Leibniz's Discourse On Metaphysics Summary

Remaining Issues with the Discourse on Metaphysics There are still some problems with the position Leibniz holds, the most concerning being a failure to establish or support man's choice as something besides a possible, though certain, motion of their essence. Their actions may be accidentally determined by this internal nature, but this affords no more freedom than the existence of alternate possibilities. Something yet more concerning: while Leibniz perceives action completely determined by nature as something which would render God incapable of morality, he does not seem to realize the implication extends to man. Man's essence, or soul, is certainly created by God, but the imbuement of free will is assumed in Leibniz's position. God, when
We clearly see that God is limited in his free will by the rules of contradiction. For man? Nothing is said - we do not know if we may hold with Abelard, who believes at the very least, we are given free dominion over our soul and our attitude toward the accidental situations in life. Leibniz actually seems to be more restrictive than this, stating in his Discourse that man's soul tends always toward what is ‘best’ - a determined attribute contingent upon factors inside and outside of the will! From this, we find a significant departure from some medieval thinkers on free will such as Abelard, and a marked closeness to Aquinas or Kant, both of which incline toward a compatibilism of free will and
The key change will come in the rehabilitation of substantial forms within New System of Nature, which will be carried onwards through the Monadology. By arguing for the necessity of some form of essential unity – some completely self contained substance – Leibniz in turn undermines both the spinozist and the mechanist position and creates the conditions for the existence of a self-contained soul separate from the nature of God. The reasons for the necessity of essential unities are found within the mechanist position itself: if all attributes are produced by the movement of particles, there must be some most basic particle which can be empowered with force. If no such ‘most basic’ particle exists, than there is an infinite regression of ever smaller particles ad infinitum – none of which would actually have attributes in and of