Eisenhower's Decision To Relieve Major General Fredenhall Of Command

General Eisenhower's decision to relieve Major General Fredenhall of command was delayed due to his inability to act on inferences from his observations based on egocentrism. While serving as the Supreme Allied Commander, a newly confident Eisenhower applied critical thinking skills by clarifying his concerns over the potential cancellation of Operation Anvil. Though he conceded ground on the issue, he understood the implications of the decision and was able to maintain focus on Operation Overlord.
General Eisenhower did not follow his own guidance to promptly remove those that demonstrated they were unfit for command when he failed to relieve MG Fredenhall. He inferred that Fredenhall was unfit to command, but he did not act in a timely manner to remove him from command. Gerras describes an inference as "an intellectual act in which we conclude something based on a perception as to how the facts and evidence of a situation fit together." Eisenhower visited the II Corps command post of February 13, 1943 and personally observed several indicators that Fredenhall was not prepared for the challenges that lie ahead. The II Corps Headquarters was located in a large underground bunker
The timetable provided the opportunity to "monitor implementation" and the data acquired from that timetable allowed him to "begin again" if the situation warranted. The 30,000 troop increase was a quantifiable decision and the implementation of which constituted the end of the cycle of discussions to determine the requirements for the defeat of Al Qaeda and the disruption of the Taliban. The ambiguity of the "July 2011 'transfer of forces out of Afghanistan'" comment from the President was a deliberate measure to separate the decision of the current troop increase with a later analysis focused on force