Ford Pinto Essay
Running head: FORD PINTO
FORD PINTO
Insert Name Here
Insert Affiliation Here
The case of Ford Motor Company producing the Pinto is a clear example of unethical behavior on the part of an automobile manufacturer, where a potentially dangerous product was knowingly released into the market. While there are some good consequences from the action, such as the jobs that were provided to American employees producing the car, and the individuals provided with an affordable vehicle, these were far outweighed by the negative effects, such as the potential danger from the number of Americans driving the car, those that were actually harmed in crashes, and, eventually, the effects on the Ford employees themselves after their company gained …show more content…
bad publicity from the incident. The fact that these negative consequences greatly exceed the positive ones shows that Ford acted unethically, and this is made all the more egregious by the fact that the company knew about the Pinto 's defect prior to release. Although some might argue that the company eventually attempted to recall the product, it took them seven years to do so, and only after they began to spend more resolving lawsuits than they had saved failing to install a protective baffle to begin with. Therefore, the release of the Ford Pinto was unethical, and serves as a cautionary tale for automobile manufacturers to this day. When attempting to determine whether the release of the defective Pinto was a moral one, it is important to know the stakeholders in this case, and how they were affected, either positively or adversely. To be sure, there were some positive effects from the release of the Pinto, at least for certain stakeholders for some time. The rapid release of the Pinto into the market in 1971 meant that consumers had more rapid access to a car that they could purchase for less than $2,000, and as the 1970s went on, having an affordable car with low gas mileage became even more important (DeGeorge 298, Farley 16). The fact that around 2 million Pintos had been sold by the time that the company began to face criticism shows that for many Americans, these cars were an affordable driving option (Weinberger 45). Even today, some Pinto owners still value their vehicles for their mileage, although they note that they have had to repair them frequently (Farley 16). The employees of Ford and the shareholders in the company also benefited; for a time, the Pinto was one of the most popular Ford vehicles, and with a 40 percent market share for the vehicle, Americans were kept in automotive jobs, and the investors in Ford, along with the owners, were able to continue making profits. Unfortunately, however, these were not the only consequences of the Pinto 's release. The Ford Motor Company knew about the defect that gave the vehicle a potential to catch fire in rear-end collisions above 20 miles an hour, and even rejected putting a baffle in the vehicle for six years to correct the problem (DeGeorge 298-299). Therefore, the action must be assessed in terms of both potential and actual effects, because many of the executives in the company knew that they would eventually be facing some degree of problematic lawsuits and even fatal crashes. In releasing a vehicle to the public had the potential to catch fire, the company was potentially putting not only its 2 million buyers at risk, but also their passengers, and the individuals in the vehicles colliding with them, of being burned, injured, and killed from crashes that would normally only result in minor injuries (Weinberg 46). As it happened, many people did become involved in fatal or fiery rear-end collisions, with 13 occurring between the years of 1976 and 1977, although it seems that the public did not widely catch on to the fact that these cars were at a greater risk of catching fire until Harley Copp, Ralph Nader, and various media sources reported the danger (DeGeorge 299). There were a variety of other negative effects other than the danger to the American public 's Pinto owners, as well, which also must be considered. Ford had calculated that it would not spend more than $20.9 million on accidental death and injury suits, but was paying more than $50 million by 1977, which was cutting into the profits of the company and impacting their ability to produce new vehicles (DeGeorge 299). In 1978, the company had to pay out $124 million to a single plaintiff for a similar charge, and awards against the manufacturer began to increase, making the decision to avoid the baffle ultimately unprofitable (Davis 136). This had a disastrous effect on the Pinto 's market share, which plummeted to just 15 percent by 1981, a decrease which represents a steady slide downward as the danger of the vehicles became more well-known (Weinberg 45-46). Ford lost hundreds of millions of dollars in sales, and its brand reputation suffered, with many Americans opting for the seemingly safer cars of rivals, ultimately leading to declining stocks for shareholders and lost jobs for workers (Weinberg 46). These negative effects were far greater in their extent than the positive effects that the vehicle 's release had, and in many cases, they affected the same individuals adversely in the end as had initially benefited from the Pinto 's sales, such as Ford employees and shareholders, undoing any good that the car had produced. Because the release of the Pinto created many more negative effects than positive ones, the knowing sale of a dangerous automobile must be concluded to be unethical. However, there are some proponents of Ford 's behavior that note that the company eventually did try to rectify the action.
