Army Leader Development Model Paper
The United States (U.S.) Army is one of the best leadership institutes in the world. This paper seeks to analyze the effective practices and cornerstone doctrine that allows the Army to produce effective leaders across the entire duration of a soldier’s career. The analysis begins with a review of the Air Force’s traditional, more centralized leadership approach providing contrast with the Army’s decentralized approach called “Mission Command.” An explanation of Mission Command and review of behavioral traits associated with the organizational culture provides insight into why the Army’s approach is superior for its purposes. Finally, the paper reviews the Army Leader Development Model, identifies shortfalls of the model, and makes recommendations
…show more content…
to improve the effectiveness of leadership development.
Research has demonstrated the benefits and effectiveness of centralized authority and vertical leadership within different organizations in the public sector (Barkow, 2011).
Vertical leadership provides a clear structure that is visible and predictable. Employees and management acknowledge the chain of command; they recognize the hierarchy and reporting relationships within the organization. Vertical operative organizations require considerable effort to maintain power and balance. The more levels in the hierarchy, the more decision-making authority rests at the top of the organization. The flatter an organization, the lower the participation of management in the decision-making process (Morel, 2011).
Supplementary research shows that the utilization of centralized control necessitates the elimination of the intermediate levels of hierarchy to expedite the transfer of messages directly from top managers to nonsupervisory employees. In other words, increasing the vertical division of labor requires centralization of authority and its distribution throughout an organization (Meyer, …show more content…
1968). Given the high level of lethality of its assets and the significant impact of employing its assets, the Air Force has adopted a more centralized leadership doctrine that is authoritative but suitably adaptable and descriptive (Michael, 2001). Also, Air Force units generally operate in concert with other Department of Defense (DoD) elements, which requires high-level of coordination and synchronization. The centralization of authority and information systems allows senior leaders to make comprehensive decisions and select the best possible course of action to accomplish the mission (United States Air Force, 2012).Thus, vertical leadership is an effective structure for the Air Force. The Air Force may require centralized authority because of the sophisticated technology and high lethality of its systems, but this reduces the developmental opportunities for junior leaders. Thirtle (2002) found that the Air Force develops its leaders through a doctrine, which instills organizational values and develops skills that allow junior leaders to function within its centralized authority construct. For example, Thirtle (2002) found that the Air Force promotes leadership processes and methods such as dispute resolution, collaboration, and team efficiency that allow for better staff coordination and de-confliction (p. 11). Also, Mastroianni (2005) found that the Air Force seeks to maintain their organizational culture and a concentration on technology to preserve the Air Force as a unique entity among the other military branches. Self-assurance in the intellectual authority of the Air Force coincides with what appears to be disapproval of open intellectual dissertation and innovation.
The Army and the Air Force are vertical leadership structures, but the Army has adopted a more decentralized authority construct that allows for distributed leadership. The reasons for this adoption are rooted in history. Throughout the ages, military commanders have always had the same goal: Defeat the adversary through effective maneuvering of formations and application of overwhelming force at an advantageous time and place. Yet, no matter how detailed and thorough a senior commander makes their plans, unforeseen events or a sudden change in circumstances at the forward edge of battle can reduce or eliminate the effectiveness of a senior commander’s plan. As Prussian Field Marshal Helmuth Von Moltke wrote, “No plan of operations extends with any certainty beyond the first contact with the main hostile force” (Moltke, & Hughes, 1993, p. 92). Over the course of the 18th and 19th centuries, various military leaders sought to develop a concept that provided subordinate commanders with more flexibility to respond to changes on the battlefield, yet accomplish the original intention (or purpose) for conducting an operation. Based on lessons from the Napoleonic Wars, the Prussian Empire developed what they termed “mission-type doctrine” (Storr, 2003). Moltke commented in his memoirs about this doctrinal shift that:
“A favorable situation will never be exploited if commanders wait for orders. The highest commander and the youngest soldier must be conscious of the fact that omission and inactivity are worse than resorting to the wrong expedient” (Dupuy, 1977, p. 166).
At its core, this theory empowers subordinate leaders and ensures a wide understanding of the mission across the formation. The wartime successes of the Prussian Empire (and later Germany) proved the effectiveness of this approach.
