How Did Thutmose III Change Egypt
Thutmose III was the 6th Pharoah of the 18th Dynasty in Egypt. During his reign, he created a new model for a larger army; reformed the administration, weapons, chariots; and developed a way for the army to support itself away from Egypt (Gabriel 21). Most relevantly, he changed Egypt’s originally more defensive policies into an offensive strategy, which required the control of city-states in Canaan and Syria. The new policies focused on finding ways to travel faster during campaigns, and required new administrative bases, strongholds, and shipyards in areas further away from the Egyptian base (Gabriel 24). Thutmoses took an offensive approach to expanding his empire; he aggressively conquered new regions, used tactics that achieved submission, and developed an administrative system after gaining control of an area. These particular expansionist policies support the idea that his overall goal was to gain as many long-term benefits as possible for Egypt through her hegemony.
Thutmose III focused on an offensive expansion of the Egyptian empire by campaigning in new regions. He chose to fight in new territories, such as the Levant, instead of territories already conquered. Thutmose was …show more content…
credited with the unprecedented growth of the Egyptian empire with a very aggressive expansionist policy. He had frequent foreign campaigns, with a low average of one campaign every 1.2 years (O’Conner 6), which shows his focus on expansion in comparison to his early 18th Dynasty predecessors, who put their interests into reconquering Lower and Upper Nubia, as they believed that this area was rightfully under the Egyptian hegemony. By Thutmose III’s reign, Nubian land seemed to be secured as part of Egyptian territory (Manley 61). On the other hand, his predecessors focused less on the Levant region, as the last of evidence of an Egyptian campaign was during Thutmose I’s reign, almost thirty years before that of Thutmose III (O’Conner 13). The Egyptians had little claim to the Syro-Palestine region, but the fact that Thutmose III focused many of his campaigns there suggests that he took an offensive approach to his foreign policies, was more interested in controlling new regions and expanding the empire geographically. This brings the Egyptian empire more resources and tributes to use.
As part of his expansion policy, Thutmose III used tactics that achieved submission, rather than tactics that purely involved fighting or destroying cities. Before Thutmose’s reign, his predecessors would severely destroy and abandon the cities in the Palestine region in order to drive out the Hyksos (Weinstein 10) and only gained one-time tributes. Out of the seventeen recorded campaigns between year 22 and 42, the most important one was Thutmose’s first campaign, in which he conquered Gaza and Joppa, and took part in the battle of Megiddo (Manley 64). As by his annals, “the capturing of Megiddo is the capturing of a thousand towns” (Weinstein 11), and after fighting this one battle in Megiddo, he gained control of the surrounding city-states and access to major trade routes in Palestine (Manley 70). As documented in the annals in Karnak, he didn’t fight in any sites that were the destroyed cities from earlier campaigns, or in any sites situated in the surrounding South-central Palestine area. Therefore, Thutmose only fought one battle as necessary, suggesting that his policy was focused on achieving submission and cooperation. Furthermore, in contrast to earlier Palestine campaigns, there’s agreement between different evidence that Megiddo wasn’t destroyed by the Egyptians, and was sieged until surrender (Weinstein 10). In addition, on four of his campaigns, he chose to display his authority and avoided any fighting. It is clear that as part of his policy, Thutmose fought battles only as necessary, and aimed to achieve submission without destruction. As later explained, this is so that the resources and people would still be part of the empire to be used by Egypt, and emphasises the beneficial nature of a growing empire.
In between his expansion campaigns, Thutmose III converted parts of the cities into military and administrative support so that Egypt could gain a flow of tributes and carry out campaigns efficiently. His annals described a period of intensive campaigning in between periods of little military records (O’Conner 29), which were these periods where he developed the cities as administrative bases, strongholds, and fortress-borders. In particular, after his victories in the Levant region, he established military strongholds and administrative centers in Palestine and southern Syria. As Palestine and Syria were initially a collection of fragmented states, he organised his conquered regions into three areas with headquarters at Gaza, Sumur, and Kumidi (Weinstein 12). Thumose considered them as part of his empire and put in administrative effort into integrating them into the empire, which is a long-term empire-building strategy. Another example is the Way of Horus, which was a fortress that was completed during Thutmose’s reign, and was used as a storage for future campaigns through the path (Morris 49). Additionally, after campaigning once by crossing Palestine by land, Thutmose utilised his new logical base in Byblos to help transport his army and supplies by ship the second time he crossed the Naharin (Manley 72). Therefore, by utilising resources from new parts of his empire, he took advantage of their resources. It’s important to note that some of these fortress-towns were treated as its own settlement, where the population farmed their own land and fought to protect their towns in danger (Morris 78). As these towns were self-sufficient and existed to pay tribute, Thutmose could also gain economic benefits over time, while reducing the fights he took part in. Manifestly, after conquering regions, Thutmose aimed to devote his resources into converting these new regions into strongholds and military support. Not only did this provide military and economic benefits for Egypt, but as these regions were ruled by the local rulers, it came at minimal costs.
