Goals Of Operation HUSKY

The goals of Operation HUSKY were to: “1)... secure Allied lines of communication in the Mediterranean, 2) divert as much German strength as possible from the Russian front and, 3) pressure Italy to drop out of the war. ” As Swanson further points out, “the specific military objective for the campaign would be to capture and control the island as a base for future military operations. ” While the operation was ultimately successful in achieving many of its main objectives, the nature of its design undermined the operation’s success in more than one way, on more than one occasion. A study of Operation HUSKY gives us further insight into the problems of the operational level of warfare, as, from its inception, Op HUSKY seemed to have a number
of problems in planning, intelligence sharing, and logistics. That said, the following essay will first examine the joint function of command and control in Op HUSKY. It will then evaluate the integration of two joint functions in Op HUSKY: operational intelligence and operational logistics. A study of command and control structure in Operation HUSKY reveals many flaws that jeopardized its mission. Those flaws in command and control structure can be interpreted namely in areas of commander’s intent, mutual trust, and common understanding between personnel. According to Mission Command White Paper, a commander’s intent can be defined as “a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operating and the desired military state...In mission command, intent fuses understanding, assigned mission, and direction to subordinates .” In the case of Operation HUSKY, there was some clear expression of purpose, however, faulty understandings of the battlefield reality, coupled with a lack of direction over subordinates, obfuscated the achievement of the commanders intent, to the degree those misunderstandings and missteps in Allied intelligence gave Axis forces the window to withdraw from Sicily as the Allies advanced.
As Dougherty notes, “One obvious branch that could have disrupted the German evacuation would have been an amphibious landing in Calabria, on the toe of Italy, behind Axis forces fleeing Sicily. Kesselring had no means of meeting such a threat and confessed, ‘A secondary attack on Calabria would have enabled the Sicily landing to be developed into an overwhelming Allied victory’. ” This misunderstanding essentially gave the retreating Axis forces to mobilize and evacuate with their resources to strengthen their defenses in the European mainland. And thus, inasmuch as understanding is a crucial element of a commander’s intent, its formation, its communication—faulty understandings of battlefield realities (of which there were many others), inhibited the manifestation of that intent in warfare operations
.“Understanding”, as its own requirement of command and control structure will be given more attention later on. In addition, Op HUSKY also displayed failure in adhering to the commander’s intent, mainly because that intent had no solid plan of action agreed to by all parties (i.e. Canadian, British, and American forces) . These forces seemed to operate in a quasi-centralized manner which, on the one hand, meant subordinate generals could act a bit more autonomously, but on the other hand, meant that the Allied forces could not effectively organize their attack on Sicily to complete one of its main objectives: the containment and/or destruction of Axis forces in Sicily. Besides obstructions to commander’s intent, HUSKY also seemed to lack an atmosphere of mutual trust. As Mission Command White Paper of 2012 notes, “Building trust with subordinates and partners may be the most important action a commander will perform...trust is the moral sinew that binds the distributed Joint Force...together .” This was sometimes entirely non-existent in Operation HUSKY. After all, there were a number of conflicts between British and American commanders before, during, and after Operation HUSKY. The differences of doctrine, perspective, military practices and traditions between the two nations proved to be a hurdle to their formulating battle plans together. It was that lack of mutual trust between Allied commanders which became, in essence, another enemy on the battlefield, another obstacle to Operation HUSKY’s success. In spite of this, the Allied forces were still successful in taking Sicily; but the full potential of the Allies resources could not be adequately employed amidst the ‘infighting,’ and poor integration across organizational differences. Lastly, another aspect of command and control structure in Operation HUSKY where the operation lagged was understanding. This was discussed earlier in regards to the formation and communication of commander’s intent, but it is worthy of consideration on its own. The Mission Command White Paper of 2012 states that “Understanding equips decision-makers at all levels with the insight and foresight required to make effective decisions, to manage the associated risks, and to consider second and subsequent order effects...[to] enable independent decision and action. ” Furthermore, understanding provides a shared context among members of the warfighting organization enabling them to meet the tactical/strategic goals of a changing operational environment, and also better fulfill the commander’s intent. In the context of Operation HUSKY, one can find how “understanding,” in this sense, was lacking.
After all, the ultimate decision to invade Sicily was contentious because different parties in the Allied forces having different understandings of the ultimate purpose of the war, or the strategy and tactics by which to achieve it. But coupled with this lack of shared understanding, few of the Allied commanders in Operation HUSKY had any experience in coordinating land, air, and sea operations . They did not understand how to best coordinate their decisions to effectively and efficiently succeed in HUSKY, wasting valuable time and resources or conceding some of the Allies advantages gained through their advance into Sicily; giving the Axis forces time to regroup and retreat with their
resources. In addition to its implications to command and control structure, Operation HUSKY also gives one the opportunity to assess the integration of joint functions within a warfighting operation. Two of the joint functions to be analyzed here are operational intelligence and operational logistics.
In terms of Operational Intelligence, HUSKY had a number of problems to contend with in the gathering and disseminating of crucial intelligence. According to Cote, “A major problem during the planning phase of HUSKY was the absence of a G-2 section within Task Force 141. Planners had to rely upon the G-2 section of AFHQ to obtain processed intelligence...[which] was not focused on supporting the Task Force 141 planners. ” In turn, this only “made staff coordination difficult to exercise. ” Granted, the Allies were still keen to the intentions of Axis forces. But they were unable to predict the withdrawal of Axis forces from Sicily, or adequately interpret Axis battle actions for what they were: diversions while the brunt of Axis forces were escaping . Furthermore, intelligence leaks provided Axis forces with some level of advanced knowledge about Allied plans to invade Sicily (or at least enough to buy time for their evacuation).
One also finds a number of failings when they analyze HUSKY’s joint function of Operational Logistics. As Cote points out, “The over emphasis on the logistical buildup prevented the Allies from incorporating speed and maneuver in order to create a fast operational tempo. ” Essentially, the Allies (at least by Cote’s estimate) placed too much importance on ensuring air, ground, and sea forces were adequately supplied and dispersed, and not enough time planning to meet all of HUSKY’s operational objectives. As Cote’s further asserts, “The military defeat of enemy forces must be the overriding concern. Functional areas such as logistics must play a supporting role to the pursuit of combat operations. ”

Conclusion
In sum, Operation HUSKY made many valuable gains for Allied forces against the German-Italian Axis; but it by no means presented “the model” for command and control structures, or integrated, Joint functions (particularly in respect to Operational Intelligence and Operational Logistics. In some sense, its successes as an operation are somewhat overcast by failings in its operational level. A lack of shared understanding or context between British and American forces hindered cooperation. This likewise hindered the formation and clear expression of a commander’s intent. Furthermore, an atmosphere of mutual mistrust (rather than trust), only compounded HUSKY’s operational difficulties. Coupled with all of these are HUSKY’s failings in operational logistics and intelligence. If anything, HUSKY provides us with an example of what command and control structure or integrated Joint Functions should not look like, and one should take these lessons to heart. For if an operations leadership cannot prevent these failings, they only help concede the position of relative advantage to the enemy to exploit.