Mayaguez Incident Of 1975 Summary

AMERICAN PUBLIC UNIVERSITY SYSTEM

CHARLESTOWN, WEST VIRGINIA

THE MAYAGUEZ INCIDENT OF 1975 –THE LAST ACT OF THE VIETNAM WAR
WAS THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPONSIBLE FOR THE CAMBODIAN TAKEOVER OF THE MAYAGUEZ?

A research paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of
MASTERS OF ARTS: in HOMELAND SECURITY by Richard Goldman
Department Approval Date:

The author hereby grants the American Public University System the right to display these contents for educational purposes. The author assumes total responsibility for meeting the requirements set by United States Copyright Law for the inclusion of any materials that are not the author’s creation or in the public domain.

© 2013 by Richard Goldman

All Rights Reserved
DEDICATION

The author wishes to dedicate this paper to the following individuals for without whom history itself could never have been written, nor ever been made:

President Gerald R. Ford (1913-2006). A friend, a mentor, a leader and a visionary who taught me the ways of political life and political thinking. A lifetime of service came about from these lessons wherein cooperation and crossing the aisle to obtain what is needed for the American people became a way of life for me. Having shared this experience together, there is no finer way to honor the memory of my dear friend than to present this paper in its fullest so that future generations can understand what transpired during those final dark days of the Vietnam War in 1975.

Lt. Alvin R. Goldman (1925-2012). Lt. Goldman was not only a father, a friend and a mentor; he was a hero amongst men. The horrors he faced, the horrors he saw, made for a lifetime of nightmares that no human being should ever have to encounter. The emotional scars carried with these men for the rest of their lives, and with nearly all of them now gone, it remains the duty, no, the obligation of the sons and daughters of every soldier of every generation to carry on their legacy, and to make certain what they saw and what they fought for will never be forgotten.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:

I wish to thank the Gerald R. Ford family for allowing me to present a paper that for many years was quietly tucked away among controversy and political resentment. With President Ford having to utilize the War Powers Act of 1973 for the first time during Mayaguez, a debate raged for a generation that continues forward today on the Powers of the United States Presidency and how the Executive Branch is to report Incidents of National Security to Members of Congress. President Ford never wished to be part of history, never wished to be President of the United States but accepted the Office and the challenge that came with it – to save a nation from turning onto itself during the final days of the Richard Nixon Presidency and what has become known as the Watergate Scandal.

ABSTRACT OF THE RESEARCH PAPER

THE MAYAGUEZ INCIDENT OF 1975 –THE LAST ACT OF THE VIETNAM WAR
WAS THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPONSIBLE FOR THE CAMBODIAN TAKEOVER OF THE MAYAGUEZ? by Richard Goldman

American Public University System, 1, May 2013

Dr. Patrick Forrest, Research Paper Professor

On May 12, 1975, Soldiers from the Khmer Rouge, who followed the Communist Party of Kampuchea in Cambodia, used gunboats to seize the United States merchant ship SS Mayaguez inside of international waters, in the Gulf of Thailand. The Mayaguez, her captain, and her crew of thirty nine men and officers, were captured approximately sixty five nautical miles southwest of Cambodia near what was then known as the Poulo Wai Islands. The Mayaguez had been on its way on a peace mission to Thailand and it carried supplies and commercial cargo intended to be given to United States Service personnel and the United States Embassy of Thailand. The “Incident” as history now calls it, was the last true battle of the Vietnam War, and propelled the Gerald R. Ford Administration into action in their attempt to rescue the Mayaguez and her hostages.

This essay will trace the Incident itself, the Ford Administration’s attempt to rescue the Mayaguez and will detail the failings of the Mission from March 14-16, 1975 overall.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

I. INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………. 7

II. LITERATURE REVIEW……………………………………………….. 7

III. METHODOLOGY……………………………………………………… 12

IV. BACKGROUND………………………………………………………... 14 V. THE CREW OF THE MAYAGUEZ IS TRANSFERRED…………….. 15

VI. THE WHITE HOUSE MOVES INTO RESCUE MODE………………. 16

VII. THE THREE PRONGS OF HENRY KISSINGER…………………...... 16

VIII. COMSVENTHFLT BECOMES INVOLVED IN RESCUE OPS…….... 17

IX. REAL TIME COMMUNICATION BY THE LISTENING POSTS….... 19

X. INCIDENT AFTERMATH-CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION.... 28

XI. THE EFFECTS ON THE WHITE HOUSE AND FUTURE ADMINS... 30

XII. THE WAR POWERS ACT INVOCATION…………………………..... 31

XIII. THE MODELS ADMINS NOW USE IN RESCUE ATTEMPTS……… 32

XIV. CONCLUSION………………………………………………………….. 34

XV. REDACTED MAPS AND FIGURES USED IN RESCUE ATTEMPT… 36

XVI. REFERENCES…………………………………………………………... 43

INTRODUCTION

On May 12, 1975, as the last United States Citizens and political refugees were being evacuated from Saigon under the Executive Order signed on May 10, 1975 by President Gerald Ford, soldiers from the Khmer Rouge, who followed the Communist Party of Kampuchea in Cambodia, used gunboats to seize the United States merchant ship SS Mayaguez inside of international waters, in the Gulf of Thailand. The Mayaguez, her captain, and her crew of thirty nine men and officers, were captured approximately sixty five nautical miles southwest of Cambodia near what was then known as the Poulo Wai Islands. The Mayaguez had been on its way on a peace mission to Thailand and it carried supplies and commercial cargo intended to be given to United States Service personnel and the United States Embassy of Thailand. The Mayaguez Incident would encompass over 78 hours from the time of the seizure of the Merchant Ship until the full withdrawal of United States Marines from the rescues site on island of Koh Tang on May 15, 1975 (GAO Report on Mayaguez, 1976).

LITERATURE REVIEW
In a 1976 study of the Mayaguez Incident, JJ Paust sets forth a broad range of arguments that the Ford Administration allegedly was forced to use during the Incident itself. Paust is critical of the Ford Administration and in particular Henry Kissinger, the Secretary of State, citing failure of all parts to correctly identify the Khmer Rouge and its terror style tactics towards the end of the Vietnam War. He paints a picture of intelligence failures that led to the Mayaguez Incident including that Kissinger attempted to lay blame on the State Department not receiving enough communications regarding the Khmer Rouse movements prior to the boarding of the Mayaguez, nor the fact that a Panamanian vessel had only a week before been boarded in the same region that carried American personnel.
Paust lays no blame on the Central Intelligence Agency, which is not surprising, since no documentation was available at the time of his essay as they had been redacted or marked for secrecy by the Intelligence Committee of the United States Senate and the White House. Paust is also critical of the War Powers Act and goes into detail how President Ford tried to not usurp the Act towards members of Congress, but had no choice in the end but to invoke Presidential Privilege in an attempt to prevent Congress from leaking information about the Rescue Attempt before the operation was underway.

Finally, Paust chastises Congress and the Ford Administration for the failures of the Rescue Attempt and the loss of life that followed. He lays particular blame on communication failures for those that were left behind and summarily executed in the streets of Cambodia by the Khmer Rouge. Paust directs little blame to the Ford Administration for the loss of life, instead focusing on the array of misguided egos of those involved who wanted to credit themselves for the rescue of the crew.

The article by Paust was the first of many written by Paust and his colleagues about intelligence failures and the involvement of the military in same. By presenting his arguments in a short and concise setting, Paust allows for the reader to digest the particular argument, as well as do further research as cited by the article itself.

Richard Head, in an essay titled Crisis Resolution: Presidential Decision Making in the Mayaguez and Korean Confrontations (1978) applauds Paust for placing blame on misguided egos and military glad-handing that led to loss of life.
Heads applauds Ford for the proper utilization of the War Powers Act and how Congress was immediately informed of the impending Rescue efforts of the crew and ship itself, while taking aim at the Central Intelligence Agency “Listening Stations” that he claimed could have prevented the Cambodian incursion and overall loss of life. He targets the CIA as also possibly inciting inaction by the Pentagon, with misguided cues and an array of false information that was being directed towards Washington by the Cambodian Government during the hours that led to the capture of the Mayaguez herself. Head, along with co-authors Frisco Short and Robert McFarlane, takes a hard look at Presidential Powers and how those can be usurped by the slightest misinformation that can lead to loss of life in Incidents that are across the range of the globe, beginning with Korea and ending with
Vietnam.
Robert J. Mahoney wrote a novel titled “The Mayaguez Incident: Testing America 's Resolve in the Post Vietnam Era” where he describes the significant impact the way the White House and Pentagon along with the Armed Forces have changed since the Incident. Mahoney spends much of his focus on what he perceives as the “Inner Circle” of the White House during the Incident, including President Gerald Ford, Secretary of State and National Security Council Chairman Henry Kissinger, Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, Secretary of Defense Arthur Schlesinger, Assistant Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld, and Central Intelligence Agency chairman William Colby. His descriptions are accurate on several levels, but he has no first-hand knowledge of the Incident and interviewed none of the principals or former White House staffers involved. This is a rather curious thing to have the author readily admit, as creating assumptions and perceiving reactions only go to nullify the content of the novel itself.
What is entirely accurate is the perception offered on the War Powers Act and how President Ford reacted to it overall from the time of the Incident forward. It is essential in his book that the reactions of President Ford are made known to future Presidents of his opposition to the Act and why the Act failed overall causing the loss of life during the Incident.
Ralph Wetterhahn in 2002, presented a controversial side of the Incident in his novel “The Last Battle” The Mayaguez Incident and the End of the Vietnam War”, wherein Wetterhahn, a former Vietnam Veteran and journalist, take a first-hand style approach in attempting to recreate the Incident from the outset, interviewing survivors and former military personnel. From a fictional standpoint as well as a military historical standpoint, Wetterhahn presents an accurate version of how the military itself was taught to think during the Vietnam War, and how the CIA and others reacted to the botched Rescue Attempt for lack of Command and Control leadership.