To maintain the economic and military benefits so that they were sustainable, Thutmose III allowed current rulers to control their cities but reeducated their sons, and sent Egyptian officials to check over them. One of Thutmose’s biggest aims of the empire was to bring economic benefits to Egypt in terms of annual tributes and booty from winning battles. The important of the rewards is apparent, as these spoils of war which included objects and captives from each campaign, were carefully documented on his annals and the tomb chapels (Shaw 238), as well as on his statues and stele (Shaw 239). Even in the years with little campaigns, the tributes that Egypt received were still documented, which shows Thutmose‘s great concerns about receiving tributes. As mentioned earlier, by achieving submission without destruction and letting the current rulers control their cities, Thutmose would achieve more economic benefits over a longer period of time. He is recorded to only have humiliated or replaced the city-state leaders in his first campaign as well as another one in year 39, where he was punishing local disturbance (Manley 70). Otherwise, he would let the local rulers stay in charge, but to gain their constant cooperation, Thutmose took the sons of the chiefs as hostages to Egypt (Gabriel 30), while the the princes he brought back were re-educated in the Egyptian order so that they could replace their fathers (Hoffmeier 5), and this further secures the subordination of these city-states. The clear benefit of this is the continued cooperation of these states in the long-term. In addition, Thutmose placed garrisons in these locations and sent royal agents to ensure that tributes and harvests from these cities were sent back to Egypt (Redford 337). Fields were split into plots, and the Egyptian royal agents would be in charge of getting their harvest back into Egypt, or feed the Egyptian army when they were passing through the region (Hoffmeier 5). In terms of checking for obedience, Thutmose used his Egyptian agents to keep order, and as described earlier, he also had frequent formal showings of power. It is important to note this tension between the freedom of letting the local rulers stay in charge while also having many measures to ensure their subordination; this is the tension between using a system that ensures the cities’ long-term commitment to the empire at a low cost, and making sure that it is maintained and sustained. Based on Thutmose’s policies, it is fair to say that he was concerned about receiving tributes and military cooperation in the future. This system of keeping local rulers therefore allows for the benefits of a low-cost long-term sustainable empire, while his measures ensure that there will be cooperation.
In conclusion, Thutmose III’s foreign policy was an offensive policy that sought out to achieve his goal of a strong, long-lasting empire where the city-states would provide him with tributes and support his military.
To do this, Thutmose targeted new regions to expand and campaign in, particularly the Levant. To ensure that he could utilise these new resources in the future, he considered the other party’s defeat simply as the ruler’s submission, and converted their cities into administrative and military support bases while keeping the local rulers. Lastly, to maintain his empire, he re-educated the rulers’ sons and send royal agents to check on the rulers. It is clear that Thutmose’s policies was to create a growing empire that would always bring Egypt benefits in the
future.
Bibliography
Gabriel, Richard A. Thutmose III : The Military Biography of Egypt's Greatest Warrior King. vol. 1st ed, Potomac Books, 2009. EBSCOhost.
Hoffmeier, James K. "Aspects of Egyptian Foreign Policy in the 18th Dynasty in Western Asia and Nubia.", 2001, Web.
Manley, Bill. The Penguin Historical Atlas of Ancient Egypt. Harmondsworth: Penguin Group, 1996. Print.
Morris, Ellen Fowles. The Architecture of Imperialism: Military Bases and the Evolution of Foreign Policy in Egypt's New Kingdom. Leiden: Brill, 2005. Print.
O'Connor, David B. "Thutmose III: An Enigmatic Pharaoh." Thutmose III: A New Biography. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan, 2006. 1-38. Print.
