The Subjectivity Of Values, By Stevenson, And J. L. Mackie

Contemporary philosophers such as, G.E. Moore, C.L. Stevenson, and J.L. Mackie, all have theories that develop different views concerning the status of moral judgments and the existence of moral facts. Moore, in his, Subject Matter of Ethics, argued that moral facts do exist and can be true or false but must be indescribable. Stevenson, in his, The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms, disagreed with Moore and said that moral judgements can’t be true or false they simply can inspire certain feelings of approval or disapproval in humans. Mackie, in his, The Subjectivity of Values, would disagree with both and say that there are no moral facts and that all moral judgments are simply wrong. It seems to be the case, on soundness alone, that Moore has
the best and most sound argument pertaining to the existence of moral facts.
Moore thought that moral judgments could be true or false and there are properties that can make them true. He can be shown showing how a ethical judgement can be false here, “bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb He can be shown here asserting, “True ethical judgments, of the two kinds last dealt with , may indeed be made by those who don’t know the answer to this question as well by those who do.” He can clearly be assumed to mean that he believes that moral statements can be true or false because he states that people may come to realize true moral judgments accidentally. He states, however, that what makes moral statements true is the notion of how to define good or rather what good is. Moore discusses the idea that good is a complex whole and that good does not exist at all. He thinks that any definition given for good, can be asked whether that definition that is given is good or not. He determines that good has be something other than any of these definitions. He then defines good as, something indescribable and simple. He can be observed stating that here, “My point is that good is a simple notion just as yellow is a simple motion; that, just as you cannot by any manner of means explain to anyone who does not already know it, what yellow is, so you cannot explain what good is.” Moore, then, asserts that good definitely exists because, he affirms, “When any person asks a question about what ought to be the case, they have a clear, unique object in their mind which is in fact good itself.” Good, as Moore believes, is a property to be had and that property can’t be explained because the term good is simple. He further proves his point that the good is something that exist and that it is moral judgements can be true when he defines the counter position to himself. Moore states that if its not simple it is either something complex and complete about correct analysis which may be disagreed with or it good means nothing at all. Both of which he does not think to be the case.nnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnneeds to be stronger when are moral judgments wrong?
One problem that Moore’s theory has is with the motivational force behind the word good. Moore argues that conduct is what good is associated with; he can be seen saying this here, “….all of them are concerned with the question of conduct….what in the conduct of us, human beings, is good, and what is bad, and what is right, and what is wrong.” He sets out to state that when humans talk about what is good, they talk about what actions are good; yet in his definitions of good he never once says that they have a motivational force to push humans to act. It seems that if good is concerned with action, then generally, a good thing would push humans to either want that good thing or motivate them in some way to peruse the supposed good thing. In total he fails to account for the motivational or emotive force behind good or bad.
Moore might respond to this objection by saying that it could be the case that good implies an intrinsic quality of motivation towards action but he most likely would argue there is no need to prove this to be the case. He would respond this way because he felt that generally humans don’t imagine good things without having some attitude of will towards it.
Stevenson, unlike Moore, thought that ethical judgments can’t be true or false just give off an attempt to bring up a feeling of approval or disapproval towards that action.
To understand why Stevenson thinks this it must be stated how he defines good. Stevenson first thinks in order for something to be good it must fit a certain “vital” set of criteria. He lays out three criteria that good must fulfil and that is to, “be able to disagree intelligently about whether something is good. Goodness must have, so to speak, a magnetism and it must not be discoverable solely through the scientific method.” He feels that all previous interest theories fail to satisfy these three rationally deduced principals. Stevenson’s attempt to satisfy these three criteria for good is that ethical statements aren’t trying to indicate facts but to create influences. He can be interpreted to mean that the purpose of ethical statements is to change or intensify people’s feelings or sentiments, he calls this the emotive value of words. . He states that clearly here, “When you tell a man that he oughtn’t steal, your object isn’t merely to let him know that most, or some, people disapprove of stealing you are attempting rather to get him to disapprove of it.” He firmly asserts that ethical judgements are mere attempts at swaying people’s feelings about actions or rather getting them to realize the emotive feelings that you have. Stevenson argues that, “….In leaving out the emotive meaning of words, (interest theories) give the impression that ethical judgments are used descriptively only, and of course when judgments are used descriptively only; the only disagreement can arise are disagreements in belief specifically beliefs in interest not about interest.” He then asserts that no other disagreement necessarily exist. He can be interpreted to mean that ethical statements are not wrong or right but merely disagreements about interest which is solved by whichever party is more persuasive in
conveying their sentiments. Stevenson mentions two people arguing about which is better to go to, a symphony, or a movie. The resolution of the story ends with whomever is most persuasive or both party simply disagreeing and going their separate ways.
One major problem that comes from this argument is, that someone can have something tragic has happen to them, say a car accident where a drunk driver killed someone that person cared about, and now they have a yay attitude towards murder if it’s aimed at that person who killed the love one. One could mention all sorts of rational statements in attempt to make that person feel that murder is wrong and how wrong that person feels towards murder but the original person, who had their family member killed by the driver, can still maintain that they still have a feeling of approval towards murdering that person and their judgement can’t be officially wrong.
Stevenson may have an objection to say that a belief in interest may allow all sorts of people to disagree with that person and try to get others to think or feel, rather, that the person, who thinks murder is good, is a bad person for his belief. He would have to bite the bullet, however, when it comes to the person who feels murder is right, that his or hers sentiment cannot be wrong by definition.
Mackie, in his, The Subjectivity of Values, argued for a moral skepticism by saying that there are no moral facts and that all moral judgments are simply wrong. In order to understand why he believes this it must be established what his theory is. Mackie claims his theory is an error theory concerning objective morality. Mackie argues that moral judgments “assume moral objectivity, which is itself wrong.” Mackie argues that moral objectivity must have two things in order to exist: intrinsic reason-giving power, and the ability to categorically motivate humans to act. Mackie thinks that moral values can’t have these properties, and thus cannot exist. He proves, in his argument from relativity, that moral objectivity doesn’t have intrinsic reason giving power because morality is determined at a subject level. Mackie quotes the differing cultural opinions pertaining to moral norms and states that the disagreements are being caused by differing ways of life, instead of opposing views of objective morals. He then argues against that moral judgements can’t motivate humans to act in his argument from queerness. Which states that, “If there were objective values, then, they would be entities, or qualities, or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe….if we were aware of them it would have to be by some special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing anything else.” According to Mackie there has been no proper account for any of these faculties because they simply don’t exist. To sum up Mackie says that moral judgments don’t follow his argument from queerness nor his argument from relativity and therefore are wrong.