Euthyphro
Euthyphro is one of Plato’s earliest dialogues of Socrates and Euthyphro. The dialogue took place just before Socrates’ trial in 399 BC between Socrates and Euthyphro – a man of strong religious belief. When Socrates found out that Euthyphro is laying a charge against his father for being impious, he then questions Euthyphro the meaning of piety and impiety as he is unsure himself; because he is confused as to why he is facing a charge for being impious. Euthyphro suggests four definitions of what piety is, all of which are rejected by Socrates. The dialogue concludes with no satisfactory definition of what piety is.
The main argument in the dialogue is Euthyphro’s third definition on piety; which is closely related to Euthyphro’s fourth definition. His third definition on piety proposed that “piety = what is loved by all the gods” and “impiety = what is hated by all the gods”. (9A – 9E) Socrates challenged this definition by introducing the ‘Euthyphro Dilemma’, asking Euthyphro: “Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved?” (10A) He then clarify his point by illustrating the principle between active and passive properties. We accept that X is a carried thing because it is being carried. ‘Being carried’ is the state of X that is being carried, the state of X that is acted upon. X can only be in the state of being carried if someone decides to carry it. Additionally, if piety is defined as “what is loved by all the gods”, it is loved for a reason; not because it is loved so it is loved by those who love it. Thus, pious is loved for the reason of being pious, not because it is being loved. And god-loved is loved by all the gods because they love it. Socrates proves that Euthyphro’s third definition is faulted as “being pious” cannot be defined as “being god-loved”.
Euthyphro’s third definition has placed itself in a very serious position against the thought that morality somehow dependent upon God which reflects on the
The main argument in the dialogue is Euthyphro’s third definition on piety; which is closely related to Euthyphro’s fourth definition. His third definition on piety proposed that “piety = what is loved by all the gods” and “impiety = what is hated by all the gods”. (9A – 9E) Socrates challenged this definition by introducing the ‘Euthyphro Dilemma’, asking Euthyphro: “Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved?” (10A) He then clarify his point by illustrating the principle between active and passive properties. We accept that X is a carried thing because it is being carried. ‘Being carried’ is the state of X that is being carried, the state of X that is acted upon. X can only be in the state of being carried if someone decides to carry it. Additionally, if piety is defined as “what is loved by all the gods”, it is loved for a reason; not because it is loved so it is loved by those who love it. Thus, pious is loved for the reason of being pious, not because it is being loved. And god-loved is loved by all the gods because they love it. Socrates proves that Euthyphro’s third definition is faulted as “being pious” cannot be defined as “being god-loved”.
Euthyphro’s third definition has placed itself in a very serious position against the thought that morality somehow dependent upon God which reflects on the