At the beginning of the 21st Century, the U.S. Army transformed from a divisional structure to a brigade structure, which placed a larger emphasis on small unit tactics, speed, and tenacity (Macgregor, 2003). U.S. Army soldiers have always had a reputation for having initiative and being innovative in battle, but these qualities are increasingly important in modern conflicts. Thus, the U.S. Army sought to formally encourage this type of leadership behavior by adopting the doctrine of “Mission Command,” which is heavily based on the Prussian “Mission-Type Doctrine” (Storr, 2003). Under this construct, senior Army commanders provide the overarching intention to conducting operations (intent), defining successful results of operations (end state), and general guidance to help formulate planning at lower echelons. This allows junior leaders to develop their own plans to conduct the mission, to modify those plans as conditions on the ground change, or make rapid decisions to capitalize on unforeseen opportunities. This approach provides junior leaders with the freedom and flexibility to determine the best way to accomplish the senior commander’s vision.
Considering the purpose of the Army and the challenging situations that it faces in ground combat reveal that the Mission Command construct and decentralized authority is a superior approach to the centralized approach of the Air Force. The success of this approach is not limited to the military since Mission Command closely resembles distributed leadership theory. Bolden (2011) found that public sector organizations using distributed leadership demonstrated a higher collective and universal understanding of the organization and its processes. Additionally, he argued that the comprehensive or self-governing aspect of distributive leadership result in an effective balance among the individual, collective and situational aspects of the leadership style. Anderson & Brown (2010) also found that distributed leadership is an effective approach within public organizations. Specifically, they observed that distributed leadership allowed steeper hierarchies to expedite improved group functioning and coordination. These studies show the tremendous value of informing and empowering subordinate leaders so that they can function autonomously with flexibility. This is critically important to tactical operations in the Army and explains why the Army adopted Mission Command.
Behavioral Traits and Organizational Success
Indoctrination into the Army begins immediately for new recruits and officers.
One of the most important principles that new personnel learns at their initial entry training is that they must be prepared to take charge and accomplish the mission should the need arise for any number of reasons. In this way, leadership can appear to be naturally occurring, but this behavior is the result of the immediate indoctrination that encourages behaving in this manner. This sets an important foundation for implementing Mission Command.
Beyond initial entry training, the Army published a supporting doctrine that focuses on developing an organizational culture that influences behavior to maximize Mission Command. Specifically, Army Field Manual (FM) 6-22 Army Leadership focuses on what makes the Army a “profession” versus an institution as well as the types of behaviors that the Army expects of leaders, required leader traits and skills, and how to develop Army organizations and others. The pillars of the Army profession are trust, military expertise, honorable service, esprit de corps, and stewardship (The Army Profession,
2013).
Trust is the primary foundation for Mission Command. Studies show that trust enables individuals to rely on each other and develop consistency within different environments (Six, 2007). In the Army, a commander must feel a sense of trust in his or her subordinates when providing them a sense of autonomy, but the subordinates must also trust their superior’s judgment and loyalty to then. FM 6-22 Army Leadership provides details of the people-oriented behaviors that leaders must exhibit to build trust. Self-development, specifically developing self-awareness and empathy, serves as the foundational element to establish trust. Building on this foundation, the four people-oriented behaviors that support successful leadership in the Army are setting conditions, providing feedback, enhancing learning, and creating opportunities (United States, 2015). These tasks bolster interpersonal relationships and enable other key behaviors.
Army leaders also develop and demonstrate task-oriented behaviors that support the Mission Command doctrine and successful leadership. For example, leaders regularly delegate tasks and assign missions to subordinate officers without dictating exactly how their subordinates perform the tasks. Instead, leaders use standard operating procedures (SOPs) as guidelines for routine activities to ensure consistency and a degree of standardization that helps subordinates understand performance requirements. Additionally, Army leaders use processes such as “After-Action Reviews” (AARs) to assess the quality of communication amongst leaders, performance levels of tasks, and ways to improve upon those tasks. This allows for leader development, but also increased performance levels in critical tasks associated with the unit’s mission. At the executive level, Army leaders demonstrate organizational-oriented behaviors by communicating their vision and command philosophy to the unit. This provides a general sense of direction for the unit and synchronizes all activity towards the same set of goals. The leader’s behavior provides the “commander’s intent” portion of the Mission Command doctrine and enables subordinate leaders to determine the best means to accomplish a mission. Army leaders also take the time to develop their staff by coaching during exercises and operations, mentoring individually, and rewarding high performance that serves as a model for others to follow.