Overall, what is presented is an effective read of the last battle of the Vietnam War, and closes out an era of controversy with the fall of Saigon itself. Wetterhahn research and documented details of the Command and Control fallout is breathtaking, although his interjection of personal accounts of his own service during Vietnam tend to draw away from the COC missteps and arrogance as he so aptly puts it, in fighting Orders from the White House and This is an excellent account of the last battle of the Vietnam War. What stands out is the presentation of the planning and preparation by the COC, the facts that the execution of the Rescue Plans were marred in controversy as the Hood and others were forced to rely on the Listening Posts to relay information where COC failed to do so.

For the first time in any presentation since the Fascell Committee, Wetterhahn speaks of the three marines that were left behind and tackles this in the most humanistic aspect to date. He brings forward their own personal stories, the families’ reaction to their executions, the nineteen year block of time that becomes missing from 1075 forward with no word on the fate of the marines, and how apparently the execution of the marines took place in front of the Kangaroo style Court that the Khmer created for their own amusement. This lone aspect caused for former Secretary of State Kissinger to publicly comment for the first time since 1975, acknowledging the mistakes made in leaving the marines behind.

Perhaps the most damning report regarding the Mayaguez and the military/CIA involvement came from the General Accounting Office (1976) in their report to Congress simply titled as The Seizure of the Mayaguez. A Case Study of Crisis Management (Departments of State and Defense, National Security Council) Comptroller General of the United States. The GAO accounts for the entire Incident from the first word at the White House of the incursion, to the Rescue Operation itself. It places no fault on the Ford Administration or Congress (under the guise of the War Powers Act), and places direct and comprehensive blame on the military itself and the miscommunications that led to the loss of life. The GAO summarized that the COC was broken from the start, that misguided orders, misguided ego and misguided communication were responsible for the failure and loss of life.

By taking a central point of blame directly to the Military Community for allowing the Incident to commence, while absolving those who were directly on the ground during the Rescue Attempt for not having been told in advance of the Cambodians returning the Crew of the Mayaguez to the ship from their hostage-held point inland. This breakdown in communication, where loss of life commenced shortly thereafter, has the GAO citing the military as a direct proximate cause for the failure of intelligence and failure to relay information through the Listening Stations to the ground forces as they moved inland towards an empty hostage venue.

METHODOLOGY
A review of the Literature and study of redacted national security documents, White House historical documentation, first hand reports by those involved in the rescue attempt, published journal articles revealed several questions concerning the research topic. As a result of these articles and documents, nine questions were selected to become the primary focus for this research paper. These nine questions were:
1. How many Listening Posts were manned by the Central Intelligence Agency in Southeast Asia in 1975 towards the end of the Vietnam War?
2. How many Central Intelligence Agency personnel were in Cambodia and in the vicinity of the Khmer Rouge during the last weeks of the Vietnam War in 1975?
3. Did the Ford Administration know of the Listening Posts scattered throughout the Region and did they rely on these posts during the last weeks of the Vietnam War in 1975?
4. Did the Central Intelligence Agency give any information either factual or misleading to the Ford Administration during the days leading up to and during the Mayaguez Incident?
5. Did the Central Intelligence Agency provide misleading or any information to the rescue crews as they moved into the Region in an attempt to rescue the crew members of the Mayaguez?
6. Did the Central Intelligence Agency have “clear sight” on the Khmer Rouge to provide intelligence as to the crew being taken off the Mayaguez, into the surrounding jungle which prevented a rescue attempt from commencing?
7. Did the Central Intelligence Agency fail to provide the necessary information to the rescue teams that the crew of the Mayaguez had been returned to the ship itself well before the rescue attempt began?
8. Did the Central Intelligence Agency abandon its posts before the rescue attempts on the Mayaguez commenced?
9. Did the Ford Administration, as a result of these communications or non communications with the Central Intelligence Agency and its ground personnel knowingly violate the War Powers Act itself by failing to provide such intelligence to Congress as mandated by the Act?

This research paper will answer these questions and contend that the Central Intelligence Agency, despite the numerous allegations made over the years by various authors and pragmatists, did not in any way, shape nor form, become the direct cause for either the Cambodian incursion onto the Mayaguez, the loss of life during and after the Rescue Attempt, nor did the Central Intelligence Agency play any role in mitigating the Khmer Rouge from acting in any other way than to attempt to derail the United States evacuation from Saigon as its own troops marched forward into Saigon City wherein the Vietnam War came to an end. In fact, it will show that the Listening Posts as manned by the CIA Operatives, went far and beyond their own call of duty and orders, breaking silence to attempt to give accurate information to the Rescue Operators, the COC ships Hood and Wilson that were involved, and used their own interception of Khmer communications in an attempt to relay ground troop movement to the Rescue OPS in order to avoid gunfire.

