Charles Goslin Research Paper
White Paper
HOTEL SECURITY
Duos Technologies, Inc.
HOTEL SECURITY
WHITE PAPER
BY
CHARLES GOSLIN
“Charles Goslin, Vice President of International Operations for Duos Technologies, Inc., is an international expert in security threat and risk assessment. He developed his extensive security experience as a veteran operations officer for 27 years with the Central Intelligence Agency. He is skilled in developing and executing programs targeting terrorism, espionage, weapons proliferation, and other select U.S. national security objective. He brings a unique, ground-level perspective to security challenges that can only come from a lifetime spent mitigating risk, in all its forms, while living and working abroad. His most recent …show more content…
Nearly a decade after the attacks of 9/11, adversaries are still widely assumed to come in two basic types: the casual, petty criminal/intruder, and the more serious professional intruder, or terrorist. With regard to the latter, the tactic most often anticipated by terrorists is infiltration of bad things: of the terrorist and a gun, the terrorist and an explosive (hidden on his person, or in/under a vehicle), or both. The extension of this logic is that detection and deterrence technology is focused on finding bad things at checkpoints. All too often, these checkpoints are Maginot Line Syndrome aggregated at the main entrance to a facility, more to make guests feel better than for real security. The back door of the hotel, service entrances, and loading docks are only lightly guarded, if at all. This is the Maginot Line Syndrome, all over again. Recognizing hardened security, the terrorists either blast their way through with automatic weapons and grenades, or elect a suicide attack with a massive bomb over infiltration and hostages. In their wake lie twisted and smoking bollards, barriers, fences, cameras, explosives detectors or portals, and – most unfortunate of all – dead guards. All technically good countermeasures, miscast in their design for a different set of circumstances, and different type of terrorist, in a more innocent era. Security countermeasures that are built into a traditional “security-in-depth” design, with a focus on bad things only perpetuate the illusion of good security. It does not take into account the changing tactics of terror today, and the human element. This brings us to the convergence of information technology and physical security design and
HOTEL SECURITY
Duos Technologies, Inc.
HOTEL SECURITY
WHITE PAPER
BY
CHARLES GOSLIN
“Charles Goslin, Vice President of International Operations for Duos Technologies, Inc., is an international expert in security threat and risk assessment. He developed his extensive security experience as a veteran operations officer for 27 years with the Central Intelligence Agency. He is skilled in developing and executing programs targeting terrorism, espionage, weapons proliferation, and other select U.S. national security objective. He brings a unique, ground-level perspective to security challenges that can only come from a lifetime spent mitigating risk, in all its forms, while living and working abroad. His most recent …show more content…
Nearly a decade after the attacks of 9/11, adversaries are still widely assumed to come in two basic types: the casual, petty criminal/intruder, and the more serious professional intruder, or terrorist. With regard to the latter, the tactic most often anticipated by terrorists is infiltration of bad things: of the terrorist and a gun, the terrorist and an explosive (hidden on his person, or in/under a vehicle), or both. The extension of this logic is that detection and deterrence technology is focused on finding bad things at checkpoints. All too often, these checkpoints are Maginot Line Syndrome aggregated at the main entrance to a facility, more to make guests feel better than for real security. The back door of the hotel, service entrances, and loading docks are only lightly guarded, if at all. This is the Maginot Line Syndrome, all over again. Recognizing hardened security, the terrorists either blast their way through with automatic weapons and grenades, or elect a suicide attack with a massive bomb over infiltration and hostages. In their wake lie twisted and smoking bollards, barriers, fences, cameras, explosives detectors or portals, and – most unfortunate of all – dead guards. All technically good countermeasures, miscast in their design for a different set of circumstances, and different type of terrorist, in a more innocent era. Security countermeasures that are built into a traditional “security-in-depth” design, with a focus on bad things only perpetuate the illusion of good security. It does not take into account the changing tactics of terror today, and the human element. This brings us to the convergence of information technology and physical security design and