E- Ink Analysis
E-Ink Analysis
At an early stage, E Ink had a broad perspective and considered several market opportunities, both in emerging- and mature industries, as well as different business models, in which all leveraged their unique technology. In 1999, E Ink insured the protection of their technology by acquiring 26 patents, which protected them from other firms to replicate their technology. E-ink moved forward building up a team of high quality people and the rounds for fund-raise included investors with technology and media expertise beyond the financial corporate investors. (See Exhibit 2 from the case). E-ink partnership with Philips, which provided E Ink with the electronic expertise needed. Further on this partnership led to exploring new strategic partnerships, which led to an alliance with Toppan, which again led to the entry into the Japanese market and gave access to Sony as potential customer. In 2003, E Ink took action and restructured the company. E Ink shut down the IIM project and focused all their resources on delivering an acceptable product to Sony and their primary technological goal: the radio paper. This valuable experience made E Ink more carefully considered which project to keep up with, focusing on electronic ink production and development; tracking closer to main competitors and substitute products.
What did go wrong?
In 1999, E Ink made a wrong decision; to focus on three big market opportunities rather than focus all their effort in one.
In 2000, E Ink decided to make an effort with an initial public offering, which was to late since the IPO window closed making the time for an alternative venture capital funding run out.
Making the cash problems even worse: E Ink had estimated the market opportunities and potential profits too high and under-estimated the manufacturing time, difficulty and costs; making them run out of cash even faster as soon as problems started to
At an early stage, E Ink had a broad perspective and considered several market opportunities, both in emerging- and mature industries, as well as different business models, in which all leveraged their unique technology. In 1999, E Ink insured the protection of their technology by acquiring 26 patents, which protected them from other firms to replicate their technology. E-ink moved forward building up a team of high quality people and the rounds for fund-raise included investors with technology and media expertise beyond the financial corporate investors. (See Exhibit 2 from the case). E-ink partnership with Philips, which provided E Ink with the electronic expertise needed. Further on this partnership led to exploring new strategic partnerships, which led to an alliance with Toppan, which again led to the entry into the Japanese market and gave access to Sony as potential customer. In 2003, E Ink took action and restructured the company. E Ink shut down the IIM project and focused all their resources on delivering an acceptable product to Sony and their primary technological goal: the radio paper. This valuable experience made E Ink more carefully considered which project to keep up with, focusing on electronic ink production and development; tracking closer to main competitors and substitute products.
What did go wrong?
In 1999, E Ink made a wrong decision; to focus on three big market opportunities rather than focus all their effort in one.
In 2000, E Ink decided to make an effort with an initial public offering, which was to late since the IPO window closed making the time for an alternative venture capital funding run out.
Making the cash problems even worse: E Ink had estimated the market opportunities and potential profits too high and under-estimated the manufacturing time, difficulty and costs; making them run out of cash even faster as soon as problems started to