By presenting a minute by minute account of the Listening Posts redacted communication relays for the first time in written form, the paper will also show that the COC, by ignoring the Listening Posts communications – were directly responsible for the lives lost, injuries suffered as well as the three marines that were left behind – a cause for controversy that until this paper, has never been fully explained – as to how the Listening Posts communicated with the COC and took a central role in attempting to circumvent the Rescue OPS from becoming a Grand Scale failure that it become.
With the redacted security documents and the testimony being presented accurately for the first time, the history of the first true act of terrorism against the United States in the 20th Century by a foreign entity will change, if proven correct, the Incident itself as well as the way that the Ford Administration is perceived to have handled the rescue attempt as well as the alleged abuses by President Ford of the relatively new and not previously tested War Powers Act of 1973.

BACKGROUND
With the fall of Saigon commencing and the final evacuation of staff, personnel and individuals from Saigon proper as the Khmer Rouge poured in from the North, President Gerald Ford was focused on the safety of the evacuees and the final withdraw of American Forces from Vietnam itself. When Ford was advised of the Mayaguez having been boarded by the Khmer, Ford shifted his focus as to how the Incident commenced and how the information was being passed. The CIA Listening Posts had orders to continue operations, but prepare to immediately evacuate with the Khmer movement to Saigon. Each Post was fully operational at the time of the Incident and its crews manned 24-7 communications despite the overwhelming presence of the Khmer in the Region.

President Ford was advised that the Listening Posts scattered throughout the Region had picked up communication from the Khmer that the ship had been boarded and that the crew may have been taken off the ship itself. The Listening Posts passed this information on as it was “real time”, attempting to notify the White House as the Incident was proceeding forward.

Within hours of the Mayaguez being seized, President Gerald Rudolph Ford summoned his national security staff, as well as representatives from his Cabinet, the National Security Council, Department of State and the Department of Defense to the White House, where at around noon eastern time the White House issued a statement that the President considered the seizure of the Mayaguez to be an act of both piracy and terrorism and that “failure by the Cambodians to release the Mayaguez and her crew would result in the most serious of consequences.” Those in attendance at that meeting included the President, Vice President Nelson D. Rockefeller, Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State; James Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense; William Colby, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; Lt. General Skowcroft, Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs; Robert Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of State; William Clemens, Deputy Secretary of Defense; Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to the President; and W. Richard Smyser, senior National Security Council staff officer for East Asia. (Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, 2011).

President Ford also summoned to the White House representatives of the United Nations and the People’s Republic of China in an attempt to utilize both to assist in the immediate release of the Mayaguez and her crew.

THE CREW OF THE MAYAGUEZ ARE TRANSFERRED
Immediately upon seizure, the Mayaguez and her crew were taken to the Island of Poulo Wai where it stayed, along with its crew into the morning hours of May 13th. President Ford had ordered recon flights to attempt to track down the Mayaguez, where she was found on May 13th anchored just off the southern coastline of the Island of Koh Tang.

The Listening Posts advised that scattered communications presented a problem in that conflicting information was being given as to where the crew was. The Listening Posts asked that recon photos commence to assist in finding the crew.

In fact, the crew was nowhere to be seen in the recon photos, and, had in fact, been transferred through fishing boats to the Island of Kompon Som (GAO, p. 6). POTUS Ford asked if the Listening Posts and for that matter, anyone in the CIA had any indication that the Khmer would “pull this stunt.” The CIA reported back to Ford that they neither they nor the Listening Posts had any prior knowledge of the impending Cambodian incursion and that the Cambodians had maintained radio silence up until the taking of the ship and its crew. (GAO, p. 8)

THE WHITE HOUSE MOVES TO RESCUE MODE
President Ford during the evening of May 12th, met with the National Security Council and representative of the Joint Chiefs to begin discussions on a rescue mission, should the diplomatic channels that were being attempted by both the United Nations and the Chinese, be unsuccessful overall. The recommendation of the NSC as well as the JC was to mount a rescue mission of both the Mayaguez, which and its crew. (USSM.org, 2011). On May 13th, the Commander in Chief Pacific Forces (CinCPAC) Admiral Noel Gaylor was ordered by President Ford to contact the Commander of the 7th Fleet (COMSEVENTHFLT) to begin to prepare both light and heavily armored forces to support the Mayaguez rescue operation in a three-pronged operation.

THE THREE PRONG RESCUE ATTEMPT AS ADVISED BY KISSINGER
President Ford, following the advice given to him by his aides and Henry A. Kissinger, the Secretary of State, proposed a “three prong” rescue style mission for the Mayaguez (NSC, May 13, 1975 pp. 1-15). The prongs included:

1. Forces shall storm the Mayaguez, completely and swiftly overpower any Khmers on board, and secure her;
2. Forces shall fully execute an amphibious assault on Koh Tang Island and recover the crew;
3. Forces shall immediately strike military targets in and around Kampong Som airfield (Ream) and Seam Ream naval base to prevent reinforcement by the Khmer Rouge from the mainland.
COMSEVENTHFLT (COMMAND SEVENTH FLEET) BECOMES INVOLVED
Ford received a communication from COMSEVENTHFLT, Vice Admiral George P. Steele, who informed the President that he had directed the aircraft carrier USS Coral Sea and two destroyers, the USS Henry B. Wilson and the USS Harold E. Holt to proceed at “full measure” to the Gulf of Thailand west of Kampong Som and stand by for orders. Ford then ordered that CinCPAC designate his long time friend and ally, Lt Gen John J. Burns, commander of the United States Support Activities Group (USSAG) at Nakhon Phanom Air Base (NKP), Thailand, to become the Commander of the Joint Task Force (CJTF). Burns sends word to the Listening Posts that the Rescue Attempt is imminent and that the Posts should monitor all Khmer communication and strategy in order to provide assistance to the OPS.

