Lilly Ledbetter Case Summary
Issue: Can Mrs. Ledbetter, the plaintiff, bring a salary discrimination suit under the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when the unequal pay is received during the statutory limitations period of 180 days, but the pay is the consequence of the discriminatory salary decisions that occurred before the limitations period?
Facts:
Lilly Ledbetter was one of the very few female supervisors at the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. plant in Gadsden, Alabama, and she worked at that plant for nineteen years, from 1979 till her retirement in 1998. Initially, when she started working for the company, her pay was equal to that of the other male supervisors. However, as time passed the pay discrepancy between Ledbetter and her 15 male counterparts was stark: the lowest she received was $3,727 per month, while the lowest paid male received $4,286. Thus, after realizing this Mrs. Ledbetter filed an official complaint before the EEOC in March 1998, stating that Goodyear violated the Title VII as they paid her a discriminatory low salary due to her sex. After she filed an official complaint, her case went to trial, and the jury concluded that the pay disparity was due to intentional discrimination. However, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the jury verdict, as it claimed Mrs. Ledbetter’s’ case was not filed in time, as the original discriminatory pay decision occurred before the statutory limitations of 180 days. …show more content…
Consequently, the case went to the Supreme Court for review.
Law:
The primary law which was both employed and examined in order to reach a decision on the issue was Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
This law prohibits employers from discriminating their employees on the basis of religion, race, sex, color, and national origin. Since Mrs. Ledbetter was paid significantly less than her male employees at Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. it is evident that she felt she was a victim of gender discrimination, and thus filed a complaint against Goodyear for violating the Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act.
Analysis:
After scrupulously analyzing and reviewing all the facts and laws involved in the case, it is over that Mrs. Ledbetter was a victim of gender discrimination, as she illustrated viable evidence that suggested she received a much lower salary for similar type and amount of work than her male colleagues. However, it is also evident that there was no evidence of discrimination in the reviews that were part of the 180 days. Hence, since the Circuit Court found no evidence of discrimination in those specific reviews, it reversed the jury’s verdict, and dismissed Ledbetter’s official complaint.
Conclusion:
Via a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court eventually ruled on May 29, 2007 that Ledbetter’s claim was time-barred by the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964’s limitation period of 180 days. Furthermore, the Court also proclaimed that in order for a timely claim the plaintiff would have needed to file within the 180 days of a pay and gender discriminatory decision. In addition, the Court stated that if it were to adopt Mrs. Ledbetter’s argument then it would have to allow discriminatory pay decisions made twenty years ago, which seemed an implausible path to take. On the contrary, in dissent, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg claimed that the court “ordered a cramped interpretation of Title VII, incompatible with the statute’s broad remedial purpose” Therefore, it is evident that even though there was clearly pay and gender discrimination involved in this particular case, the Court ruled against the plaintiff as she failed to meet the time requirements set by the EEOC.
Opinion:
Even though the Court reversed the jury’s original verdict, which was in the favor of Mrs. Ledbetter, I personally agree with the verdict of the jury, than the reversal of the Court. Firstly, the evidence that the plaintiff provided was quite viable and convincing: “she was a member of a protected class, she worked substantially equal to the work of the dominant class (men), she was less compensated for that work, and the disparity was attributable to gender-based discrimination” Secondly, her former supervisor admitted to the jury that her pay, during a particular period, fell below the minimum threshold of her position. Thirdly, the courts’ is radically contradictory to that of the standards of Title VII, which was established to prevent workplace discrimination. Therefore, these are the primary reasons why I believe the Supreme Court unjustly, and it should have maintained the original decision of the jury.
Facts:
Lilly Ledbetter was one of the very few female supervisors at the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. plant in Gadsden, Alabama, and she worked at that plant for nineteen years, from 1979 till her retirement in 1998. Initially, when she started working for the company, her pay was equal to that of the other male supervisors. However, as time passed the pay discrepancy between Ledbetter and her 15 male counterparts was stark: the lowest she received was $3,727 per month, while the lowest paid male received $4,286. Thus, after realizing this Mrs. Ledbetter filed an official complaint before the EEOC in March 1998, stating that Goodyear violated the Title VII as they paid her a discriminatory low salary due to her sex. After she filed an official complaint, her case went to trial, and the jury concluded that the pay disparity was due to intentional discrimination. However, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the jury verdict, as it claimed Mrs. Ledbetter’s’ case was not filed in time, as the original discriminatory pay decision occurred before the statutory limitations of 180 days. …show more content…
Consequently, the case went to the Supreme Court for review.
Law:
The primary law which was both employed and examined in order to reach a decision on the issue was Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
This law prohibits employers from discriminating their employees on the basis of religion, race, sex, color, and national origin. Since Mrs. Ledbetter was paid significantly less than her male employees at Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. it is evident that she felt she was a victim of gender discrimination, and thus filed a complaint against Goodyear for violating the Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act.
Analysis:
After scrupulously analyzing and reviewing all the facts and laws involved in the case, it is over that Mrs. Ledbetter was a victim of gender discrimination, as she illustrated viable evidence that suggested she received a much lower salary for similar type and amount of work than her male colleagues. However, it is also evident that there was no evidence of discrimination in the reviews that were part of the 180 days. Hence, since the Circuit Court found no evidence of discrimination in those specific reviews, it reversed the jury’s verdict, and dismissed Ledbetter’s official complaint.
Conclusion:
Via a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court eventually ruled on May 29, 2007 that Ledbetter’s claim was time-barred by the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964’s limitation period of 180 days. Furthermore, the Court also proclaimed that in order for a timely claim the plaintiff would have needed to file within the 180 days of a pay and gender discriminatory decision. In addition, the Court stated that if it were to adopt Mrs. Ledbetter’s argument then it would have to allow discriminatory pay decisions made twenty years ago, which seemed an implausible path to take. On the contrary, in dissent, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg claimed that the court “ordered a cramped interpretation of Title VII, incompatible with the statute’s broad remedial purpose” Therefore, it is evident that even though there was clearly pay and gender discrimination involved in this particular case, the Court ruled against the plaintiff as she failed to meet the time requirements set by the EEOC.
Opinion:
Even though the Court reversed the jury’s original verdict, which was in the favor of Mrs. Ledbetter, I personally agree with the verdict of the jury, than the reversal of the Court. Firstly, the evidence that the plaintiff provided was quite viable and convincing: “she was a member of a protected class, she worked substantially equal to the work of the dominant class (men), she was less compensated for that work, and the disparity was attributable to gender-based discrimination” Secondly, her former supervisor admitted to the jury that her pay, during a particular period, fell below the minimum threshold of her position. Thirdly, the courts’ is radically contradictory to that of the standards of Title VII, which was established to prevent workplace discrimination. Therefore, these are the primary reasons why I believe the Supreme Court unjustly, and it should have maintained the original decision of the jury.