59617 GV101
Considering the complimentary role played by the selectorate theory when studying the research and evidence surrounding autocracies, we find that the selectorate theory provides a complete and overarching explanation for the longevity of autocratic leaders. Approaching the selectorate theory through both its intrinsic and extrinsic role, it demonstrates that durability can be achieved in various ways. Subsequently, there is no set criteria that can explain the longevity of autocratic leaders. Rather, the two dimensions of the selectorate and the winning coalition proposed by BdM et al. (1999) explain longevity through their dual roles.
Intrinsically, through its own components, the selectorate theory explains the longevity of autocratic leaders through reference to their institutional environment. Two dimensions determine this environment (BdM et al.1999): the selectorate (those who have a say in selecting the leader) and the winning coalition (whose support is necessary for the leader to stay in power) these two form the loyalty norm (the probability of being apart of the next winning coalition). The sizing of the first two dimensions plays an essential role in explaining the longevity of autocratic leaders. For instance, the durability of a leader is enhanced with a large selectorate because the larger the selectorate the greater the advantage the incumbent has over opposition. This is because there is a lower chance of the defector successfully joining the next winning coalition, so they have a strong loyalty norm. Similarly, a small winning coalition is equally advantageous for a leader’s tenure as then it takes a fewer amount of private goods to “buy off” the necessary support needed to remain in power (BdM et al. 1999), making the process of maintaining power easier. So, considered intrinsically, the selectorate theory is able to explain the longevity of autocratic leaders through the size of the winning coalition (small) and selectorate (large).
Intrinsically, through its own components, the selectorate theory explains the longevity of autocratic leaders through reference to their institutional environment. Two dimensions determine this environment (BdM et al.1999): the selectorate (those who have a say in selecting the leader) and the winning coalition (whose support is necessary for the leader to stay in power) these two form the loyalty norm (the probability of being apart of the next winning coalition). The sizing of the first two dimensions plays an essential role in explaining the longevity of autocratic leaders. For instance, the durability of a leader is enhanced with a large selectorate because the larger the selectorate the greater the advantage the incumbent has over opposition. This is because there is a lower chance of the defector successfully joining the next winning coalition, so they have a strong loyalty norm. Similarly, a small winning coalition is equally advantageous for a leader’s tenure as then it takes a fewer amount of private goods to “buy off” the necessary support needed to remain in power (BdM et al. 1999), making the process of maintaining power easier. So, considered intrinsically, the selectorate theory is able to explain the longevity of autocratic leaders through the size of the winning coalition (small) and selectorate (large).
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