Why Is Operation Market-Garden A Failure?

In September 1944, Allied High Command found themselves more than 200 hundred days ahead of schedule as Allied Forces raced across France toward the German border. Looking to enter Germany and capture the Ruhr, Germany’s industrial heartland, General Eisenhower authorized Field Marshall Montgomery to execute a combined airborne and ground offensive to capture a series of bridges over the Rhine River. Collectively, this offensive is known as Operation Market-Garden (Ryan, 1995). The largest airborne operation to date, Operation Market, would see more than three airborne divisions of the First Allied Airborne Army (FAAA) secure a series of cities and bridges along a 60-mile stretch of road from the Dutch cities of Eindhoven to Arnhem. Concurrently, Operation Garden would see elements of the Second British Army, led by XXX Corps,
Allied forces never gained complete control of Arnhem and were forced to retreat after nine days of fighting. The British 1st Airborne Division, decimated in Arnhem with over 1,100 causalities and nearly 6,000 missing or captured, did not recover as a fighting force before the end of the war (Builder, Bankes, Nordin, 1999, p. 116). The failed operation removed the initiative from the Allied advance. The Allies did not cross the Lower Rhine until March 1945, delaying the capture the Ruhr until mid-April 1945. Allied forces declared victory in Europe less than two months after they entered Germany and captured of the Ruhr. Updated intelligence reports identified several deficiencies in the operational plans that Allied commanders were made aware of but failed to address. Allied forces would have defeated the Germans at Arnhem if they used available intelligence to properly plan the airborne and ground assaults. Would a successful Operation Market-Garden have ended the war by January with US and British forces capturing Berlin? What major impact might this have had on post-war