In 1978, the company recalled the Pintos in order to install a cheap baffle that would prevent the danger of rear-end collision fires from occurring, and that at that point, many people were still interested in purchasing Pintos (DeGeorge 299). However, this does not make Ford 's actions any more unethical. As Harvey Copp had noted, engineers and executives knew about the defect in the vehicle for years, and took no action even after people began to be injured (DeGeorge 299). It was only after it became less profitable for the company to avoid putting the baffle in, due to lawsuits and lost sales, that it finally took action to protect consumers, or even to admit that the Pinto posed a danger to them, and even this action had to be prompted by the American government (DeGeorge 299; Weinberg 45). Additionally, in 1978, not all consumers were aware of the Pinto 's danger, as some news programs like 60 Minutes had not yet reported on it; after they did so, the Pinto 's sales began to drop even further, creating a large number of long-term problems for Ford 's branding and profits (Weinberg 45). So, even though Ford had attempted to rectify its situation, it had to be forced into doing so by the government and consumers, and even the workers and shareholders that initially benefited from the Pinto ended up
suffering. The use of utilitarian analysis of the Ford Pinto case study shows, quite clearly, that releasing the Pinto while knowing that it had a potentially dangerous design flaw was an unethical action on behalf of the Ford Motor Company. Certainly, there were some positive consequences from the release, such as the availability of a cheap, gas-efficient vehicle, and some growth in profit for the Ford company and its investors. However, many of these positive effects were undone by the damage ultimately done to the company through lawsuits and bad publicity, not to mention the immense danger posed to drivers and passengers of the Pinto. These negative effects far outweigh the positive, and even though the company eventually tried to fix the problem, the damage to all parties had already been done, making the sale of the Pinto ultimately unethical.
Works Cited
Davis, Phillip M. "How To Avoid Punitive Damage Awards." Design News 52.10 (1996): 136. Business Source Premier. Web. 5 Apr. 2012.
DeGeorge, Richard T. Business Ethics. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson. 2009. Print. 5 Apr 2012.
Farley, Cory. "A Pinto Is A Pony Car, Right?." Autoweek 60.14 (2010): 16-1NULL. Web. 5 Apr. 2012.
Weinberger, Marc G., and Jean B. Romeo. "The Impact Of Negative Product News." Business Horizons 32.1 (1989): 44. Business Source Premier. Web. 5 Apr. 2012.
FORD PINTO
Insert Name Here
Insert Affiliation Here
The case of Ford Motor Company producing the Pinto is a clear example of unethical behavior on the part of an automobile manufacturer, where a potentially dangerous product was knowingly released into the market. While there are some good consequences from the action, such as the jobs that were provided to American employees producing the car, and the individuals provided with an affordable vehicle, these were far outweighed by the negative effects, such as the potential danger from the number of Americans driving the car, those that were actually harmed in crashes, and, eventually, the effects on the Ford employees themselves after their company gained …show more content…
bad publicity from the incident. The fact that these negative consequences greatly exceed the positive ones shows that Ford acted unethically, and this is made all the more egregious by the fact that the company knew about the Pinto 's defect prior to release. Although some might argue that the company eventually attempted to recall the product, it took them seven years to do so, and only after they began to spend more resolving lawsuits than they had saved failing to install a protective baffle to begin with. Therefore, the release of the Ford Pinto was unethical, and serves as a cautionary tale for automobile manufacturers to this day. When attempting to determine whether the release of the defective Pinto was a moral one, it is important to know the stakeholders in this case, and how they were affected, either positively or adversely. To be sure, there were some positive effects from the release of the Pinto, at least for certain stakeholders for some time. The rapid release of the Pinto into the market in 1971 meant that consumers had more rapid access to a car that they could purchase for less than $2,000, and as the 1970s went on, having an affordable car with low gas mileage became even more important (DeGeorge 298, Farley 16). The fact that around 2 million Pintos had been sold by the time that the company began to face criticism shows that for many Americans, these cars were an affordable driving option (Weinberger 45). Even today, some Pinto owners still value their vehicles for their mileage, although they note that they have had to repair them frequently (Farley 16). The employees of Ford and the shareholders in the company also benefited; for a time, the Pinto was one of the most popular Ford vehicles, and with a 40 percent market share for the vehicle, Americans were kept in automotive jobs, and the investors in Ford, along with the owners, were able to continue making profits. Unfortunately, however, these were not the only consequences of the Pinto 's release. The Ford Motor Company knew about the defect that gave the vehicle a potential to catch