USSAG Headquarters, located in Nakhon Phanom, which was the closest US military headquarters to Cambodia and had been heavily involved in Operations Frequent Wind and Eagle Pull. Burns had also been the operational commander for Operation Eagle Pull. (Vandenbrouke, 1993).
Lt Gen Burns appointed Col Lloyd Anders, Deputy Commander for Operations, 56th Special Operations Wing (56th SOW) at NKP as the operational task force commander and further gave him instructions from POTUS and the NSC to open and obtain a forward operating post 250 miles north of Kampong Som at the Utapo Air Base. Lt Col Burns ordered two helicopter squadrons, the 21st Special Operations Squadron, code named “21st SOS, and the “Jollies” from the 40th Air Rescue and Recovery Squadron, code named “40th ARRS” to stand by to become part of the RR (Rescue and Recovery) portion of the mission itself.
President Ford was exceedingly pleased that both squadrons were standing by to take flight, as both had been part of the final evacuation of the United States Embassies in Phnom Penh (Code named Operation Go Eagle Pull) and Saigon proper (Code named Operation Fly into the Frequent Wind). (Paust, 1976 pp. 784-806).
Henry Kissinger, through Ford, directed Lt Gen Burns to configure members of the 56th Security Police Squadron (56th SPS) to speed to Utapo from North Vietnam (the last remaining SP Unit there) so that they would become the assault team if necessary. (Paust, p. 789). In a haunting tale of what was to happen further down the line, one of the Transporters that was on its way to Utapo, crashed immediately after takeoff, killing all eighteen SPs and five crewmembers on board. President Ford then ordered two contingents of Marines (50 from the Philippines and 250 from Okinawa) to become assault one teams and execute the mission. Ford was overwrought with emotion when learning of the crash (Hanhimaki, 2004).
Although Col Anders requested the “Nails” of the 23rd Tactical Air Support Squadron (23rd TASS) to support the operation, Lt Gen Burns did not deem Forward Air Controllers (FACs) necessary for this operation and the plan did not include them.
By 11:00 am Eastern Time on May 14, 1975, with all efforts of the United Nation having been exhausted to convince the Khmer Rouge to release the Mayaguez, all forces were in placed in and around 14 May, all assigned forces were in and around Utapo. The Listening Posts begin to pick up extended chatter from the Khmer but none appear to indicate that the Khmer was expecting any form of Rescue Operations overall. The Khmer seemed more concerned as to placement of their own ground troops as local fighting still continued throughout the Region.

REAL TIME COMMUNICATIONS BY THE LISTENING POSTS TO COC
What follows is the approximate time line (annotated for length) of the operation as it began on 15 May, from both the military and White House observations (NSC, May 15, 1975), (Staats, E.B., 1976), (CINPAC, 1976, pp. 1030) (GAO-Fascell, 1976).
All times Khmer Time in Cambodia-Vietnam Time
15, May 0100
POTUS Ford orders The Marine Ground Security Force (GSF), Mayaguez assault team and helicopter crews at Utapo to undergo a final mission briefing that will include intelligence, call signals ass designated and weather related information. The 56th SOW intelligence estimated the Khmer forces on the island to be at fifteen to thirty irregular troops, while the NSC and the Defense Intelligence Agency held their own estimated at just over one hundred to possibly two hundred regular infantry.
The Listening Posts estimate that the troops are five to nine hundred and pass this information on. The White House notes after the fact that none of this information is ever given to the Ground Force Troops or the helicopter trams. The Khmer have been pooling troops due to the local fighting and the overall estimates could not become verified.
The White House further noted that three sets of target area photos were delivered to the assault platoon commander moments before full flight takeoff, but there was no delay the mission or change the hastily developed tactical plan. The Listening Posts are instructed to monitor all related chatter that may commence before during and after the Assault Orders are given. The Listening Posts are further instructed that they are to maintain radio silence unless so ordered by GSF and POTUS. (Gerald R. Ford Library, 2011). As the OPS develop, this instruction becomes ignored as the Listening Posts jump into the fray to assist with location and movement. It is this violation of Orders that lead to lives being saved.
0415
Listening Posts advise that that Cambodia is maintaining silence and that Radar is also “down” from a military perspective. POTUS orders a total of eleven helicopters to liftoff from Utapo towards their objective. Strike teams eleven, twelve and thirteen proceed to the USS Holt, already holding the Marine assault team and support personnel on board. “Knife 21, 22, 23, and 31 are the first Koh Tang assault wave, followed five minutes in trail by Knife 32, and Jolly’s 41, 42, and 43.”
The first one hundred eight marines of the planned are on board the eleven helicopters. The Listening Posts transmit – radio silence still ensues.
The first incursion is scheduled for 5:45 AM. However due to the War Powers Act of 1973, the launch is delayed while President Ford, under the guise of the WPA, briefs Congressional leaders on the operation. POTUS Ford orders COS Cheney to bring House Majority and Minority Leadership to WH so that a briefing can commence. POTUS Ford is angry that he has to provide this briefing, fearing that the perceived tactical advantage will be lost.
POTUS Ford advises Kissinger that the new WPA can potentially cause death or injury due to the delay. Ignoring the fact that the WPA is in effect, Speaker of the House Carl Albert, as angry as POTUS Ford, tells the President to “go, go, go” and to forget the rest of the briefing.

