Compare And Contrast The Airline Crash Of B/11 And B-11

Aviation has historically been an industry heavily reliant on time management and efficiency. From the rushed mass production of B-17s for the European Theatre of WWII to line service activity on an active airport ramp, a common variable exists. Though those two occasions differ vastly, both display urgency and determination to quickly produce results. Unfortunately, this urgency has the dangerous ability to lead to somewhat inconsistent, careless work ethic. An example of this situation is the 1979 crash of a McDonnell Douglas DC-10 out of Chicago's O'Hare Airport. American Airlines was operating a regularly scheduled Flight 191 from Chicago to Los Angeles on the afternoon of May the twenty fifth. The aircraft, filled with 258 passengers
The crash confused the minds of many, concerning a DC-10 would normally have no problem flying with only two of three engines. After a lengthy investigation, the details of the disaster were determined. The pilots had performed their duties properly, however, there were critical maintenance flaws causing the aircraft to fall from the sky. The first question was how the aircraft lost the left engine to begin with. The investigators discovered the aircraft's engine had been removed for repairs eight weeks beforehand. While the technicians were removing or installing the engine, they damaged the pylon which connects the engine to the wing. It was eventually discovered that American Airlines had altered the recommended manufacturer's procedure to reduce maintenance hours by nearly 200. McDonnell Douglas recommended removing the engine from the pylon before removing the pylon from the wing. American, United, and Continental Airlines had all loyally practiced this shortened procedure. The new procedure involved supporting the engine with a forklift while removing the engine and pylon as a whole assembly. The NTSB determined that this procedure was indeed the cause of engine separation, due to cracking discovered on the mounting bracket matching the shape of the pylon rear attachment fitting. The fatigue
However, the left wing slats had retracted after takeoff, resulting in a drastic loss of lift on the left wing. The DC-10 lacked a locking mechanism for the leading edge slats aside from hydraulic pressure. When the engine separated from the aircraft, essential hydraulic lines were ripped out, along with the generator which provided a slat agreement system. With the loss of hydraulic pressure, the wind pressure led to the left slats retracting. The loss of lift ultimately led to a stall of the left wing while lift on the right wing was still prominent. Meanwhile, the generator lost meant a lack of electrical warnings in the flight deck. The pilots, only aware that they had lost thrust from the left engine, fought to keep the plane level while it dove into the