2), pp. 158-163 Isenberg, D. (2009). Private Military Contractors and U.S. Grand Strategy. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute (PRIO) Keefe, P.R. (2004). Iraq: America’s Private Armies. The New York Review of Books, Vol. 51(13), p 48 Kinsey, C. (2006). Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Military Companies. Contemporary Security Studies. London: Routledge Leander, A. (2005). The Power to Construct International Security: On the Significance of Private Military Companies. Millennium: Journal Of International Studies, Vol.33 (3), pp.803-825 O’Keefe, M.S. (2009). Outsourcing Force: Examining of Private Military/Security Companies. University of Ottowa: Graduate School of Public and International Affairs. Scahill, J. (2007). Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army. New York: Nation Books…
Unsurprisingly, this statement generates criticism on applicability of Clausewitz’s theory with the increase of intra-state wars since the end of Cold War. For instance, H.P Willmott and Michael B. Barrett argued that Clausewitz’s theory is overly simplistic, and according to the Prussian, war has only one simple nature which is its subordination to policy and the theory lost its legacy as a result of absence of inter-state war since the first Gulf War. At first glance it might seem that war is inherently subservient to a government as it usually generates politics and directs policies. However, governments are not only policy makers and wage wars on another yet emergence of non-state actors brought change in the current security environment. In fact, Clausewitz had an answer to his critics if one read his book carefully. Essentially he said that “…..the feudal lords and trading cities of the Middle Ages, eighteenth-century kings and the rulers and peoples of the nineteenth century - all conducted war in their own particular way, using different methods and pursuing different aims”. It is therefore fair to assume that he was aware of other actors who would have different aims/policies than those of states. With regard to the ISIS, its main aim is to create Islamic caliphate and its actions against Iraqi and Syria governments, and against the West are continuation of its policies. Therefore, it is fair to say that Clausewitz’s hypothesis on war’s subordination to policy is still applicable while policy itself, in other word, war’s one of characters changing over time. War has been and would be always continuation of policy yet policy makers would decide to provoke it under their assumption of chance to succeed as…
All through Part five of her book Shadows of War, Carolyn Nordstrom shares her perspectives on war regarding social, physical and mental objectives and rebuffs of such viciousness. To start, one of the main objectives of war as characterized by Nordstrom is an immediate consequence of a risk of loss of control. She clarifies that it is basic for one military to want to decimate another when their control over a specific (arrive range claimed or controlled by somebody) is under risk (56). A fascinating point that Nordstrom makes is identifying with/about (group of individuals/all great individuals on the planet's) don't differentiate between the presence of various violences. As expressed by Nordstrom, a great many people will normally tell/demonstrate the contrast between various wars; nonetheless, not very many tell/demonstrate the distinction between the experience of brutality all through such wars (57).…
“Though warfare is surely a prime mover in the origin of the state,” Carneiro argues, “it cannot be the only factor.”2 Carneiro contends that war is…
“The state is considered the sole source of the ‘right’ to use violence.” (Weber 1972, 1)…
Charles Tilly’s made an argument in analogizing between war making and state making, on one hand, and organized crime, on the other. Tilly articulated the basic duties of government. One of which was protecting its citizens from external hardship. This “protecting of the citizens” by the government will eventually lead to dominance or monopoly over a particular area. Charles Tilly, in his argument, mainly discussed how Europeans states were generally formed through state making and war making processes. He also discussed the relationship between the ruler of a state and its own people (bandits, magnates, lords). In addition, he explained how taxes were collected and that continent-based traveling was much more expensive than sea traveling.…
Phillips, Rachel. "Counterpoint: ‘Enemy Combatant’ Is an Illegitimate Exercise of Uncontrolled Power." Points of View (2011). Ebscohost.com. Points of View, 23 June 2011. Web. 21 May 2012.…
