Analyzing Kant's Argument

The analytic-synthetic furrow; a notion whereby an analytic statement is one which is true by virtue of its meaning and independent of fact, whereas, a synthetic statement is true and grounded in fact, is fundamental to the aspect of logic of analytical propositions made in this discussion. The passage in question is signified by Kant’s argument concerning “natural science” in which he puts forward a two-step system concerning human interpretation of the natural world and the application of our sensory data whereby we make sensory information intelligible. First and foremost, the argument is introduced by the dissection of the term “natural science”. Kant defines nature as “the existence of things” which is determined according to natural
Rather, Kant contends that the implied meaning is concerned with the objects of experiences as we observe them. Thus, pertaining to his argument, in order that the interpretation of nature be scientific, our experience of the natural world must conform to natural and necessary laws as determinants of fact. This is followed by the explanation that, if nature did in fact imply the existence of things, in themselves, it would be unintelligible to us as we are unable cognise such things in nature without the determinants of natural and necessary law. Kant claims that we could not cognise them as a priori, due to its nonconformity to such laws, being that a conception cannot precede experience. Furthermore, as Kant declares himself, it is also impossible for it be a posteriori, as the conception of such things would be inapplicable to human understanding separate of experience. For the nature of things to be scientific, such things must apply to natural law therefore determining it as an objective fact rather than one which is subjective. Essentially, the two notions are co-dependent. Experience can only offer us what is observable, however, it cannot enlighten us to the nature of such things in
He asserts that nature is a “materialiter”, meaning that it is the sum total of all objects of experience. All from which we can derive knowledge has an empirical basis in nature and is definable in terms of the law of nature. Again, he clarifies that we are not concerning this argument with the things, or objects themselves, but rather, with things as objects of what may be a future experience in the total sum of things known as nature. This brings the discussion to a much more comprehensible line of questioning, how is it possible in general to cognise a priori the necessary conformity to law of things as objects of experience? In other words, how can we deduct a concept that must be applicable to law as an object of empirical