Comparison Of Will, Omnipotence And Moral Perfection: Necessing Perfection

Will, Omnipotence, and Moral Perfection: Escaping Incompatibility

Omnipotence and moral perfection are plausible and intuitive characteristics to assign the greatest possible being. Yet it is not clear whether it is logically possible for God to possess both. Wes Morriston examines this paradox in his paper “Omnipotence and Necessary Moral Perfection: Are They Compatible?” by considering three claims: Let E be some possible state of affairs that God’s moral perfection prevents him from actualizing…
P1 If God is necessarily morally perfect, there is no possible world in which He actualizes E.
P2 If God is omnipotent, He has the power to actualize E.
P3 If God has the power to actualize E, then there is a possible world in which God actualizes
I will examine the definitions of basic power and conditional power that Morriston offers and argue that these definitions cannot adequately explain the examples that he describes. Guided by these examples, I will offer a new explanation of what it means to be unable to bring oneself to do something. If this new explanation provides definitions of omnipotence and moral perfection that do not run afoul of any of Morriston’s other objections and are not self-contradictory, then it is plausible to believe that the greatest possible being is both morally perfect and
In the case where B “suffers from a kind of mental paralysis” (155), we can explain B’s inaction in several ways. B could make a decision but lack the SMP to act on it. Alternatively, B’s will could oscillate between different options, never resting on one decision long enough to act on it. Lastly, B could have made no choice whatsoever. Only the first of these suggests that B lacks omnipotence; the others suggest that her will is imperfect. We can explain B’s failure to make a purple shirt similarly: B only lacks SMP if she were unable to make a purple shirt even if she chose