Craig And Peterson's Cosmological Argument

To deny the conclusion of the Cosmological argument is to accept the truth of a number of seemingly controversial empirical claims. The sceptic’s forced acceptance of these empirical claims imposes upon them a smaller set of possible worlds which are consistent with the non-existence of a God. Thus, in this regard the Cosmological argument remains firmly ‘alive’ as what Swinburne calls a ‘correct C-Inductive argument’, as it succeeds in adding to the probability of the theistic conclusion .
Peterson defines a ‘proof’ as a sound argument that the person for whom it is a proof knows to be sound and whose premises that person knows as true without inferring them from the conclusion. In his discussion of what constitutes a good argument, but which
It uses a general pattern of argumentation that makes an inference from certain alleged facts about the world to the existence of a unique being, generally referred to as God. Arranging the different cosmological arguments philosophers have raised into a useful typology remains a controversial task, with Craig and Peterson each advocating their own approach in this matter. Craig distinguishes between 3 types of cosmological arguments: that advocated by Thomas Aquinas, based on the impossibility of an essentially ordered infinite regress, the kalām argument, which holds that an infinite temporal regress is impossible because an actual infinite is impossible, and that espoused by Leibniz and Clarke, which is overtly founded on the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Peterson on the other hand, does not distinguish between the 1st and 3rd of these categories as constituting separate categories of cosmological argument. Rather he advocates a two category typology, with the difference between the two determined simply by the relevance of time. I shall not need to enter this debate in order to continue, as I shall require only one concrete example of the cosmological argument that is accepted by both parties – namely, the Kalam version – in order to demonstrate that the cosmological argument remains firmly alive as an inductive argument, making more plausible the theistic
If this premise were to be found to false, or at least were demonstrated to be less plausible than the conclusion which it aims to prove – namely, that God exists – then this would suffice for us to conclude that the entire category of cosmological arguments were in fact, ‘dead’. Although Craig considers its validity to be intuitively obvious, some deny this, arguing that the claim that something should suddenly spring from nothing is in fact, intelligible. The most often cited examples of this are in quantum physics, as on the quantum level, the connection between cause and effect, if not entirely broken, is to some extent loosened. For example, it appears that electrons can pass out of existence at one point and come back into existence elsewhere. One can neither trace their intermediate existence nor determine what causes them to come into existence at one point rather than another. Neither can one precisely determine or predict where they will reappear; their subsequent location is only statistically probable given what we know about their antecedent states. However, given our limited knowledge it is not yet possible to demonstrate whether indeterminacy is a real feature of the world. Thus, this first premise does not yet provide us with the implausibility required to disregard the Kalām cosmological