0600
The choppers arrive at the Holt. The Listening Posts are silent. The Posts are advised from the Holt that the choppers have arrived. The Posts acknowledge with a simple “OK” and maintain further silence.
0630
The Listening Posts urgently advise the Holt that chatter has commenced and that it is their belief that the Captain and Crew have been released. This is done through verbal acknowledgement and not Morse. The Listening Posts give definitive information that there may be a Fishing Boat with the Crew on it. The Listening Posts ask that all OPS “Hold” until the verification can be given that the crew is on this Boast.
0641
The Holt inexplicably ignores the Listening Post information and the White House is never informed that the Khmer had indeed released the captain and crew of the Mayaguez after they had been interrogated overnight at Kaoh Rong Samloem. The captain and crew boarded a Thailand-flagged fishing boat for the return trip to the Mayaguez. The fact that the crew is on its way back to the ship causes the Listening Posts to begin “screaming” at the Holt to “hold”.
The Listening Posts are incredulous that the Captain and Crew have been released and that a strike order must be abandoned if this is correct. Again, message not passed through the Holt to the WH.
Almost at the exact time of the 0630 release, the first wave the rescue OPS were approaching Koh Tang to begin the incursion and rescue. Recon had called for the insertion into two LZ’s or landing zones on the northern tip of the island. The Helo’s were able to land without detection. The Western end of the landing zone was reported as silent as LZ is quiet as Knife 21 was able to put his 20 marines ashore.
0655
The Listening Posts immediately advise that chatter has begun and the choppers have been compromised. The Khmer ground troops in the area have seen the Helo’s and are rushing toward them en masse. The chatter increases as the ground troops near.
0657
Posts further advise the Holt that they need to “cease, cease, cease” and abort. The Holt passes this on to the Helo’s- however - ground fire begins some ten minutes into the landing, and the first Helo loses an engine in and is forced to fly out of the zone. The Helo is crippled and crashes into the sea one mile out, killing a crew member.
Listening Posts advise “rescue one” having picked up the Helo “mayday” call. Dispatch of Rescue Operations begins. The posts verify that there is no aerial assault forthcoming and that the Rescue Operation is “safe on all fronts” to proceed.
0700-0710
The Listening Posts advise that chatter has indicated that the ground fire in the smaller, Western LZ is “load” heavy (complete ambush scenario detected and that the area is compromised by onrushing ground swell of troops). The Eastern LZ is met by a heavy machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and mortars, and both Helos’ are shot down attempting to off load the marine units. Again, the Listening Posts attempt to call for a cease of operations, but the Holt still does not respond and advise the WH.
The five-man Helo crews and twenty marines are the first and only forces to reach the Eastern LZ, and despite several aborted rescue attempts, they will be isolated there for over ten and one half hours. The Listening Posts are in continual communications with the marines and report back to them on all Cambodian movement through scattered chatter. For these ten and one half hours, it is the Listening Posts themselves who are guiding the marines in an attempt to protect their lives.
Helo Knife 31 takes a direct hit in a fuel tank from an RPG and disappears in a fireball. The co-pilot is dead, and half the marines are killed trying to reach shore. Eleven Marines and three aircrew survive and swim out to sea under heavy fire from the Khmer. The Listening Posts contact the USS Wilson and advise a rescue one operation is needed. The Wilson begins immediate OPS and ceases all further activities in order to commence rescue.
0730-0845
The Listening Posts are in direct contact with the survivors and Listening Post One (area of operation unknown as to location), becomes the primary contact on “Tact 4” to communicate with the survivors. The Post stays active for four hours until the USS Wilson finally comes about and spots the survivors commencing rescues operations.
0900
The second flight of four HELOS’ begins its assault run and is more heavily armored than the Knife CH-53s, with an additional 7.62 MM minigun mounted at the tail of the cargo bay. Jolly 42, 43 and Knife 32 insert their marines into the West LZ by 0930.

