How Did Jackson Agree That The German Invasion In 1940 Was Primarily A Military Defeat?

Jackson did say that all of these reasons accumulated to a French loss. However, Jackson states that the invasion in 1940 was primarily a military defeat. The German tactics, based on the notion of blitzkrieg, were much superior to the French’s doctrine of defense and slow, methodical movement on the battlefield. They found themselves utterly confounded by the speed of German maneuvers, while their men were shocked by the German air attack and armored penetrations. “The main charge is that the French military had not adapted to the idea of mobile warfare and had neglected to possibility of grouping tanks together so that they could be deployed offensively and autonomously rather than playing an infantry support role as in the Great War.” A
As stated above, the Belgians cancelled their alliance with France in 1936 essentially defeating the plan. This left the French with two options, Plan E which ran from the River Scheldt to Antwerp, and Plan D which ran from the Dyle river to Antwerp. The only problem with both of these plans was that they did not cover the area of the Ardennes forest. The German plan, or Manstein Plan, called for a major thrust through the Ardennes and across the river Meuse at Sedan. This allowed the Germans to have a compromising position on the French lines that could allow a breakthrough if the French did not respond. “By the third day (13 May) the Germans had succeeded in crossing the Sedan in three places. Despite pockets of fierce resistance, the French defence overall, weakened by the aerial bombardment, was unimpressive.” One key point that Jackson adds to this is that these crossing did not necessarily have to be