David Gauthier Value Judgments

In determining how things have different levels of subjective value, David Gauthier outlines both rational and irrational reasons one might have for preferring something to another. As a subjectivist philosopher, Gauthier believes that value descriptions like "good" or "bad" are entirely the products of the imagination of individuals, who are likely to disagree with other individuals over what they deem to be valuable. Since these values are inadvertently chosen by the subject, it is impossible to be "wrong" when making value judgments, but it is still possible to make these value judgments irrationally. One might choose randomly, without thinking about their judgment, or one might contradict themselves in their judgment. Our words and actions often conflict with each other, we sometimes take actions without realizing what the consequences will be, and perhaps worst of all, we sometimes wish we had acted differently in the past, despite knowing in the moment how this action might affect our future selves. But if values really are subjectively decided, then it is still possible to aim for any end without contradicting oneself, so long as the decision was made rationally, which according to Gauthier is when "there is no conflict between their behavioural and attitudinal dimensions and they are stable under experience and reflection" (Gauthier 32-33). No matter what subjective decision an agent may make, no matter how cruel or stupid it may seem to the rest of us, the
agent is still acting rationally so long as they are not conflicting with their other interests in the present or future. “If it be agreed that values are subjective, then there is no ground for appeal beyond what a person acknowledges, given that she has reflected sufficiently and is fully experienced” (34).
If it is necessary that a rational agent choose their actions in light of sufficient reflection and full experience, some measurement must be made to determine how reflective and experienced the agent must be in order to meet Gauthier's standards of rationality. Gauthier brings up the relatively common human interest in being healthy as an example. Since being healthy is required for survival, it's likely that almost everyone would want healthiness as an end if they reflected on their presupposed interest in survival or had a variety of experiences regarding their health. Still, Gauthier concedes that there will still be some people who rationally choose not to be healthy after reflection and experience.
At the beginning of chapter two, Gauthier makes one of his main claims that "Value does not afford a single uniform measure of preference but a measure relative to each valuer" (25). In his example regarding health, the agent who places value in being healthy is just as rational as the agent who places value in being unhealthy. The capability of rational thought to lead different agents to aim for opposite ends may support Gauthier's claim that ends are chosen subjectively, but it does not explain how supposedly equally rational actions yield opposite results. Since the agents arrive at different ends, there must be some level of difference between their reasoning, which means there must be some level of difference in their reflection and experience. Unless Gauthier is willing to provide objective standards for what it means to reflect sufficiently and be fully experienced, an agent can be rational under his definition with any level of reflection and experience sufficient to their own subjective standards, which might not include any amount of reflection or experience. This would render his standards of rationality unnecessary for reasoning under his own definition. On the other hand, if Gauthier were to claim that at least some reflection and experience were required for rationality (even though this would contradict his claim that value is relative to each valuer), he would then be required to give an account for how much reflection and experience an agent needs to act rationally, independent of what the agent may think they need to be rational.
The flexibility of subjective moral philosophies serves as both their main strength and main weakness.
Under subjectivist philosophies, I am free to value anything, but I am also free not to value the subjectivism which gave me the freedom to value whatever I wanted in the first place. Unless specific rules can be applied to a subjective philosophy, the philosophy can be used to contradict itself. But if specific rules are applied to a subjective philosophy, it would contain some level of
objectivism.