Kennedy's Response To The Nuclear Crisis

Never had the world seen a period of such political intensity and fear. Immediately following the discovery of the missiles, Kennedy formed a secret military management group of advisors; EXCOMM. By considering a range of opinions and alternates, Kennedy could therefore evalute the best stratgey for the United States. One of which was to take an aggressive approach to the situation; a strategic airstrike. Whilst it would effectivly eliminate Soviet missiles and show strength of the United States government, an airstrike would be seen as an act of war upon Cuba and the Soviet Union. This could therefore act as a catalyst in esculation towards nuclear war between the nations, a consequence that Kennedy did not want to risk. Even when an American
U2 plane got shot down over Cuba, killing Major Rudolph Anderson, Kennedy chose not to act aggressivly in response. Instead, Kennedy agknowledged the death as a loss, not risking esculation of nuclear war. Secret recordings of the EXCOMM meetings also state that Kennedy was influenced by Pearl Harbour, a previous airstrike on the United States during World War II, “I now know how Tojo felt when he was planning Pearl Harbour.” Therefore, the combination of these negative factors influenced Kennedy to disregard the aggressive approach of officials such as Vice President Lyndon Johnson.
Similarly, the invasion of Cuba was also considered an aggressive response to the issue.
Whilst the plan had the potential to secure the nuclear safety of the United States, the potential harm to Soviet soliders would be considered an act of war upon the union. Similarly to an airstrike, this could lead to esculation of nuclear war between the two nations, as stated by George Ball, Secretary of State, “you go in there with a surprise attack … this isnt the end. This is the beginning.” Also influencing President Kennedy’s fear of esculation was the historical novel ‘The Guns of August,’ a narrative volume of early World War I. Kennedy did not want similar escualtion as seen in the novel, as stated by Micheal Dobbs in his novel ‘One Minute to Midnight,’ “helped in dealing with the Cuban Missile Crisis including the profound and unpredictable implications a rapid escualtion of the situation could have.” Prior events such as the failed Bay of Pigs invasion also influenced Kennedy’s reluctance to act agressivly. Protecting their own intrests, in 1960 President Eisenhower authorised the CIA to recruit 1400 Cuban exiles in attempt to overthrow the Castro and the Cuban Government. Ulitmately however, the invasion failed, with the exiles surrendering on April 19th 1961. Whilst the Bay of Pigs invasion was initiated by President Eisenhower, it created tension between the two nations, and demonstrated the negative potential consequences of
invasion.
Remaining unresponsive was another option considered by EXCOMM, however it was unfavourable amoungst most members. Although it would prevent escualtion in the form of the nuclear war, the United States could be precived as weak. The Soviet Union could then feel empowered to consider moves claiming Western Berlin, a consequence Kennedy wanted to avoid at all costs. Ultimately, a naval blockade was agreed upon, as stated by President Kennedy, “to halt this offensive buildup a strcit quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba being initiated.” Unlike other options, a naval blockade demonstrated strength within the United States government without the use of missiles or invasion. As stated by Robert Kennedy, the action would “make know unmistakably the seriousness of U.S determination to get missiles out of Cuba” whilst leaving the Soviets “some room for maeuver to pull back.” Thus, this therefore limited the risk of esculation to an extent. However, limitations had to be established within the United States navy and militray in order to prevent firing against Soviet ships; an act of war. By October 24th the action had been deemed successful, with Soviet ships changing courses. Further avoiding esculation, President Kennedy chose to agree to Khrushchev’s propsoal; removal of the missiles in exchange for lifting the quarantine and a pledge that the United States will not invade Cuba. In doing so Kennedy sent his brother, Robert Kennedy, to negotiate. However, in order to show strength as a nation, Kennedy chose to ignore the Soviet Union’s request for missiles in Turkey to be deloyed. Instead, Kennedy secretly chose to have the missiles removed “in time.”
Acting as a contrasting opinion to the Cuban Missile Crisis is that of Nikita Khrushchev.
As Premier of the Soviet Union, Khrushchev’s communist values were polar opposite to that of President Kennedy, “do you think when two opposing views get together and shake hands, the contradictions between our systems will simply melt away? What kind of daydream is that?” Similarly to Kennedy however, Khrushchev wanted to expand his chosen political system globaly. Therefore, when the oppourtunity arose, Khrushchev chose to support Cuba against the United States following the 1962 Bay of Pigs Invasion. Taking both deffensive and offensive actions, nuclear weapsons were developed in Cuba, as well as 40,000 Soviet workers being sent and a public backing from the Soviet Union, “long live the eternal, indestructable friendship and cooperation between the Soviet and Cuban peoples.” Whilst the nuclear missiles did protect Cuba theoretically, the oppourtunity was most benefical to the Soviet Union. Reciporacy was one way in which this was achieved. In 1961 the United States military deployed intermediate range “Jupiter” nuclear missilies in Italy and Turkey, adjacent to Russia. From there the missiles could reach all of the Western Soviet Union, including Moscow and Leningrad. Therefore, by developing nuclear missiles in Cuba it reciprocated for the existing threats against the Soviet Union. Khrushchev also saw the crisis as an oppourtunity to “close the missile gap,” with the United States
having nearly nine times the amount of nuclear weaponry as the Soviet Union. Ultimately however, Khrushchev used the implementation of the missiles as a move of brinkmanship, the practice of pushing dangerous events to the brink of disaster in order to achieve the most advantageous outcome. For Khrushchev, brinkmanship was an attempt to attain power in the Berlin Crisis. As stated by Khrushchev, the Soviet Union wanted to, “wring this peace treaty … they had hauled Germany into the Western bloc.” Thus, by minipulating the United States through the use of Cuba, Khrushchev hoped achieve similar results in Europe.
Deception, denial and dismisal were all qualities employed by Khruschev when responding to the United States discovery of the nuclear missiles. Whilst being confronted at the United Nations Council on October 25th, Ambassador Zorin, on behalf of Khrushchev and the Soviet Union denied the existance of any nuclear weaponry in Cuba, “you have denied that they exist … I want to know I’ve understood you correctly.” By doing so, it allowed Khruschev a longer period of time to get the missiles operational, further strenghtening his control over the United States. Thus, the decision was benefial to the Soviet Union despite the conflicting photographic evidence. In days following the declaration however, Khruschev’s stance and actions changed significantly. In addition to passivly obeying Kennedy’s naval blockade, John Scali, ABC News reporter was approached by Aleksander Fomin on behalf of the Soviet Union, “quote.” By offering a reporter a solution instead of directly approaching the United States, it allowed Krushchev to have more flexibility in terms of denying of the proposal, should the result be unfavourable to the Soviet Union. Realising the potential detremental effect nuclear war could have globably, Khrushchev also sent a letter to Kennedy reinforcing the offer: removal of the missiles in exchange for lifting the quarantine and a pledge that the United States will not invade Cuba. On October 27th, Khrushchev sent a following letter requesting that all nuclear weaponry in Cuba be removed also as part of the agreement, “you have placed destructive missile weapons in Turkey … how can the recognition of our equal military capacities be reconciled with such unequal relations between out states.” Although Kennedy chose not to aknowledge the second letter, the deal was still favourable for Khruschev as it avoided esculation into nuclear war. Additionally, Kennedy agreeing to remove the nuclear weaponry in Turkey and Italy “in time” was benefical to the Soviet Union, as it eliminated the need for reciprocation. For these reasons, on October 28th Krushchev chose to agree to the deal, signifying an end to the Cuban Missile Crisis.