In Euthyphro’s second attempt at defining piety, he solves the problem of essentialism by providing a rationale behind piety. He declares that “what is dear to the gods is pious, [and] what is not is impious” (7a). Despite the fact that Euthyphro’s definition meets Socrates’ only condition, Socrates cautiously examines it. By challenging Euthyphro’s logic, Socrates unveils a new problem with the definition—it violates the principle of bivalence. Previously in their discussion, Euthyphro acknowledged that the gods are in a constant state of conflict. Socrates asserts that although differences involving trivial issues may be simply resolved, deciding “the just and unjust... [And] the good and the bad” will cause major disputes between humans and among the gods (7d). This brings the discussion back to the first question. If it is possible for one god to believe an action is pious while another believes that it is impious, then how does one decide what is just? In a final effort to validate prosecuting his father, Euthyphro contends that “no god would differ from one another, that whoever has killed anyone unjustly should pay the penalty” (8c). However, Socrates responds by asserting that the gods base their interpretations of justice on the same experiences—signifying that an external factor outside of the gods control must determine the piety of an action.
In his third attempt to define piety, Euthyphro adds the qualifier all to his previous argument. He explains that “the pious is what all the gods love, and the opposite, what all the gods hate, is the impious” (9e). On the one hand, this definition resolves the problem that was created in the second attempt. Since all the gods are agreeing on what is pious and impious, the definition adheres to the principle of bivalence. However, after careful thinking, Socrates raises the question: “Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods” (10a)? In other words, do the gods love something because it is pious, or is something pious because the gods love it? Socrates and Euthyphro both accept the first claim, which allows them to recognize the paradox embedded in the entire statement. If the gods believe that something is pious because it is pious, then there must be objective laws independent from the gods that govern piety. Consequently, piety would exist without the gods’ commands. Conversely, if something is pious because it is loved by the gods, then piety is arbitrary. Whatever the gods love at a particular time would distinguish the pious from impious. Therefore, Socrates realizes that Euthyphro’s definition describes an “affect or quality…but [Euthyphro has] not yet told [him] what pious is” (11b). Although Euthyphro becomes irritated, he summons the strength to define piety for the last time.
In his fourth attempt to define piety, Euthyphro declares that the godly and pious is the part of the just that is concerned with the care of the gods, while that concerned with the care of men is the remaining part of justice" (12e). The problem with this definition is that Euthyphro makes a circular argument. While coming up with his definition of piety, Euthyphro commits a logical fallacy—he presupposes that humans know the “care of the gods” (12e). As a result, when Socrates asks him to describe the purpose of piety, Euthyphro is forced to restate his third argument--he explains that "piety is what is loved by the gods" (14b). Consequently, the discussion has come full-circle. Socrates once again asks Euthyphro "What is piety?" and Euthyphro hastily abandons the conversation.