Clausewitz And WWI
Did the Slavish Adherence to the Theories
Proposed by Clausewitz Cause the Prolonged the Bloody
Stalemate of World War One?
Clausewitz and World War I
The influence of various theories and concepts on the conduct World War I has generated a range of studies in an attempt to understand how and why World War I was fought. Specifically, Clausewitz’s theories on warfare have come under a considerable amount of scrutiny with regards to their influence on World War I. This scrutiny has led to the ascertation that the protracted and bloody stalemate of World War I was largely due to a stubborn reliance on Clausewitz’s theories. The question that this paper attempts to address is weather the cause of the bloody and protracted stalemate during World War I was a product of each side’s strict adherence to Clausewitz.
German Rejection of Clausewitz’s Theories Arguably Clausewitz’s theories on warfare were as applicable in the years leading up to and during World War I as they were during the early eighteen hundreds, however, this was not the view of all German military and political leaders prior to and during World War I.1 In 1916 German General Erich Ludendorff wrote regarding Germany’s new direction of warfare that “all theories of Clausewitz have to be thrown overboard”.2 Although some on the General Staff openly rejected Clausewitz in 1916, German military and political leadership had in practice done so as early as 1891 under General Alfred von Shlieffen. Shlieffen set in motion early on in his tenure as General Chief of Staff military preparations not only disconnected from Germany’s political objectives, but forced Germany into a dangerous political direction against its best interest.1 Not only did Shlieffen reject Clausewitz, but so did the newly appointed Kaiser Wilhelm II, who in 1890 dismissed Otto von Bismarck as German Chancellor, himself an astute student of Clausewitz’s theories.3 Under Germany’s new leadership, Clausewitz’s theory
Proposed by Clausewitz Cause the Prolonged the Bloody
Stalemate of World War One?
Clausewitz and World War I
The influence of various theories and concepts on the conduct World War I has generated a range of studies in an attempt to understand how and why World War I was fought. Specifically, Clausewitz’s theories on warfare have come under a considerable amount of scrutiny with regards to their influence on World War I. This scrutiny has led to the ascertation that the protracted and bloody stalemate of World War I was largely due to a stubborn reliance on Clausewitz’s theories. The question that this paper attempts to address is weather the cause of the bloody and protracted stalemate during World War I was a product of each side’s strict adherence to Clausewitz.
German Rejection of Clausewitz’s Theories Arguably Clausewitz’s theories on warfare were as applicable in the years leading up to and during World War I as they were during the early eighteen hundreds, however, this was not the view of all German military and political leaders prior to and during World War I.1 In 1916 German General Erich Ludendorff wrote regarding Germany’s new direction of warfare that “all theories of Clausewitz have to be thrown overboard”.2 Although some on the General Staff openly rejected Clausewitz in 1916, German military and political leadership had in practice done so as early as 1891 under General Alfred von Shlieffen. Shlieffen set in motion early on in his tenure as General Chief of Staff military preparations not only disconnected from Germany’s political objectives, but forced Germany into a dangerous political direction against its best interest.1 Not only did Shlieffen reject Clausewitz, but so did the newly appointed Kaiser Wilhelm II, who in 1890 dismissed Otto von Bismarck as German Chancellor, himself an astute student of Clausewitz’s theories.3 Under Germany’s new leadership, Clausewitz’s theory
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