Compare And Contrast Dennett On Intentionality And Brandom's
In this paper, I will compare and contrast Dennett's ideas on intentionality with Brandom's. Dennett believes that Brandom is missing a crucial piece of the picture by excluding evolutionary theory from his musings. Brandom, on the other hand, believes that he need not address evolutionary theory, as his project will not conflict with whatever scientists have to say about that story. In a nutshell, Brandom believes Dennett and himself to be taking on different questions; Dennett believes Brandom is missing something crucial. I argue that Brandom is right, and furthermore, that Dennett has missed part of the story Brandom is telling (because Brandom is not the clearest writer).
In his essay, Intentional Systems, Dennett introduces the concept …show more content…
of, well, intentional systems. He believes this concept proves useful in explaining and predicting the behavior of organisms in a distinctly normative manner. He compares it to other systems, such as behaviorism, and finds it to be superior. Lastly, he applies the aforementioned concept to the notion of beliefs.
The Stances
To start, Dennett considers how an observer can take a number of different stances towards an object that requires explanation.
For some phenomena, such as molecular bonding, one might take the physical stance. This stance considers the mere physical states, actions, and reactions of some event, e.g. the chemical processes underlying the fusion of hydrogen and oxygen. Sometimes, however, it might prove useful to take a different stance towards a phenomena (due either to complexity or the desire for satisfactory explanations. In these cases, one might adopt what Dennett terms the design stance.
This stance is appropriate when one believes that the design of some object can be determined. For example, one might prefer to take the design stance, rather than the physical stance, towards a watch. It is true that the physical stance could give an explanation, via description of the gears, smelting processes, and materials used in its construction, but the physical stance doesn't tell us what it is supposed to do. The design stance, on the other hand, is perfectly suited for this task. By taking the design stance, one can determine whether or not the object is functioning properly. The design of a watch is such that the watch ought to keep accurate time. In other words, it is appropriate to speak of the watch as functioning well or malfunctioning. In this sense, the design stance adopts normative properties which the physical stance does
not.
Sometimes, however, even the design stance might prove inadequate in explaining some phenomenon. Perhaps due to complexity, one might want to adopt what Dennett terms the intentional stance. The intentional stance treats some object as capable of functioning rationally. By this, I mean to say that it is sometimes appropriate to speak of some object as engaging in behavior such that it is useful to attribute it beliefs, desires, or other sorts of mental states (regardless of whether the object actually possesses these states). Dennett uses the example of a chess program. With this program, it doesn't always appear appropriate to take the design or physical stance towards it. We might speak of the circuits that have been soldered in order to construct the computer, or we might consider the code as it was designed in order to carry out certain operations, but neither of these stances will assist us in beating the program at chess. In order to play against the program, it seems best to consider the program as wanting to win, and capable of adopting appropriate strategies. We treat the program as having goals it desires to achieve in a rational manner. We need not assume that things with which we take the intentional stance towards share our beliefs, or even possess beliefs, but merely that these objects operate via logical truths.
Intentional Theory and Common Sense
At this point, Dennett considers how intentional systems theory (IST from hereon), stacks up against other theories. First, he consider how “common-sense” explanations trade on intentional vocabulary only question a supposedly rational creature once we notice it behaving contra to what we deem to be rational. A good example here might be a chat bot. If I receive an instant message from an unknown source, I often take it to be a person. However, upon further discourse, I may come to believe it is an unintelligent bot, as it will not cease in its urgings of me to purchase penis-enhancement pills in order to impress the Russian bride that is oh-so-sincerely wants me to take. At this point, I downgrade the bot to a “non-rational entity” and will take the design stance towards it. At this point, Dennett notes that we treat animals from the intentional stance. He believes that we should consider animals to obey some simple rules of logic, such as, “If there is a cat to the right, then I ought not go to the right.” Now, sometimes we might trick the mouse into approaching the cat, but we need not consider any intentional system to be perfectly rational. In a possible allusion to a potential reduction, Dennett notes that these “common-sense” explanations might be explicable, at some point, by the non-intentional, physical sciences' stances.
Dennett now proceeds to criticisms of behaviorist theories. First, he describes how an “intelligence loan” is exacted when some event, object, etc. in a system is dubbed as a signal, message, etc. He insists that there is further analyzing to be done, as these signals, messages, etc. need to be received and interpreted by something in order to prove useful. Eventual this “loan” needs to be repaid (via explanation of how the content is received), in order to establish a plausible conception of “intelligence.” Some, such as skinner, attempted to bypass this by reducing intelligence to behavior. However, Dennett notes that by controlling the environment down to the most minute detail, Skinner succeeded merely in masking the intelligence of intentional systems. Dennett thinks we need to formulate a rigorous definition of intentionality before we come to a better understanding of intelligence, but until then it will still prove useful to presuppose intelligence in a system (he notes economics and game theory as examples). Dennett here is defending himself against the charge that his theory is vacuous since he has not explained why/how intelligence/intentionality comes to be. But he insists (rightly so), that predictions made from the intentional stance are useful regardless of the aforementioned pitfalls.