Leader Development Shortfalls and Improvement
The Army’s culture and doctrinal publications support the Mission Command construct, but it has not fully institutionalized all aspects leader development. Instead, the Army Leader Development Model consists of three developmental domains: institutional, operational, and self-development (United States, 2015). These three domains cover the various methods that leaders can develop their skills and understanding throughout their career. The operational domain refers to the responsibility that the Army places unit leaders to establish to supplement the institutional and self-development domains of leader development. The Army does so with the assumption that mid-grade and senior leaders remain highly knowledgeable of doctrine through self-development and demonstrating the relationship-, task-, and organizational behaviors that reinforce Mission Command. In theory, commanders should establish and manage local leader development programs in their units to ensure that their subordinate leaders understand critical leadership fundamentals and skills that support Mission Command. Paired with institutional learning and self-development, junior leaders effectively grow and mature into greatness.
Unfortunately, the flaw in this approach is a variance of development considering the incredible number of individuals involved in this process and a lack of reinforcing mechanisms. In cases where commanders fail to establish and manage a development program in the unit, the burden of responsibility falls on junior leaders to learn from observation, on-the-job training, and self-development. A study by Harman, Tremble, & Goodwin (1993) on the effectiveness of the Army’s leadership development practices remains relevant today. Senior leaders from the study commented that their leader development program generally consists of teaching occasional leadership classes and allowing junior leaders to prepare briefings. However, the surveyed leaders confirmed that they do not take the time to create formal leadership development plans until a junior leader has failed. Junior leaders agreed that they did not receive a planned professional development program. Instead, they felt that they learned the most leadership from experience in specialized units, self-study and attending formal military education courses. Any individual development generally occurs during the formal evaluation process. This means that a junior leader has two opportunities to receive deliberate development feedback: at the beginning of the evaluation process and at the end while reviewing their evaluation report. Senior leaders generally offer advice and guidance far too late for a junior leader to implement that feedback effectively for demonstrated improvement for consideration into the evaluation. As part of the institution domain of learning, the Army conducts its formal leadership development and indoctrination through professional military education (PME) conducted at certain career milestones. Although unit development programs may vary, these PME courses are standardized and uniform in their application to ensure a baseline level of competency. These courses generally focus on teaching leadership and doctrinal theory, rather than application. In accordance with the Army Leader Development Model, military education developers expect leaders to learn the application aspect of leadership theory during their “operational” experiences – or within their units. However, the lack of consistency within the operational domain reveals a breakdown in the learning model, which influences the effectiveness of Mission Command doctrine at the unit level.
to improve the effectiveness of leadership development.
Research has demonstrated the benefits and effectiveness of centralized authority and vertical leadership within different organizations in the public sector (Barkow, 2011).
Vertical leadership provides a clear structure that is visible and predictable. Employees and management acknowledge the chain of command; they recognize the hierarchy and reporting relationships within the organization. Vertical operative organizations require considerable effort to maintain power and balance. The more levels in the hierarchy, the more decision-making authority rests at the top of the organization. The flatter an organization, the lower the participation of management in the decision-making process (Morel, 2011).
Supplementary research shows that the utilization of centralized control necessitates the elimination of the intermediate levels of hierarchy to expedite the transfer of messages directly from top managers to nonsupervisory employees. In other words, increasing the vertical division of labor requires centralization of authority and its distribution throughout an organization (Meyer, …show more content…
1968). Given the high level of lethality of its assets and the significant impact of employing its assets, the Air Force has adopted a more centralized leadership doctrine that is authoritative but suitably adaptable and descriptive (Michael, 2001). Also, Air Force units generally operate in concert with other Department of Defense (DoD) elements, which requires high-level of coordination and synchronization. The centralization of authority and information systems allows senior leaders to make comprehensive decisions and select the best possible course of action to accomplish the mission (United States Air Force, 2012).Thus, vertical leadership is an effective structure for the Air Force. The Air Force may require centralized authority because of the sophisticated technology and high lethality of its systems, but this reduces the developmental opportunities for junior leaders. Thirtle (2002) found that the Air Force develops its leaders through a doctrine, which instills organizational values and develops skills that allow junior leaders to function within its centralized authority construct. For example, Thirtle (2002) found that the Air Force promotes leadership processes and methods such as dispute resolution, collaboration, and team efficiency that allow for better staff coordination and de-confliction (p. 11). Also, Mastroianni (2005) found that the Air Force seeks to maintain their organizational culture and a concentration on technology to preserve the Air Force as a unique entity among the other military branches. Self-assurance in the intellectual authority of the Air Force coincides with what appears to be disapproval of open intellectual dissertation and innovation.
