ARE MORAL VALUES OBJECTIVE?
Are Moral Values Objective?
“The Subjectivity of Values”, chapter 1 of John Leslie Mackie’s “Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong”, addresses the question: are moral values objective? Mackie opens with the simple statement that there are no objective values, a standpoint to which he gives the name moral scepticism. He goes on to clarify what he means by objective values, and distinguishing his moral scepticism from similar views. And finally Mackie presents the arguments in support of moral scepticism, in his error theory and the so called arguments from rationality and queerness.
To justify why it is important to address the question of whether moral values are objective, Mackie quotes three possible reactions to that very question: some may see it as an attack on morality and all that we value as humans, others that it is a question too obvious or trivial to justify exploring, or actually that it is just an empty question where no issue is raised at all. It is, according to Mackie, by the very fact these multiple reactions can be raised, reason in itself for the question to be explored further.
Moral Scepticism
What it is, and what it isn’t
Objective values do not exist, that is the thesis Mackie argues. And by values, not only is he referring to familiar moral values such as the moral good, rightness and wrongness, but also non-moral values such as aesthetics. He is careful to outline exactly what is meant by moral scepticism, where he is not concerned with first-order views on morality, first-order being views about what we ought to do morally, e.g. “torture is bad”. The 2nd order view which Mackie is concerned with and believes does not exist, refers to the nature of morality itself, whether it is part of the fabric of our universe, and how it relates to us. First and second order views are completely independent, and one can hold that second order views are false and still believe that first order views are true, and vice versa.
This does not mean to
“The Subjectivity of Values”, chapter 1 of John Leslie Mackie’s “Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong”, addresses the question: are moral values objective? Mackie opens with the simple statement that there are no objective values, a standpoint to which he gives the name moral scepticism. He goes on to clarify what he means by objective values, and distinguishing his moral scepticism from similar views. And finally Mackie presents the arguments in support of moral scepticism, in his error theory and the so called arguments from rationality and queerness.
To justify why it is important to address the question of whether moral values are objective, Mackie quotes three possible reactions to that very question: some may see it as an attack on morality and all that we value as humans, others that it is a question too obvious or trivial to justify exploring, or actually that it is just an empty question where no issue is raised at all. It is, according to Mackie, by the very fact these multiple reactions can be raised, reason in itself for the question to be explored further.
Moral Scepticism
What it is, and what it isn’t
Objective values do not exist, that is the thesis Mackie argues. And by values, not only is he referring to familiar moral values such as the moral good, rightness and wrongness, but also non-moral values such as aesthetics. He is careful to outline exactly what is meant by moral scepticism, where he is not concerned with first-order views on morality, first-order being views about what we ought to do morally, e.g. “torture is bad”. The 2nd order view which Mackie is concerned with and believes does not exist, refers to the nature of morality itself, whether it is part of the fabric of our universe, and how it relates to us. First and second order views are completely independent, and one can hold that second order views are false and still believe that first order views are true, and vice versa.
This does not mean to