In his essay, Intentional Systems, Dennett introduces the concept …show more content…
of, well, intentional systems. He believes this concept proves useful in explaining and predicting the behavior of organisms in a distinctly normative manner. He compares it to other systems, such as behaviorism, and finds it to be superior. Lastly, he applies the aforementioned concept to the notion of beliefs.
The Stances
To start, Dennett considers how an observer can take a number of different stances towards an object that requires explanation.
For some phenomena, such as molecular bonding, one might take the physical stance. This stance considers the mere physical states, actions, and reactions of some event, e.g. the chemical processes underlying the fusion of hydrogen and oxygen. Sometimes, however, it might prove useful to take a different stance towards a phenomena (due either to complexity or the desire for satisfactory explanations. In these cases, one might adopt what Dennett terms the design stance.
This stance is appropriate when one believes that the design of some object can be determined. For example, one might prefer to take the design stance, rather than the physical stance, towards a watch. It is true that the physical stance could give an explanation, via description of the gears, smelting processes, and materials used in its construction, but the physical stance doesn't tell us what it is supposed to do. The design stance, on the other hand, is perfectly suited for this task. By taking the design stance, one can determine whether or not the object is functioning properly. The design of a watch is such that the watch ought to keep accurate time. In other words, it is appropriate to speak of the watch as functioning well or malfunctioning. In this sense, the design stance adopts normative properties which the physical stance does
not.
Sometimes, however, even the design stance might prove inadequate in explaining some phenomenon. Perhaps due to complexity, one might want to adopt what Dennett terms the intentional stance. The intentional stance treats some object as capable of functioning rationally. By this, I mean to say that it is sometimes appropriate to speak of some object as engaging in behavior such that it is useful to attribute it beliefs, desires, or other sorts of mental states (regardless of whether the object actually possesses these states). Dennett uses the example of a chess program. With this program, it doesn't always appear appropriate to take the design or physical stance towards it. We might speak of the circuits that have been soldered in order to construct the computer, or we might consider the code as it was designed in order to carry out certain operations, but neither of these stances will assist us in beating the program at chess. In order to play against the program, it seems best to consider the program as wanting to win, and capable of adopting appropriate strategies. We treat the program as having goals it desires to achieve in a rational manner. We need not assume that things with which we take the intentional stance towards share our beliefs, or even possess beliefs, but merely that these objects operate via logical truths.
Intentional Theory and Common Sense
At this point, Dennett considers how intentional systems theory (IST from hereon), stacks up against other theories. First, he consider how “common-sense” explanations trade on intentional vocabulary only question a supposedly rational creature once we notice it behaving contra to what we deem to be rational. A good example here might be a chat bot. If I receive an instant message from an unknown source, I often take it to be a person. However, upon further discourse, I may come to believe it is an unintelligent bot, as it will not cease in its urgings of me to purchase penis-enhancement pills in order to impress the Russian bride that is oh-so-sincerely wants me to take. At this point, I downgrade the bot to a “non-rational entity” and will take the design stance towards it. At this point, Dennett notes that we treat animals from the intentional stance. He believes that we should consider animals to obey some simple rules of logic, such as, “If there is a cat to the right, then I ought not go to the right.” Now, sometimes we might trick the mouse into approaching the cat, but we need not consider any intentional system to be perfectly rational. In a possible allusion to a potential reduction, Dennett notes that these “common-sense” explanations might be explicable, at some point, by the non-intentional, physical sciences' stances.
Dennett now proceeds to criticisms of behaviorist theories. First, he describes how an “intelligence loan” is exacted when some event, object, etc. in a system is dubbed as a signal, message, etc. He insists that there is further analyzing to be done, as these signals, messages, etc. need to be received and interpreted by something in order to prove useful. Eventual this “loan” needs to be repaid (via explanation of how the content is received), in order to establish a plausible conception of “intelligence.” Some, such as skinner, attempted to bypass this by reducing intelligence to behavior. However, Dennett notes that by controlling the environment down to the most minute detail, Skinner succeeded merely in masking the intelligence of intentional systems. Dennett thinks we need to formulate a rigorous definition of intentionality before we come to a better understanding of intelligence, but until then it will still prove useful to presuppose intelligence in a system (he notes economics and game theory as examples). Dennett here is defending himself against the charge that his theory is vacuous since he has not explained why/how intelligence/intentionality comes to be. But he insists (rightly so), that predictions made from the intentional stance are useful regardless of the aforementioned pitfalls.