Redford, Donald B. "The Northern Wars of Thutmose III." Thutmose III: A New Biography. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan, 2006. 325-343. Print.
Shaw, Ian J. The Oxford History of Ancient Egypt. New York: Oxford UP, 2003. Print.
Weinstein, James M. “The Egyptian Empire in Palestine: A Reassessment.” Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research, no. 241, 1981, pp. 1–28. JSTOR.
Thutmose III focused on an offensive expansion of the Egyptian empire by campaigning in new regions. He chose to fight in new territories, such as the Levant, instead of territories already conquered. Thutmose was …show more content…
credited with the unprecedented growth of the Egyptian empire with a very aggressive expansionist policy. He had frequent foreign campaigns, with a low average of one campaign every 1.2 years (O’Conner 6), which shows his focus on expansion in comparison to his early 18th Dynasty predecessors, who put their interests into reconquering Lower and Upper Nubia, as they believed that this area was rightfully under the Egyptian hegemony. By Thutmose III’s reign, Nubian land seemed to be secured as part of Egyptian territory (Manley 61). On the other hand, his predecessors focused less on the Levant region, as the last of evidence of an Egyptian campaign was during Thutmose I’s reign, almost thirty years before that of Thutmose III (O’Conner 13). The Egyptians had little claim to the Syro-Palestine region, but the fact that Thutmose III focused many of his campaigns there suggests that he took an offensive approach to his foreign policies, was more interested in controlling new regions and expanding the empire geographically. This brings the Egyptian empire more resources and tributes to use.
As part of his expansion policy, Thutmose III used tactics that achieved submission, rather than tactics that purely involved fighting or destroying cities. Before Thutmose’s reign, his predecessors would severely destroy and abandon the cities in the Palestine region in order to drive out the Hyksos (Weinstein 10) and only gained one-time tributes. Out of the seventeen recorded campaigns between year 22 and 42, the most important one was Thutmose’s first campaign, in which he conquered Gaza and Joppa, and took part in the battle of Megiddo (Manley 64). As by his annals, “the capturing of Megiddo is the capturing of a thousand towns” (Weinstein 11), and after fighting this one battle in Megiddo, he gained control of the surrounding city-states and access to major trade routes in Palestine (Manley 70). As documented in the annals in Karnak, he didn’t fight in any sites that were the destroyed cities from earlier campaigns, or in any sites situated in the surrounding South-central Palestine area. Therefore, Thutmose only fought one battle as necessary, suggesting that his policy was focused on achieving submission and cooperation. Furthermore, in contrast to earlier Palestine campaigns, there’s agreement between different evidence that Megiddo wasn’t destroyed by the Egyptians, and was sieged until surrender (Weinstein 10). In addition, on four of his campaigns, he chose to display his authority and avoided any fighting. It is clear that as part of his policy, Thutmose fought battles only as necessary, and aimed to achieve submission without destruction. As later explained, this is so that the resources and people would still be part of the empire to be used by Egypt, and emphasises the beneficial nature of a growing empire.
In between his expansion campaigns, Thutmose III converted parts of the cities into military and administrative support so that Egypt could gain a flow of tributes and carry out campaigns efficiently. His annals described a period of intensive campaigning in between periods of little military records (O’Conner 29), which were these periods where he developed the cities as administrative bases, strongholds, and fortress-borders. In particular, after his victories in the Levant region, he established military strongholds and administrative centers in Palestine and southern Syria. As Palestine and Syria were initially a collection of fragmented states, he organised his conquered regions into three areas with headquarters at Gaza, Sumur, and Kumidi (Weinstein 12). Thumose considered them as part of his empire and put in administrative effort into integrating them into the empire, which is a long-term empire-building strategy. Another example is the Way of Horus, which was a fortress that was completed during Thutmose’s reign, and was used as a storage for future campaigns through the path (Morris 49). Additionally, after campaigning once by crossing Palestine by land, Thutmose utilised his new logical base in Byblos to help transport his army and supplies by ship the second time he crossed the Naharin (Manley 72). Therefore, by utilising resources from new parts of his empire, he took advantage of their resources. It’s important to note that some of these fortress-towns were treated as its own settlement, where the population farmed their own land and fought to protect their towns in danger (Morris 78). As these towns were self-sufficient and existed to pay tribute, Thutmose could also gain economic benefits over time, while reducing the fights he took part in. Manifestly, after conquering regions, Thutmose aimed to devote his resources into converting these new regions into strongholds and military support. Not only did this provide military and economic benefits for Egypt, but as these regions were ruled by the local rulers, it came at minimal costs.
