Aristotle's Interpretation Of Ethical Virtues Analysis

Ruchi Ahuja
IDS 385W
Professor Jeremy Bell

Aristotle’s Interpretation of Ethical Virtues
“An ethical virtue is a habit, disposed towards action, by deliberate choice, being at the mean relative to us, and defined by reason and as a prudent man would define it” (The Nicomachean Ethics, Book Beta, 1107a). Book Beta of The Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle revolves around the central concept of virtue, in particular, ethical virtue. An ethical virtue is comprised of several components, the first of which is habit. He believes that ethical virtues are acquired by habituation; they can neither be taught, nor are they innate or existent by nature. For example, we have the ability to see because we possess the power of vision (sensation); on the other
hand, we are incapable of being just (virtue) unless we practice just deeds until performing them becomes a habit. Unlike sensations – which are innate powers that are utilized after we come to possess them – ethical virtues are acquired as a result of practice. For instance, the only way to become a builder or a lyre-player is to practice building and playing the lyre respectively. An individual may possess the talent for these activities, but he/she cannot possibly be proficient at them without continual practice. Initially, virtuous deeds/actions are the result of conscious decision-making, but by performing them recurrently, they transform into good habits and become a part of the individual’s personality. Once these habits have been formed, he/she does not have to volitionally make an effort to do good deeds, it is now an involuntary occurrence. The attainment of ethical virtues by habituation can thus be explained in the form of a sequence – repeatedly performing good actions inevitably causes the development of good habits, which further result in the formation of our virtues. It is only after the complete development of these good habits that one can be called a good person. This further leads to the claim that virtues are habits, which Aristotle arrives at by the process of elimination.
In an attempt to define what a virtue is Aristotle states that a virtue could be one of three possible things – a feeling, a power or a habit. Since we are judged on the basis of our virtues and not our feelings, feelings are the first to be ruled out. Moreover, feelings occur unintentionally, whereas a virtue develops as a result of performing certain actions, which are undoubtedly intentional. Thus, virtues cannot be feelings. Next, he considers the possibility of virtues being a power. A power is the capability of feeling, and is possessed by nature. This is instantaneously ruled out as well since it has been established that virtues do not occur by nature, and because one cannot be judged on the basis of a capability. Thus, it is fair to arrive at the conclusion that virtues are habits. In addition, to further explain the concept of a virtue, Aristotle states, “every virtue (a) makes that of which it is the virtue be well disposed and (b) makes it perform its function well” (The Nicomachean Ethics, Book Beta, 1106a). For instance, the virtue of an eye is that it makes the eye good, and makes the eye perform its function, sight, well. Similarly, the virtue of a human being is an acquired habit that makes him ethical and good.
Further, Aristotle speaks of yet another characteristic of an ethical virtue – “I am speaking here of ethical virtue, for it is this which is concerned with feelings and actions, in which there is excess, deficiency, and moderation” (The Nicomachean Ethics, Book Beta, 1106b).
He claims that all ethical virtues are destroyed by excesses and deficiencies, and are preserved by moderation or the mean. To comprehend this concept, we must first understand the two kinds of means - objective and subjective means. Objectively, the mean of the numbers two and ten is six, and that is a universally accepted fact. Thus, the former type of mean – objective mean - is standard and independent of situational and personal differences. However, if an individual is speaking of a relatively distinctive subject such as the moderate quantity of food that he/she can consume, there exist several moderate amounts due to individual variations among people. The latter kind – subjective mean – is what Aristotle is concerned with when speaking of ethical virtues. For example, temperance and bravery are ethical virtues that can lucidly explain this concept. One who is incapable of facing any adverse situation is deemed to be a coward (deficiency), whereas one who mindlessly faces all dangers is labeled rash (excess). However, the mean between these two extremes, bravery, is an esteemed ethical virtue. Similarly, one who gives into the temptation of all pleasures becomes intemperate, but one who abstains
from all of them becomes insensible. Thus, we can see how ethical virtues such as temperance and bravery are destroyed by the extremes, and preserved by the mean. It is almost impossible to set in stone an acceptable manner of conduct due to the prevalence of innumerous situational and individual differences. Thus, Aristotle prefers to speak sketchily and have general fundamentals that enable myriad individuals in varying situations to act virtuously.
Since the procurement of virtues such as temperance and bravery depends on actions, it is imperative to discuss what influences them.
In Book Beta, Aristotle states, “Again, since virtues are concerned with actions and passions, and since every action and every passion is accompanied by pleasure or pain, then for this reason too, virtues would be concerned with pleasures and pain” (The Nicomachean Ethics, Book Beta, 1104b). In other words, since pleasures and pains influence our actions, and actions lead to the formation of virtues (via habituation), pleasures and pains indirectly shape our virtues. According to Aristotle, we are often enticed by temptation into performing pleasurable activities that are bad for us, and we refrain from doing good for the sake of avoiding pain. These very pleasures and pains are indicative of our habits. “A habit becomes bad because of pleasures and pains, that is, by pursuing or avoiding pleasures or pains either when one should not, or at a time when he should not, or in the manner in which he should not, or in some other way contrary to that specified by [right] reason” (The Nicomachean Ethics, Book Beta, 1104b). As mentioned, it is crucial to guard against pleasures and pains. In addition to guarding against them, becoming truly virtuous involves molding oneself so that one takes pleasure in acting virtuously and feels pain while behaving viciously because the latter is inconsistent with one’s character. The concept of ethics involves
feeling pleasure and pain for the right reasons. Since we are innately inclined to gravitate towards pleasure and stray away form pain, acquiring this balance can be a highly challenging task. Therefore, it is evident that becoming truly ethically virtuous is a difficult job. Any individual can commit a good deed accidentally, or for the sake of appearing virtuous, however one does not truly possess the virtue unless the deed is done for the right person, the right intention, and in the right fashion.

Works Cited
Aristotle, H. Rackham. The Nicomachean Ethics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1934. Print.