How Successful Was The Franco-Prussian War Of 1870

The Franco-Prussian War of 1870
The Franco-Prussian War is easily described by realists as the French reaction to an increasingly unfavorable balance of power in Europe due to the unification of Germany. The French mobilized when Prussia attempted to place the German Prince Leopold upon the Spanish throne, although, “curiously, this issue had been more or less resolved in France’s favor before it declared war. France rode into battle despite having already scored a diplomatic victory in forcing the withdrawal of what it viewed as an objectionable candidate for the Spanish crown.” While the succession crisis was perhaps an official justification for the war, Napoleon III on a personal level was more immediately concerned with the pressing need
He believed that the war would be protracted, and took for granted that “he would have plenty of time to extort concessions from both of the German powers in return for French neutrality in the war.” Like much of Europe, Napoleon III was assured of an Austrian victory, and was thus thrilled by the early Austrian concession of Venetia. He hoped this success would bring him the support of France’s large Catholic population, which was being antagonized by the Italian threat of taking Rome. With Venetia under his belt, and with Otto Von Bismark’s promises to cede Luxembourg, Belgium, and Alsace-Lorraine, Napoleon III was prepared to win over his opposition and had, “decided early on to use the Austro-Prussian war to fortify his commanding position in Europe.” He was shocked to hear that the war was won in a mere seven weeks by Prussia, and that Bismark conveniently reneged on his previous promises. This was the beginning of the devolution of his empire, as liberal opponents set in motion new legislation to curb the omnipotence of the Emperor. As his ability to govern disintegrated, “one of the conditions the liberals laid down in taking office was that the Prussian gains of 1866 be regarded as legitimate and not a cause for revenge despite the French failure to obtain the promised compensation.” Napoleon III saw this as a major blow to his credibility
In that time, he had disposed with the liberal promises of plebiscites and social and economic reform, and “had grown old, and France’s youth, none of whom could remember the anarchy and excesses of 1848, began to question his mildly repressive regime.” Frequent scandals of Bonaparte princes and official dignitaries blemished his rule. Indeed, the year 1870 began with Pierre Bonaparte, a cousin of Napoleon III, shooting Victor Noir, a republican journalist and killing him after he had published a critical article against Napoleon I. Huge crowds attended the journalist’s funeral and riots broke out in Paris in protest of the illiberal regime. Napoleon III grew increasingly nervous about his empire’s prospects, and the “relevance of all this to war and foreign affairs was plain. With his domestic support ebbing away, Napoleon III relied increasingly on foreign adventures to popularize his regime.” At this point, war was no longer a question but an absolute certainty, if Napoleon III wanted to keep his empire