The Army and the Air Force are vertical leadership structures, but the Army has adopted a more decentralized authority construct that allows for distributed leadership. The reasons for this adoption are rooted in history. Throughout the ages, military commanders have always had the same goal: Defeat the adversary through effective maneuvering of formations and application of overwhelming force at an advantageous time and place. Yet, no matter how detailed and thorough a senior commander makes their plans, unforeseen events or a sudden change in circumstances at the forward edge of battle can reduce or eliminate the effectiveness of a senior commander’s plan. As Prussian Field Marshal Helmuth Von Moltke wrote, “No plan of operations extends with any certainty beyond the first contact with the main hostile force” (Moltke, & Hughes, 1993, p. 92). Over the course of the 18th and 19th centuries, various military leaders sought to develop a concept that provided subordinate commanders with more flexibility to respond to changes on the battlefield, yet accomplish the original intention (or purpose) for conducting an operation. Based on lessons from the Napoleonic Wars, the Prussian Empire developed what they termed “mission-type doctrine” (Storr, 2003). Moltke commented in his memoirs about this doctrinal shift that:
“A favorable situation will never be exploited if commanders wait for orders. The highest commander and the youngest soldier must be conscious of the fact that omission and inactivity are worse than resorting to the wrong expedient” (Dupuy, 1977, p. 166).
At its core, this theory empowers subordinate leaders and ensures a wide understanding of the mission across the formation. The wartime successes of the Prussian Empire (and later Germany) proved the effectiveness of this approach.
At the beginning of the 21st Century, the U.S. Army transformed from a divisional structure to a brigade structure, which placed a larger emphasis on small unit tactics, speed, and tenacity (Macgregor, 2003). U.S. Army soldiers have always had a reputation for having initiative and being innovative in battle, but these qualities are increasingly important in modern conflicts. Thus, the U.S. Army sought to formally encourage this type of leadership behavior by adopting the doctrine of “Mission Command,” which is heavily based on the Prussian “Mission-Type Doctrine” (Storr, 2003). Under this construct, senior Army commanders provide the overarching intention to conducting operations (intent), defining successful results of operations (end state), and general guidance to help formulate planning at lower echelons. This allows junior leaders to develop their own plans to conduct the mission, to modify those plans as conditions on the ground change, or make rapid decisions to capitalize on unforeseen opportunities. This approach provides junior leaders with the freedom and flexibility to determine the best way to accomplish the senior commander’s vision.
Considering the purpose of the Army and the challenging situations that it faces in ground combat reveal that the Mission Command construct and decentralized authority is a superior approach to the centralized approach of the Air Force. The success of this approach is not limited to the military since Mission Command closely resembles distributed leadership theory. Bolden (2011) found that public sector organizations using distributed leadership demonstrated a higher collective and universal understanding of the organization and its processes. Additionally, he argued that the comprehensive or self-governing aspect of distributive leadership result in an effective balance among the individual, collective and situational aspects of the leadership style. Anderson & Brown (2010) also found that distributed leadership is an effective approach within public organizations. Specifically, they observed that distributed leadership allowed steeper hierarchies to expedite improved group functioning and coordination. These studies show the tremendous value of informing and empowering subordinate leaders so that they can function autonomously with flexibility. This is critically important to tactical operations in the Army and explains why the Army adopted Mission Command.
Behavioral Traits and Organizational Success
Indoctrination into the Army begins immediately for new recruits and officers.
One of the most important principles that new personnel learns at their initial entry training is that they must be prepared to take charge and accomplish the mission should the need arise for any number of reasons. In this way, leadership can appear to be naturally occurring, but this behavior is the result of the immediate indoctrination that encourages behaving in this manner. This sets an important foundation for implementing Mission Command.
Beyond initial entry training, the Army published a supporting doctrine that focuses on developing an organizational culture that influences behavior to maximize Mission Command. Specifically, Army Field Manual (FM) 6-22 Army Leadership focuses on what makes the Army a “profession” versus an institution as well as the types of behaviors that the Army expects of leaders, required leader traits and skills, and how to develop Army organizations and others. The pillars of the Army profession are trust, military expertise, honorable service, esprit de corps, and stewardship (The Army Profession,
2013).
