Game Theory and Economic Analyst
Game Theory and Economic
Analysis
Game Theory and Economic Analysis presents the wide range of current contributions of game theory to economics. The chapters fall broadly into two categories. Some lay out in a jargon-free manner a particular branch of the theory, the evolution of one of its concepts, or a problem that runs through its development. Others are original pieces of work that are significant to game theory as a whole.
After taking the reader through a concise history of game theory, the contributors discuss such topics as:
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the connections between Von Neumann’s mathematical game theory and the domain assigned to it today since Nash the strategic use of information by game players the problem of the coordination of strategic choices between independent players in non-cooperative games cooperative games and their place within the literature of games incentive and the implementation of a collective decision in gametheoretic modeling team games and the implications for firms’ management.
The nature of the subject and the angle from which it is examined will ensure that Game Theory and Economic Analysis reaches a wide readership. As an established scholar in the area of game theory, Christian Schmidt has produced an authoritative book with contributions from economists of the very highest rank and profile, some of them well known beyond the boundaries of the game-theoretic community.
Christian Schmidt is Professor at the University of Paris-Dauphine. He has recently published La théorie des jeux: essai d’interprétation (PUF, 2001).
© 1995 Éditions Dalloz
English edition: editorial matter and selection © 2002 Christian
Schmidt; individual chapters © the contributors
Routledge Advances in Game Theory
Edited by Christian Schmidt
1 Game Theory and Economic Analysis
A quiet revolution in economics
Edited by Christian Schmidt
© 1995 Éditions Dalloz
English edition: editorial matter and selection © 2002
Analysis
Game Theory and Economic Analysis presents the wide range of current contributions of game theory to economics. The chapters fall broadly into two categories. Some lay out in a jargon-free manner a particular branch of the theory, the evolution of one of its concepts, or a problem that runs through its development. Others are original pieces of work that are significant to game theory as a whole.
After taking the reader through a concise history of game theory, the contributors discuss such topics as:
•
•
•
•
•
•
the connections between Von Neumann’s mathematical game theory and the domain assigned to it today since Nash the strategic use of information by game players the problem of the coordination of strategic choices between independent players in non-cooperative games cooperative games and their place within the literature of games incentive and the implementation of a collective decision in gametheoretic modeling team games and the implications for firms’ management.
The nature of the subject and the angle from which it is examined will ensure that Game Theory and Economic Analysis reaches a wide readership. As an established scholar in the area of game theory, Christian Schmidt has produced an authoritative book with contributions from economists of the very highest rank and profile, some of them well known beyond the boundaries of the game-theoretic community.
Christian Schmidt is Professor at the University of Paris-Dauphine. He has recently published La théorie des jeux: essai d’interprétation (PUF, 2001).
© 1995 Éditions Dalloz
English edition: editorial matter and selection © 2002 Christian
Schmidt; individual chapters © the contributors
Routledge Advances in Game Theory
Edited by Christian Schmidt
1 Game Theory and Economic Analysis
A quiet revolution in economics
Edited by Christian Schmidt
© 1995 Éditions Dalloz
English edition: editorial matter and selection © 2002
References: Aoki, M. (1986) “Horizontal versus vertical information structure of the firm,” American Economic Review, 5, 971–83. Broseta, R. (1993) “Strategic uncertainty and learning in coordination games,” University of California, San Diego, mimeo, 93–34. Chandler, A. D. Jr (1962) Strategy and Structure, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Crawford, V. P. and Haller, H. (1990) “Learning how to cooperate: optimal play in repeated coordination games,” Econometrica, 58, 3, 571–96. Crémer, J. (1980) “A partial theory of the optimal organization of a bureaucracy,” The Bell Journal of Economics, 11, 2. de Jaegere, A. and Ponssard, J. P. (1990) “La comptabilité: genèse de la modélisation en économie d’entreprise,” Annales des Mines, Gérer et Comprendre, March, 90–8. de Jaegere, A. (1991) “Vers un contrôle de gestion stratégique: un exemple de mise en oeuvre,” Economie Rurale, 206, 97–104. Hall, R. I. (1984) “The natural logic of management policy making: its implications for the survival of an organization,” Management Science, 30, 8, 30–8. Hart, O. and Holmstrom, B. (1987) “The theory of contracts,” in Advances in Economic Theory: Fifth World Congress, T Johnson, H. T. and Kaplan, R. S. (1987) Relevance Lost: The Rise and Fall of Management Accounting, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Kramarz, F. (1994) “Dynamic focal points in N person coordination games,” Theory and Decision, 40: 277–313. Kreps, D. M. (1984) “Corporate culture and economic theory,” in Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, J Marschak, J. and Radner, R. (1972) Economic Theory of Teams, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Mayer, D. J. Van Huyck, J. B, Battalio, R., and Saving, T. R. (1992) “History’s role in coordinating decentralized allocation decisions,” Journal of Political Economy, 100, Milgrom, P. and Roberts, J. (1992) Economics, Organization and Management, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Ponssard, J. P. and Tanguy, H. (1993) “Planning in firms as an interactive process,” Theory and Decision, 34, 139–59. Schelling, T. C. (1960) The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.