World War I: A Synthesis Essay

The repercussions and consequences that occurred at the end of both World Wars contributed to the dramatic shifts in nationalism and desire for independence during the nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries. Many countries emerged out the fallen empires, empires such as the Weimar Republic and the Ottoman Empire. The desire for independence and the growth of individual and communal nationalism heavily impacted the worldview of ethnic and religious communities all over the world. Suddenly, collections of people were all asking the same question: how did their existence create a path for their “voices” to be legitimized? The contradiction of the development of nationalism and the development of ethnicity have been present since the emergence
of Turkey in the mid-twentieth century, most especially concerning the Kurdish-Turkey conflict. The emergence of the Kurdish people has occurred simultaneously with the emergence of Turkish nationalism, and as these two dichotomies continue to rage against each other the more inherent conflicts with Turkish nationalism and the largest minority group, the Kurdish, continue to build.
Thus, the lackluster transition from the Ottoman Empire to development of the Turkish state in the 1920s, the development of ethno-nationalism in the Turkish state, and the inappropriate ethnic assimilation based on the transition of religious identity to modernity, have all contributed and have led to the politicization of Kurds in Turkey. The Ottoman Empire fell in 1920, at the end of World War I. The instability created by the First World War began to creep into the economic and political infrastructure of the Empire. Power was no longer centralized, with the Allied nations controlling several different separate regions of the former Empire. Nationalism began to be emphasized by the leaders who emerged after the fall, most especially Kemal Ataurk, who believed that “the Ottoman Empire was
deadweight on the Turkish people, who now needed their own homeland” (“The” 2016). Through his form of nationalism, he sought to form and establish a “new Turkish state based on Anatolia, where most of the empire’s Turkish population had traditionally lived” (“The” 2016). However, the conflict between the Allied states and the new emerging Turkish state persisted; and on “August 10th, 1920, these issues were resolved with the signing of the Treaty of Sevres” (“Treaty” 1998). This treaty officially ended the Ottoman Empire and forced the newly establish Turkey to renounce all “rights over Arab Asia and North Africa, as well as ensure an independent Armenian state and called for an autonomous Kurdistan” (“Treaty” 1998). However, Kemal ignored the treaty, and began to implement mainly “nationalist Turkish ideology”, thus the demise of Sevres and the possibility of a true Kurdish state (“The” 2016). According to Kemalism, any adoption of a Kurdish state in an inherent undermining of the Turkish state, and thus de-legitimizing the Turkish state. The beginning of the Kurdish-Turkish conflict was always seen as a restrictive measure from Turkish authorities. The Kurdish people currently reside in an area that covers four nations; Turkey, Armenia, Iraq, Iran. Even though they form a “distinctive community, connected by race, culture, and language”, the lack of land to call their own restricts their political capital, which is exactly what Turkish nationalism desire (“Who” 2016). The evolution of the use of religion in the territory has also played a massive role in how Kurdish people have been politicized over time.
The first “rebellion against the modern state [of Turkey] took place in February 1925” (Robins 1993). The leader of the rebellion was a man named “Sheikh Said of Prian, a Kurdish religious leader” (Robins 1993). His platform, unlike Kemal, was “far from being exclusively nationalist” and by doing so, he gained support “on the basis of tribal and religious allegiance” (Robins 1993). This threat to the state was more than enough for the state to “ruthlessly suppress” the rebellion (Robins 1993). By doing so, the Turkish state “underlined the centrality of the use of coercion in Turkish policy on the Kurdish issues” (Robins 1993). The state also used tactics “which have been used against the current insurgency” which resulted in the use of ideology based on “ethno-nationalism, drawing from [the] European experience” (Robins 1993). Thus, just as in the beginning of the Turkish state, ethnic separation was being used to establish the legitimacy of the state, and undermine all those who were not a part of this group. This tactic was used to grow and legitimize nationalism within the state by allowing the majority to rally, despite differences, and isolate a minority, and in the specific case of Turkey, this minority is the Kurds, “simultaneously denying and coopting” their existence (Robins
1993). Notwithstanding, the identity of the Kurdish people, have not directly impacted their ability to perform in Turkey government. No Kurds have been outright limited in participating in Turkey, some of them even being members of parliament, however, many had to do so by denying their “inner Kurd” and being a “Turk”, in order to assimilate to the discriminatory state (Robins 1993). This form of ethno-nationalism has presented an interesting position for a Kurd, who have time and time again been categorized as the outsiders of the Turkish state, going as far as being recognized as the “Mountain Turks” (Robbins 1993).The isolationism and “us v. them” mentality has contributed to the lack of cohesion in a state that is seen by the Western world as the “stability in an uncertain region” of the World, which has even gone as far to change foreign policy all over the world, consistently stating Turkey as an “ally” (Robins 1993). As the Turkish state continues to attempt to mute the Kurdish population through the “combination of authoritarian ideology and state power” the population size and “lacked a focal point for [Kurdish] disaffection” has created a resistance(Robins 1993). Religion has also influenced the development of the politicization of Kurds in Turkey. A majority of the community is Sunni Muslim. However, in a region that has been affected by globalization and modernization, the impact of religion has been pushed. As the Turkish state began to rapidly develop its statehood due to industrialization, former forms of legitimacy such as “Islam and the Caliphate” were reduced to cultural attributes, as the state began to focus on “nation-state” legitimacy (Yavuz 2001). With the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, as included the destruction of the Sultan; when this occurred the Turk State changed by “ruling to governing” (Yavuz 2001). The destruction of religion for modernity in the transitioning Turkish state allowed for the confinement of the Kurdish community to be labelled as “not-Turkish”, and thus became another rallying point for Turkish nationalism to arise from. With Kurdistan, being the largest homogenous community” there has been “considerable controversy among scholars regarding the function of the autonomous state” (Edmonds 2017). With the Turkish state consistently applying policies and force to isolate the Kurds and to attempt the assimilation into Turkey, the Kurdish people have “never enjoyed the political unity that might have given them a common legitimacy and efficacy” that is seen within the Turkish state (Edmonds 2017). Due to this, the Turkish-Kurdish conflict will continue to occur. Unless the Turkish state is willing to acknowledge the Kurdish state, the politicization of the Kurdish state will continue to be used by the Turks as a point of increasing nationalism.