0920-10
The Listening Posts advise that Knife 32 is in imminent danger, having been “spotted” by the Cambodians. Knife 32 is advised to “hunker down or leave, leave now”. 1015
The Listening Posts have picked up transmissions from the Thai Fishing Boat that is heading towards the Wilson. The Posts advise that they have communicated with the crew of the Boat and that there is no “Hostile Intent” that they have the Crew of the Mayaguez on board. The Boat is moving slowly so as to not antagonize the Wilson or any air movement that may be around them.
The Listening Posts advise the Wilson to “stand down, stand down, do not fire on the Boat, it is full of our friendlies”. The Wilson pulls all stop and recognizes that the Boat is indeed carrying the crew of the Mayaguez.
The Listening Posts break full silence and advise through all channels to contact the White House, advising the attacks “need to cease and desist, we have the Mayaguez and her crew.” (Paust, p 729). The Wilson sends acknowledgement to the White House that the Listening Posts are correct.
1215
Word of the crew’s release reaches Congress and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The White House directs an order to be sent that reads:
“Immediately cease all offensive operations against Khmer Republic related to seizure of Mayaguez.” The Listening Posts act as conduits and begin transmitting on all channels in both Morse code and in English to the ABCC.
Gen Burns contacts the Airborne Command and Control Center (ABCCC) and orders the airborne mission commander (AMC) to turn all assault waves back to Utapo. Listening Posts relay orders on all frequencies.
The assault wave is turned back to Koh Tang.
The Mayaguez crew is back and enroute to Sattahip with the original crew.
13:40
The Listening Posts begin to transmit angry messages to the ABCCC advising them of the “greatest cluster f*** in American Military History.” The ABCCC advises the Listening Posts to “shut the hell up and let us work.” The Listening Posts refuse to back down and continue their verbal assault.
The rescue of the GSF is now the order of the day.
1530
There are less than four hours of daylight left.
President Ford orders the immediate extraction of the still isolated marine team from the Eastern LZ. The Listening Posts continue to transmit on all frequencies to the GSF in hopes of being heard.

1640
Helo’s and gunships descent on the LZ, running along the beach, firing M-60 rounds into the Khmer positions and providing alternative transportation off the beach if needed. The marines leave protected cover and make a fast withdrawal to the chopper. With the survivors aboard, the Helo’s make their way back out to the ocean with minimal resistance. Helo’s transmit to the Listening Posts rescue is successful. Listening Posts now transmit to the Khmer on all frequencies to stop assaults. No response from Khmer.
1800
The White House was given conflicting reports a wounded marine still in the wreckage of Knife 23 and POTUS issues a “hell at all cost, get him” order. Three Helo Units makes an effort to search and recover, if possible. Listening Posts continue to transmit on all frequencies. Helo Commanders speak individually with the Listening Posts in hopes of getting further guidance.
Gunship Black Velvet 1 also moves in close to the beach to search for the marine, with no success.
1830
The marines on the Western LZ are now ordered to be recovered. Three helicopters make the move towards the Western LZ, Knife 51, Jolly 43, and Jolly 44. The Listening Posts advise the Khmer are still active and more en route. Posts attempt to relay to 51, 43 and 44 that rescue operations are underway. No response.
In what the President will describe as agreeing with the Listening Posts that this has potentially become the “greatest cluster f--- of our times” (NSC May 15, 1975 pp 20-35) the Team Leader of the Western LZ claims he was never advised nor communicated with that his forces were about to be evacuated. Only after the first HELO appears off shore to the west, and he sees flares going up in the air due north, does he realize that an extraction team has come for them. The Khmer also sees the flares and begin to fire on the Helo position. Return fire and missiles are returned towards the Khmer positions so that the approaching team can be evacuated.
Jolly 43, 44 and Knife 51 each pull over forty marines from the LZ on their first run – which is over maximum capacity. Jolly 43 and Knife 51 return to the Coral Sea with their troops, while Jolly 44 takes the marine hold to the Holt. The Listening Posts attempt to communicate to the WH that the Coral Sea and Holt have taken rescue teams.
Ignoring the Listening Posts and not relaying vital information – some seven hours, a lifetime in the time frame after the rescues, the White House is informed that three marines inside of the Western LZ had been left behind. It is unknown how this may have happened as the men were last seen together and alive. The Listening Posts last heard from the Khmer that these troops were being pursued and attempted to relay such information to Command and Control.
POTUS orders that the Helo’s return to the island and search for survivors but, at 10AM, with no success, the JCS directed all forces to depart Cambodian waters.
The three missing marines – Lance Corporal Joseph N. Hargrove, Private First Class Garry Hall, and Private Danny G. Marshall – are left for dead. The Khmer go Radio Silent and the Listening Posts are left with their attempts to try to track the marines by word of mouth.
Nineteen years later, the Joint Task Force for Full Accounting learns that all three marines were alive, captured over the next several days, and executed by the Khmers.

