BAE Automated Systems (A): Denver International Airport Baggage-Handling System
Critical Factors
*A change in the project specifications after the freeze date was agreed up on in the contract. These changes created a domino effect of problems. This was in violation of the contract with BAE which stated there would be a number of freeze dates for mechanical design, software design, and permanent power.
*A lack of efficient and effective communication between the city, project management team, and consultants. This manifests itself in basic issues like vendors blocking roadways for other vendors, the city canceling orders for electrical filtering components that were critical path, and too many unilateral decision made because "no one was in charge".
*A late start with respect to deciding the type of technology to be used for the baggage handling system. BAE didn't even bid on the project because the scope and the timeline were not feasible. The city, under the guidance of Chief Airport Engineer Slinger arranged the deal that included penalty and time clauses for both the city and the vendor.
*The City of Denver did not listen to the requested and needed amount of time to actually construct the baggage handling system. The City had a deadline to meet and did not want to hear about any more delays. In spite of this, the vendors wrote contracts that attempted to cover their bases to ensure these deadlines would be met. In the end, extenuating circumstances conspired to prevent these dates from being met.
*BAE lost control of their project to the PMT that had no experience in airport construction, baggage handling system technologies, and the introduction of the new technologies. PMT forced BAE to modify their management structure and project approach to fit the PMT needs. BAE had a track record of success using their own management structures. This modification created confusion, inefficiency, and ultimately failure.
*2 major changes in personnel. The resignation of the head of the DIA project in May 1992 and the death of Chief Airport
*A change in the project specifications after the freeze date was agreed up on in the contract. These changes created a domino effect of problems. This was in violation of the contract with BAE which stated there would be a number of freeze dates for mechanical design, software design, and permanent power.
*A lack of efficient and effective communication between the city, project management team, and consultants. This manifests itself in basic issues like vendors blocking roadways for other vendors, the city canceling orders for electrical filtering components that were critical path, and too many unilateral decision made because "no one was in charge".
*A late start with respect to deciding the type of technology to be used for the baggage handling system. BAE didn't even bid on the project because the scope and the timeline were not feasible. The city, under the guidance of Chief Airport Engineer Slinger arranged the deal that included penalty and time clauses for both the city and the vendor.
*The City of Denver did not listen to the requested and needed amount of time to actually construct the baggage handling system. The City had a deadline to meet and did not want to hear about any more delays. In spite of this, the vendors wrote contracts that attempted to cover their bases to ensure these deadlines would be met. In the end, extenuating circumstances conspired to prevent these dates from being met.
*BAE lost control of their project to the PMT that had no experience in airport construction, baggage handling system technologies, and the introduction of the new technologies. PMT forced BAE to modify their management structure and project approach to fit the PMT needs. BAE had a track record of success using their own management structures. This modification created confusion, inefficiency, and ultimately failure.
*2 major changes in personnel. The resignation of the head of the DIA project in May 1992 and the death of Chief Airport