Trust is the primary foundation for Mission Command. Studies show that trust enables individuals to rely on each other and develop consistency within different environments (Six, 2007). In the Army, a commander must feel a sense of trust in his or her subordinates when providing them a sense of autonomy, but the subordinates must also trust their superior’s judgment and loyalty to then. FM 6-22 Army Leadership provides details of the people-oriented behaviors that leaders must exhibit to build trust. Self-development, specifically developing self-awareness and empathy, serves as the foundational element to establish trust. Building on this foundation, the four people-oriented behaviors that support successful leadership in the Army are setting conditions, providing feedback, enhancing learning, and creating opportunities (United States, 2015). These tasks bolster interpersonal relationships and enable other key behaviors.
Army leaders also develop and demonstrate task-oriented behaviors that support the Mission Command doctrine and successful leadership. For example, leaders regularly delegate tasks and assign missions to subordinate officers without dictating exactly how their subordinates perform the tasks. Instead, leaders use standard operating procedures (SOPs) as guidelines for routine activities to ensure consistency and a degree of standardization that helps subordinates understand performance requirements. Additionally, Army leaders use processes such as “After-Action Reviews” (AARs) to assess the quality of communication amongst leaders, performance levels of tasks, and ways to improve upon those tasks. This allows for leader development, but also increased performance levels in critical tasks associated with the unit’s mission. At the executive level, Army leaders demonstrate organizational-oriented behaviors by communicating their vision and command philosophy to the unit. This provides a general sense of direction for the unit and synchronizes all activity towards the same set of goals. The leader’s behavior provides the “commander’s intent” portion of the Mission Command doctrine and enables subordinate leaders to determine the best means to accomplish a mission. Army leaders also take the time to develop their staff by coaching during exercises and operations, mentoring individually, and rewarding high performance that serves as a model for others to follow.
Leader Development Shortfalls and Improvement
The Army’s culture and doctrinal publications support the Mission Command construct, but it has not fully institutionalized all aspects leader development. Instead, the Army Leader Development Model consists of three developmental domains: institutional, operational, and self-development (United States, 2015). These three domains cover the various methods that leaders can develop their skills and understanding throughout their career. The operational domain refers to the responsibility that the Army places unit leaders to establish to supplement the institutional and self-development domains of leader development. The Army does so with the assumption that mid-grade and senior leaders remain highly knowledgeable of doctrine through self-development and demonstrating the relationship-, task-, and organizational behaviors that reinforce Mission Command. In theory, commanders should establish and manage local leader development programs in their units to ensure that their subordinate leaders understand critical leadership fundamentals and skills that support Mission Command. Paired with institutional learning and self-development, junior leaders effectively grow and mature into greatness.
Unfortunately, the flaw in this approach is a variance of development considering the incredible number of individuals involved in this process and a lack of reinforcing mechanisms. In cases where commanders fail to establish and manage a development program in the unit, the burden of responsibility falls on junior leaders to learn from observation, on-the-job training, and self-development. A study by Harman, Tremble, & Goodwin (1993) on the effectiveness of the Army’s leadership development practices remains relevant today. Senior leaders from the study commented that their leader development program generally consists of teaching occasional leadership classes and allowing junior leaders to prepare briefings. However, the surveyed leaders confirmed that they do not take the time to create formal leadership development plans until a junior leader has failed. Junior leaders agreed that they did not receive a planned professional development program. Instead, they felt that they learned the most leadership from experience in specialized units, self-study and attending formal military education courses. Any individual development generally occurs during the formal evaluation process. This means that a junior leader has two opportunities to receive deliberate development feedback: at the beginning of the evaluation process and at the end while reviewing their evaluation report. Senior leaders generally offer advice and guidance far too late for a junior leader to implement that feedback effectively for demonstrated improvement for consideration into the evaluation. As part of the institution domain of learning, the Army conducts its formal leadership development and indoctrination through professional military education (PME) conducted at certain career milestones. Although unit development programs may vary, these PME courses are standardized and uniform in their application to ensure a baseline level of competency. These courses generally focus on teaching leadership and doctrinal theory, rather than application. In accordance with the Army Leader Development Model, military education developers expect leaders to learn the application aspect of leadership theory during their “operational” experiences – or within their units. However, the lack of consistency within the operational domain reveals a breakdown in the learning model, which influences the effectiveness of Mission Command doctrine at the unit level.