Russia has pursued a multi-vector foreign policy since 2000, when Vladimir Putin began his first term as Russian president. Putin focused on establishing strong alliance – type relations with the United States and on further integration with the European Union as part of what was called Russia’s “European choice.” That short period was characterized by Putin’s support for the U.S. after the events of 11 September 2001 and was highlighted by Putin’s speech to the German parliament in October 2001. By the middle of the decade, however, Russia had left the West’s political orbit to position itself in opposition to the U.S. on key global policy issues. The culmination of that period is the five-day Russian-Georgian war in 2008, and its most prominent “literary testament” is Putin’s Munich speech of February 2007. The third period was Dmitry Medvedev’s in form, but Putin’s in essence. It was marked by a ‘reset’ in Russian-U.S. relations and textually characterized by an order from the Russian government to foster ‘modernization partnerships’ with developed states. The change in Russian foreign policy orientation does not coincide precisely with the presidential terms of Putin and Medvedev, but there is some connection there. Russia’s foreign policy has changed again following Putin’s return to power, but the change in presidents is certainly not the main reason for that. Putin remained the leader under Medvedev and it was he who determined the foreign policy vector. New key factors include significant changes in Russia’s domestic situation and a shifting global environment in which this policy is implemented.
Priority directions.
Eurasian union (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan). The idea, based on the European Union's integration, was brought to attention in October 2011 by the then-Prime Minister of Russia, Vladimir Putin, but was first proposed as a concept by the President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, during a 1994 speech