Clausewitz’s theories on war are still relevant today with the revisualization of non-state actors on the world scene. The purpose of this essay is to expand on the applicability of these theories in today’s modern warfare where non-state actors play a larger, more global role. The study of theory, especially translated theory, requires an open mind to determine its applicability to various and ever-changing situations. In the case of Clausewitz, many strategists do not view his theories as relevant to today’s wars involving a Nation State vs. non-state actors. This is not true. The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College teaches that the commander’s intent is the most important part of proper execution. Strategists need to look at the intent of Clausewitz and view within the contextual historic period he wrote it, to demonstrate its relevance today. For the purpose of this essay, a Nation States is a sovereign territory that combines a political and geopolitical entity with a cultural or ethnic entity that was arrived at by self-determination. Non-state actors are groups that operate beyond state control and generally include rebel opposition groups (groups with a stated incompatibly with the government, generally concerning the control of government or the control of territory), local militias and warlords. By reviewing Clausewitz’s definitions of war, his theory of “the remarkable trinity” and the historical examples of non-state actors’ involvement with Nation States in war the relevance of Clausewitz will be apparent.…
Bibliography: 1. Hilsum, Lindsey. "Men mad with killing drown nation in blood". The Independent. 1 May 1994.…
A lot of effort has been devoted to analyzing the protracted bloody wars of the 20th Century when mass killings were “perpetrated by and against a wide range of nations, cultures, forms of government, ethnic and religious groups” (Mingst and Snyder 2008, 368) with brazen zeal to wipe out entire races for power and control. For most disposed people of the world – the ‘bottom billion’ as Collier refers to them, unchecked power takes away the freedom of the other and replaces it with terror and the primitive fear of being controlled. It is estimated that during the 20th Century alone, between 60 million to 150 million people have died in episodes of mass killings while international and civil wars accounts for about 34 million deaths (Mingst and Snyder 2008, 368).…
She suggests that different understandings of peace and order have affected states' willingness to intervene forcibly in other states, and aims to describe how changing beliefs and norms are the cause. Finnemore’s main thesis is that realist theory cannot make sense of how modern day interventions take place, because the…
She argues that violence is a function of uncertainty and that it is due to a threat from outside the state or within it. The arguments presented in this text focus on how changes in the balance of power between states and non state actors generate uncertainty and threats which in turn create an environment that is conducive to violence. Here, she looks back at Posen’s theories and says this is similar to his security dilemma, the major difference is that Posen thinks that the dilemma exists even in times of peace. However, in the balance of power case, I find it interesting that the demand for ethnic violence is not pre-existing, but it emerges internally from…
Cited: Basso, John. "Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars." Armed Forces & Society (0095327X) 27.4 (2001): 652-655. Vocational and Career Collection. EBSCO. Web. 9 Nov. 2011.…
Political Violence has been affiliated with governments and nations since the beginning of political history and plays a huge role in the causes of Wars around the world. What causes leaders to declare war? Many philosophers have based their studies and theories on this question; many have different perspectives. One philosopher, John Stoessinger, has expressed his theories on the causes of war through what he calls his “misperception framework.” Stoessinger shows great interests in the personalities of world leaders; he is less impressed with the roles of abstract forces such as nationalism, militarism, economic factors, or alliance systems as the causes of war. He views misperception as the sing most important precipitating factor in the outbreak of war. His framework is based on four parts which describe the environmental and psychological factors that leaders reflect on throughout their campaign. First off a leader’s image of themselves; there is a extraordinary consistency in the self images of most national leaders on the brink of war. Every leader confidently expects a victory after a brief and triumphant campaign were this common belief in a short decisive war is usually the overflow from a reservoir of self-delusions held by the leadership about both itself and the nation. Second a leader’s view of the character their enemy portrays. Distorted views of the adversary’s character will help precipitate a conflict. Third is based on a leader’s view of their adversary’s intentions toward their self. When a leader on the brink of war believes that their adversary will attack shows a high percentage of the start of a conflict. War becomes a virtual certainty when both leaders shore this perception. Lastly when a leader views the adversary’s capabilities and power it is depicted as the most quintessential cause of war. This is not the actual distribution of power that precipitates a…
The nature of violent conflicts has changed drastically in recent decades. The predominant form of violent conflict has evolved from national armies fighting each other; to armies fighting for independence, separation or political control; to various forms of violence, involving…