So, when the governments were forced to create some rules on their own, presidents chose instead to foster their own personal legitimacy by building patron-client ties with a tribalized peasantry. This legitimacy eventually makes corruption easy to be perpetrated (Szeftel 2000). Although aforementioned studies are all meaningful in terms of describing how presidents become corrupt in specific regions, they provide limited insights on why there exists variation of corruption within the presidency generally. In this paper, I offer a generalized theory in a way that suggest presidential term-limit affects corruption. It is based on the argument that president who’s term is not limited have reelection incentives
So, when the governments were forced to create some rules on their own, presidents chose instead to foster their own personal legitimacy by building patron-client ties with a tribalized peasantry. This legitimacy eventually makes corruption easy to be perpetrated (Szeftel 2000). Although aforementioned studies are all meaningful in terms of describing how presidents become corrupt in specific regions, they provide limited insights on why there exists variation of corruption within the presidency generally. In this paper, I offer a generalized theory in a way that suggest presidential term-limit affects corruption. It is based on the argument that president who’s term is not limited have reelection incentives