To maintain the economic and military benefits so that they were sustainable, Thutmose III allowed current rulers to control their cities but reeducated their sons, and sent Egyptian officials to check over them. One of Thutmose’s biggest aims of the empire was to bring economic benefits to Egypt in terms of annual tributes and booty from winning battles. The important of the rewards is apparent, as these spoils of war which included objects and captives from each campaign, were carefully documented on his annals and the tomb chapels (Shaw 238), as well as on his statues and stele (Shaw 239). Even in the years with little campaigns, the tributes that Egypt received were still documented, which shows Thutmose‘s great concerns about receiving tributes. As mentioned earlier, by achieving submission without destruction and letting the current rulers control their cities, Thutmose would achieve more economic benefits over a longer period of time. He is recorded to only have humiliated or replaced the city-state leaders in his first campaign as well as another one in year 39, where he was punishing local disturbance (Manley 70). Otherwise, he would let the local rulers stay in charge, but to gain their constant cooperation, Thutmose took the sons of the chiefs as hostages to Egypt (Gabriel 30), while the the princes he brought back were re-educated in the Egyptian order so that they could replace their fathers (Hoffmeier 5), and this further secures the subordination of these city-states. The clear benefit of this is the continued cooperation of these states in the long-term. In addition, Thutmose placed garrisons in these locations and sent royal agents to ensure that tributes and harvests from these cities were sent back to Egypt (Redford 337). Fields were split into plots, and the Egyptian royal agents would be in charge of getting their harvest back into Egypt, or feed the Egyptian army when they were passing through the region (Hoffmeier 5). In terms of checking for obedience, Thutmose used his Egyptian agents to keep order, and as described earlier, he also had frequent formal showings of power. It is important to note this tension between the freedom of letting the local rulers stay in charge while also having many measures to ensure their subordination; this is the tension between using a system that ensures the cities’ long-term commitment to the empire at a low cost, and making sure that it is maintained and sustained. Based on Thutmose’s policies, it is fair to say that he was concerned about receiving tributes and military cooperation in the future. This system of keeping local rulers therefore allows for the benefits of a low-cost long-term sustainable empire, while his measures ensure that there will be cooperation.
In conclusion, Thutmose III’s foreign policy was an offensive policy that sought out to achieve his goal of a strong, long-lasting empire where the city-states would provide him with tributes and support his military.
To do this, Thutmose targeted new regions to expand and campaign in, particularly the Levant. To ensure that he could utilise these new resources in the future, he considered the other party’s defeat simply as the ruler’s submission, and converted their cities into administrative and military support bases while keeping the local rulers. Lastly, to maintain his empire, he re-educated the rulers’ sons and send royal agents to check on the rulers. It is clear that Thutmose’s policies was to create a growing empire that would always bring Egypt benefits in the
future.
Bibliography
Gabriel, Richard A. Thutmose III : The Military Biography of Egypt's Greatest Warrior King. vol. 1st ed, Potomac Books, 2009. EBSCOhost.
Hoffmeier, James K. "Aspects of Egyptian Foreign Policy in the 18th Dynasty in Western Asia and Nubia.", 2001, Web.
Manley, Bill. The Penguin Historical Atlas of Ancient Egypt. Harmondsworth: Penguin Group, 1996. Print.
Morris, Ellen Fowles. The Architecture of Imperialism: Military Bases and the Evolution of Foreign Policy in Egypt's New Kingdom. Leiden: Brill, 2005. Print.
O'Connor, David B. "Thutmose III: An Enigmatic Pharaoh." Thutmose III: A New Biography. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan, 2006. 1-38. Print.
Redford, Donald B. "The Northern Wars of Thutmose III." Thutmose III: A New Biography. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan, 2006. 325-343. Print.
Shaw, Ian J. The Oxford History of Ancient Egypt. New York: Oxford UP, 2003. Print.
Weinstein, James M. “The Egyptian Empire in Palestine: A Reassessment.” Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research, no. 241, 1981, pp. 1–28. JSTOR.