Kant's Synthetic A-Priori Analysis

In establishing the presence of synthetic a-priori, Kant unleashed a new area of transcendental philosophy. The way in which Kant did this, however, assumes that judgements cannot be analytic a-posteriori. According to Kant, the limits of experience are transcendental; in this manner he believes himself to have to obey unknowable laws of thought. On the other hand, Hume did not believe in these limits. Synthetic a-priori knowledge is the pre-supposition which allows the transcendental philosopher to treat the limits of their encounter as completely standard. Kant's critique begins with the supposed finding that judgements are not simply analytic a-priori or synthetic a-posteriori, but indeed that there is a third type of judgement; synthetic
Stephen Palmquist's explanation of analytic a-posteriori can be taken further. In it, we can fit in some of Kant's terminology. It is important to note that in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant entertains the notion of analytic a-posteriori not with quite the same word order Stephen Palmquist uses, but instead by calling it 'a-posteriori analytic'. (11. B15) Thus it seems reasonable to assume, if analytic a-posteriori is an inverse of Kant's synthetic a-priori, where a deduction is made with the use of an artificial construct; a-posteriori analytic is a more accurate description. In a-posteriori analytic, the emergence of an analytic construct comes about by first and foremost, an experience or spur of activity. Palmquist noted that analytic a-posteriori induces particular conditions a-posteriori with analytic material. (12. Palmquist 1987, 273). This analytic material induced by an experience or supur of activity may then become synthetic a-priori. Kant likewise hints in his view that it is simply forgotten, that this analytic material seemingly induced by the activity or experience in question was in the first place synthetic. Likewise, in coming up with a full explanation of the inverse of Kant's synthetic a-priori, we can equally say that in using a synthetic symbol such as 'hot', we forget that 'hotness' as a concept emerged out of experience which is where truth primarily lies. Therefore Kant allocating precedence to synthetic a-priori seems to within it pre-suppose the precedence of a-priori reasoning. Indeed, Kant's entire philosophy following one obscure premise that being the irreducibility of the difference between the faculty of the understanding and of sensibility, harks back to a subjective claim. Could this claim be something that is in fact based upon Kant's personal experience? The prevalance of both the a-posteriori analytic