Characteristics Of Logical Conventionalism
“Not so fast!”, one might say. The sorts of Biological Conventions I described might well be necessary for Logical Conventionalism, but they do not entail it. In fact, we do not even have a story about how possibly Biological Conventions (i.e., biological rules for the assignment of meanings to logical idioms) can make Logical Conventionalism (i.e. a thesis about the truth-makers of logical sentences) true. Don’t we need a story of how could it be true, to conclude that the case against it is not settled yet?
Not really. Given that the focus of this paper was Quine’s influential case, showing that one of the premises of his argument was false should be enough for calling into question the pessimism of the field with regard to Logical Conventionalism.
It is true that the Biological Conventions I described are not sufficient to establish the truth of Logical Conventionalism. In fact, they are not different from Implicit nor Explicit Conventions on this regard. The candidate Conventions and Logical Conventionalism can come apart; none of them establishes the truth of the other. This is because Logical Conventionalism requires at least one sort of these Conventions to be the case, and none of the candidate Conventions is sufficient by …show more content…
For Logical Conventionalism to be true, a teleosemantic theory will have to render logical truths as dependent on biological conventions. What makes a teleosemantic account attractive for a Logical Conventionalist is that it permits biological conventions to establish the truth of logical sentences, even supposing those sentences fail to describe the structure of the world we live in. It is possible to have biological conventions instantiating Intuitionist Logic even if the structure of the world is that of Classical or Modal logic—provided that they make some difference on the fitness of the creatures that hold it, and that they are reproduced within a population due to that
Not really. Given that the focus of this paper was Quine’s influential case, showing that one of the premises of his argument was false should be enough for calling into question the pessimism of the field with regard to Logical Conventionalism.
It is true that the Biological Conventions I described are not sufficient to establish the truth of Logical Conventionalism. In fact, they are not different from Implicit nor Explicit Conventions on this regard. The candidate Conventions and Logical Conventionalism can come apart; none of them establishes the truth of the other. This is because Logical Conventionalism requires at least one sort of these Conventions to be the case, and none of the candidate Conventions is sufficient by …show more content…
For Logical Conventionalism to be true, a teleosemantic theory will have to render logical truths as dependent on biological conventions. What makes a teleosemantic account attractive for a Logical Conventionalist is that it permits biological conventions to establish the truth of logical sentences, even supposing those sentences fail to describe the structure of the world we live in. It is possible to have biological conventions instantiating Intuitionist Logic even if the structure of the world is that of Classical or Modal logic—provided that they make some difference on the fitness of the creatures that hold it, and that they are reproduced within a population due to that