slavery in the District of Columbia. Their criticism said, in part, “the institution of slavery is founded on both injustice and bad policy, but … the Congress of the United States has no power under the Constitution to interfere with the institution of slavery in the different States. … the Congress of the United States has the power, under the Constitution, to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia …”
In his famous speech at Peoria in October 1854, he goes so far as to proclaim his hatred for slavery and its spread: “I hate it because of the monstrous injustice of slavery itself. I hate it because it deprives our republican example of its just influence in the world … When it is said that the institution exists, and that it is very difficult to get rid of it, in any satisfactory way, I can understand and appreciate the saying.” Lincoln intimates here his later inaction regarding slavery upon his election as President - there is no easy way within the existing law to extirpate the institution. Later in the same speech he hints at the argument he will use to defend the Emancipation Proclamation: “Much as I hate slavery, I would consent to the extension of it rather than see the Union dissolved, just as I would consent to any GREAT evil, to avoid a GREATER one.” Lincoln would refer back to his 1837 definition of his position on slavery during the 1860 presidential election. Following his victory, but prior to his inauguration, Lincoln wrote to eventual Confederate States of America Vice President Alexander Stephens to assure him that he did not mean to abolish slavery once in office. “Do the people of the South really entertain fears that a Republican administration would, directly, or indirectly, interfere with their slaves, or with them, about their slaves? If they do, I wish to assure you, as once a friend, and still, I hope, not an enemy, that there is no cause for such fears.” Lincoln the lawyer understood that Lincoln the President could take no unilateral action regarding slavery. After the ruling in the Dred Scott case, Lincoln acknowledged that a Supreme Court hostile to his motives could overturn any action he took. Armed with this knowledge, he desired an end to slavery “that would be gradual, compensated, voluntary, lawful, and permanent.” The methods the government and military had used during the war did not live up to all of these characteristics. The Confiscation Acts of 1861 and 1862 - signed by Lincoln - were steps toward the Emancipation Proclamation, but they were not strongly enforced and were subject to invalidation by the Courts. When John Charles Frémont in Missouri, and David Hunter in Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina, issued orders unilaterally freeing the slaves in those areas, Lincoln worried that the slaveholding border states would be pushed to join the Confederacy. Instead of these extreme measures, Lincoln vowed in his First Annual Message to Congress that he would use “all indispensable means,” but would “not be in haste to determine that radical and extreme measures, which may reach the loyal as well as the disloyal, are indispensable.” Therefore, Lincoln proposed to the slaveholders in the Border States a voluntary, compensated emancipation. This policy was actually carried out in Washington, DC, but lawmakers from Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri resisted, and only Maryland and Missouri eventually attempted to pass legislation enacting this type of gradual emancipation. Upon their rejection of his offer, Lincoln felt he was left with no choice. When the cabinet was called to meet on July 22, 1862, they could not have imagined the document Lincoln was to present to them. He did not bring them together to discuss whether or not he should issue the Proclamation - he “was settled in his own mind” on this point. Instead, Lincoln read the document, highlighting the reasoning he believed sanctioned his action: And as a fit and necessary military measure for effecting this object, I, as
Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, do order and declare that on the first day of January in the year of Our Lord one thousand, eight hundred and sixtythree, all persons held as slaves within any state or states, wherein the constitutional authority of the United States shall not then be practically recognized, submitted to, and maintained, shall then, thenceforward, and forever, be free.
Lincoln not only used a specific, constitutional grant of power to justify the announcement of this policy, he was also extremely careful to define the areas that would be affected. In the areas that were in a state of rebellion and armed insurrection, the President’s war powers could be used in order to deal with a unique, emergency situation end the rebellion. When pushed by Treasury Secretary Salmon P.
Chase to expand the areas affected by the Proclamation, Lincoln refused because “the original proclamation has no constitutional or legal justification, except as a military measure.” Although Lincoln’s (and any President’s) war powers in the case of rebellion and insurrection are virtually unlimited, they are limited by geography to areas that are in actual rebellion against the government of the United States. Lincoln further reinforced his position on presidential war powers in a letter to James C. Conkling, stating: “I think the Constitution invests its Commander-in-chief, with the law of war, in time of war. … Is there - has there ever been - any question that by the law of war, property, both of enemies and friends, may be taken when
needed?”
Lincoln did not, with the Emancipation Proclamation, free every slave in the United States; that was not his intention. He used his power as Commander-in-Chief to make it more difficult for the Confederacy to conduct their war against the United States. Lincoln’s respect for the limits placed on his power - even to end something he felt was the worst moral wrong - revealed his immense reverence for the Constitution. The paramount intent of the Proclamation was not, therefore, to free slaves, but rather to defend the Constitution and the Union of the states; Lincoln’s use of his war powers was based upon a narrow reading of those powers to help control an extraordinary emergency.
Theodore Roosevelt’s reading of executive power, on the other hand, utilizes a much more liberal view of the powers granted under Article II. He states, “that the executive power was limited only by specific restrictions and prohibitions appearing in the Constitution or imposed by the Congress under its Constitutional powers.” This is an extremely broad reading of presidential power, quite different from Lincoln’s limited and careful definition that he had a great deal of power in a specific emergency, but in time of peace could perform only those powers which were specifically granted.
Roosevelt made a case for a broad reading of presidential powers by first contending that Article II is rather vague in its definition of the grant of executive powers. There are very few actions the President is clearly prohibited from carrying out - legislative and judicial powers mostly, and of course impeachable offenses. His charge to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” and the vesting of “The executive Power” in his and only his hands, can be interpreted to mean a very large residuum of power. Roosevelt accepted these grants to mean that he should do his best to actively serve the people of the United States in any and all ways he could.
This view by Roosevelt is in stark contrast to that of Lincoln. Roosevelt refers to and compares himself to Lincoln, stating that the President is “bound to serve the people affirmatively in cases where the Constitution does not explicitly forbid him to render the service,” which he asserts was the “course followed by … Abraham Lincoln.” Had this been the case with Lincoln, he would not have carefully framed the Emancipation Proclamation as a war powers measure, applicable only to areas in actual rebellion. Believing slavery to be morally wrong and not in the best interest of the citizens or the nation, Lincoln could have issued a proclamation outlawing slavery everywhere it existed, if he followed Roosevelt’s reading of presidential power.
Roosevelt also argued that as President he was not “the servant of Congress,” but rather “a steward of the people,” and that Presidents who deferred to Congress were unable to effectively carry out the duties of their office. Although Lincoln did not defer to Congress, he did have to take into account the opinions of the people and state governments. Had he unilaterally outlawed slavery, he would have likely pushed the Border States to join the Confederacy, and Lincoln understood that “to lose Kentucky [or the other Border States] is nearly the same as to lose the whole game.” Again, only when emancipation became indispensable as the only method to save the Constitution and the Union did Lincoln take such action himself. Roosevelt explains his action in setting aside public lands for the purpose of conservation, stating, “Without such action it would have been impossible to stop the activity of the land thieves.” This situation, however, was not a unique emergency, nor was it a use of the President’s war powers. It was not seeing that the laws were faithfully executed; it was, in fact, making law, which is the duty of Congress, not the President.
Although Abraham Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation was an extraordinary action, he took it in light of extraordinary circumstances. The purpose of the President is to defend and protect the Constitution and the nation it governs, and to this extent his powers are many. However, a President serving during a time of peace, such as the term of Theodore Roosevelt, is much more restrained in his power and prerogative, and must not act to create law when there is time for the Congress to do so.