Legal Argumentation
Models for the Analysis of Legal Argumentation
EVELINE T. FETERIS
Department of Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric University of Amsterdam Spuistraat 134 1012 VB Amsterdam Netherlands e.t.feteris@uva.nl
Introduction
In their classical works on argumentation the philosophers Chaïm Perelman and Stephen Toulmin presented the procedures and practices of legal reasoning as a model for a rational practice of argumentation. In the 50 years since the publication of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's La nouvelle rhétorique, Traité de l'argumentation (1958) and Toulmin's The uses of argument (1958) argumentation theorists and informal logicians have developed models for the analysis and evaluation of argumentation in the practical sphere, among them models for legal argumentation. Since argumentation theory and informal logic have become disciplines that have developed their own models of rational argumentation, it seems a good moment to have a closer look at how these models can be applied to legal argumentation and how they can be used to show the strengths and weaknesses of the practices of legal argumentation. The aim of this special issue is to give an overview of recent developments in research of legal argumentation and legal decisionmaking where models for the analysis and evaluation of legal argumentation have been developed. In different disciplines such as argumentation theory, informal logic, legal theory and rhetoric, different models have been developed for reconstructing patterns of legal reasoning that underlie the process of legal decision-making, with the aim of evaluating the quality of judicial decisions. They address questions regarding both the quality of the decision-making process in factual matters as well as the quality of decision-making and justification in the interpretation and application of legal rules. The contributions to this special issue are written by authors from such different scientific backgrounds as
EVELINE T. FETERIS
Department of Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric University of Amsterdam Spuistraat 134 1012 VB Amsterdam Netherlands e.t.feteris@uva.nl
Introduction
In their classical works on argumentation the philosophers Chaïm Perelman and Stephen Toulmin presented the procedures and practices of legal reasoning as a model for a rational practice of argumentation. In the 50 years since the publication of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's La nouvelle rhétorique, Traité de l'argumentation (1958) and Toulmin's The uses of argument (1958) argumentation theorists and informal logicians have developed models for the analysis and evaluation of argumentation in the practical sphere, among them models for legal argumentation. Since argumentation theory and informal logic have become disciplines that have developed their own models of rational argumentation, it seems a good moment to have a closer look at how these models can be applied to legal argumentation and how they can be used to show the strengths and weaknesses of the practices of legal argumentation. The aim of this special issue is to give an overview of recent developments in research of legal argumentation and legal decisionmaking where models for the analysis and evaluation of legal argumentation have been developed. In different disciplines such as argumentation theory, informal logic, legal theory and rhetoric, different models have been developed for reconstructing patterns of legal reasoning that underlie the process of legal decision-making, with the aim of evaluating the quality of judicial decisions. They address questions regarding both the quality of the decision-making process in factual matters as well as the quality of decision-making and justification in the interpretation and application of legal rules. The contributions to this special issue are written by authors from such different scientific backgrounds as