fire in rear-end collisions above 20 miles an hour, and even rejected putting a baffle in the vehicle for six years to correct the problem (DeGeorge 298-299). Therefore, the action must be assessed in terms of both potential and actual effects, because many of the executives in the company knew that they would eventually be facing some degree of problematic lawsuits and even fatal crashes. In releasing a vehicle to the public had the potential to catch fire, the company was potentially putting not only its 2 million buyers at risk, but also their passengers, and the individuals in the vehicles colliding with them, of being burned, injured, and killed from crashes that would normally only result in minor injuries (Weinberg 46). As it happened, many people did become involved in fatal or fiery rear-end collisions, with 13 occurring between the years of 1976 and 1977, although it seems that the public did not widely catch on to the fact that these cars were at a greater risk of catching fire until Harley Copp, Ralph Nader, and various media sources reported the danger (DeGeorge 299). There were a variety of other negative effects other than the danger to the American public 's Pinto owners, as well, which also must be considered. Ford had calculated that it would not spend more than $20.9 million on accidental death and injury suits, but was paying more than $50 million by 1977, which was cutting into the profits of the company and impacting their ability to produce new vehicles (DeGeorge 299). In 1978, the company had to pay out $124 million to a single plaintiff for a similar charge, and awards against the manufacturer began to increase, making the decision to avoid the baffle ultimately unprofitable (Davis 136). This had a disastrous effect on the Pinto 's market share, which plummeted to just 15 percent by 1981, a decrease which represents a steady slide downward as the danger of the vehicles became more well-known (Weinberg 45-46). Ford lost hundreds of millions of dollars in sales, and its brand reputation suffered, with many Americans opting for the seemingly safer cars of rivals, ultimately leading to declining stocks for shareholders and lost jobs for workers (Weinberg 46). These negative effects were far greater in their extent than the positive effects that the vehicle 's release had, and in many cases, they affected the same individuals adversely in the end as had initially benefited from the Pinto 's sales, such as Ford employees and shareholders, undoing any good that the car had produced. Because the release of the Pinto created many more negative effects than positive ones, the knowing sale of a dangerous automobile must be concluded to be unethical. However, there are some proponents of Ford 's behavior that note that the company eventually did try to rectify the action.
In 1978, the company recalled the Pintos in order to install a cheap baffle that would prevent the danger of rear-end collision fires from occurring, and that at that point, many people were still interested in purchasing Pintos (DeGeorge 299). However, this does not make Ford 's actions any more unethical. As Harvey Copp had noted, engineers and executives knew about the defect in the vehicle for years, and took no action even after people began to be injured (DeGeorge 299). It was only after it became less profitable for the company to avoid putting the baffle in, due to lawsuits and lost sales, that it finally took action to protect consumers, or even to admit that the Pinto posed a danger to them, and even this action had to be prompted by the American government (DeGeorge 299; Weinberg 45). Additionally, in 1978, not all consumers were aware of the Pinto 's danger, as some news programs like 60 Minutes had not yet reported on it; after they did so, the Pinto 's sales began to drop even further, creating a large number of long-term problems for Ford 's branding and profits (Weinberg 45). So, even though Ford had attempted to rectify its situation, it had to be forced into doing so by the government and consumers, and even the workers and shareholders that initially benefited from the Pinto ended up
suffering. The use of utilitarian analysis of the Ford Pinto case study shows, quite clearly, that releasing the Pinto while knowing that it had a potentially dangerous design flaw was an unethical action on behalf of the Ford Motor Company. Certainly, there were some positive consequences from the release, such as the availability of a cheap, gas-efficient vehicle, and some growth in profit for the Ford company and its investors. However, many of these positive effects were undone by the damage ultimately done to the company through lawsuits and bad publicity, not to mention the immense danger posed to drivers and passengers of the Pinto. These negative effects far outweigh the positive, and even though the company eventually tried to fix the problem, the damage to all parties had already been done, making the sale of the Pinto ultimately unethical.
Works Cited
Davis, Phillip M. "How To Avoid Punitive Damage Awards." Design News 52.10 (1996): 136. Business Source Premier. Web. 5 Apr. 2012.
DeGeorge, Richard T. Business Ethics. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson. 2009. Print. 5 Apr 2012.
Farley, Cory. "A Pinto Is A Pony Car, Right?." Autoweek 60.14 (2010): 16-1NULL. Web. 5 Apr. 2012.
Weinberger, Marc G., and Jean B. Romeo. "The Impact Of Negative Product News." Business Horizons 32.1 (1989): 44. Business Source Premier. Web. 5 Apr. 2012.