INCIDENT AFTERMATH –CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
Congress immediately called for Hearings into the matter from both a War Powers Act perspective (which led virtually nowhere) and the more important Rescue Operations and possible failures of Operation that led to (then unknown loss of life, but marines down and missing).
The General Accounting Office and Congressman Dante Fascell of California performed two independent studies while seeking the same information. The studies became known as:
‘The Seizure of the Mayaguez – A Case Study in Crisis Management’, Departments of State and Defense, National Security Council (Washington DC, 1976) US Government Accountability Office, Staats, E.B. (Comptroller of the United States),

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. War Powers: A Test of Compliance Relative to the Danang Sealift, the Evacuation of Phnom Penh, the Evacuation of Saigon, and the Mayaguez Incident. Hearings held May 7 and June 4, 1975. Washington, U.S.

Both Staats and Fascell immediately focused on The Listening Posts of the CIA as they came under scrutiny from Command and Control as they attempted to deflect responsibility for leaving the marines behind. The CIA, during testimony both public and private inside of the Fascell Committee, brings forth a minute by minute account of the Listening Posts, how the Posts themselves literally directed OPS during the Rescue Attempts and how the Posts became at ill with Command and Control over this failure to proceed as directed issues. (GAO-Fascell, 1976).
The CIA further brings in for private testimony several Post Operators who verify that it was the Posts directing OPS and Communications with the Helo’s in an attempt to guide them and alert them to Khmer movement and Khmer communications intercepted. Fascell himself questions in private the Operators and draws the same conclusion that the CIA was responsible for saving, not causing loss of, life to the marines. (GAO-Fascell, 1976).
The number of Listening Posts in the Khmer area of Cambodia and Vietnam are determined to be around 20-25, with no formal declaration given as to the exact numbers. As Saigon has fallen by the time of the Incident, the actual number is not itself known as movement amongst CIA Personnel is questionable at best. The total number of Operatives on the ground is also not known or properly revealed, as within Cambodia and Saigon proper, the Personnel is also in flux, with unknown numbers taking the last Evacuees out of Saigon during the Final days before it’s fall. (GAO-Fascell, 1976).
What is revealed by all sources is that the CIA left open its Listening Posts to track the Khmer and Communist Forces as they entered Saigon with the intention of shutting them down once the City had completely fallen. The CIA had issued orders to the Posts to “Burn and Destroy” all Posts over the course of the following three months. The fact that the Posts were able to communicate during the Incident was presented as “nothing short of a miracle that they were still up and running”. (GAO-Fascell, 1976).
President Ford was wrongly informed that the Listening Posts were operational only during the attempted Rescues. Secretary of State Kissinger had in fact informed POTUS of their operational capacity and Ford had thought that they were completely shut down during the fall of Saigon. POTUS Ford would later comment that he was extremely satisfied that the Posts provided clear and concise information to the Rescue OPS, the forces on the ground and to the White House itself. Ford calls these unnamed individuals “heroes of our time” (Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, 2011).

Staats determined that the CIA gave complete and accurate information during the Rescue Attempts and that such information only aided the Rescue OPS. Staats also concluded that the ABCC violated both trust and Command Directives by ignoring and then engaging the Listening Posts in the fashion that it did, all the while complimenting the Listening Posts for “holding their own” during the Incident. (Staats, E.B., 1976)

Staats also determined that the Listening Posts had “clear sight” on the Khmer Rouge to provide enough intelligence as to the crew being taken off the Mayaguez, into the surrounding jungle and that this clear sight continued with the Fishing Boats that brought the crew back from their hold. The Listening Posts acted in accordance with their training as well as direct lines of communication. (Staats, E.B., 1976)
THE EFFECT ON THE WHITE HOUSE AND FUTURE ADMINISTRATION
One of the unintended consequences of the Mayaguez Incident is that it had a major effect on the way the White House and its resident Administration, the intelligence community, the Armed Services as a whole and the Pentagon would interact together in a terrorist style crisis. Mayaguez was the first test of a president’s role as commander-in-chief since the passing of, and overriding of Richard Nixon’s Veto in 1973 of the War Powers Act. President Ford complied with the requirements of the Act, but it may have proved fatal by the delay that it caused while Congress was being briefed.
Until his dying days, Ford criticized the ACT for being too formal on its face, that Nixon’s Veto should have held and that the Incident proved that by having to inform Congress before the Rescue was launched, time was lost, lives were lost, the Khmer was given far too much opportunity to arm itself and that the ACT failed on its face as a result of this. Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, 2011).
Ford was joined in this criticism by Speaker Albert and Speakers through Tip O’Neill who used the Incident as reasons why the ACT was drafted incorrect. Albert attempted on three separate occasions after the Incident to introduce modified Legislation that would protect the POTUS in cases similar to the Incident, wherein notification would not be necessary until after rescue Attempts were made – to prevent loss of life from commencing. These proposals were never ratified nor ever left Committee.
THE WAR POWERS ACT INVOCATION
What President Ford became critical of, was being forced to invoke Section 4(a) (1) (50 USC Sec. 1543(a) (1) of the Resolution, which states in part that: (a) Written report; time of submission; circumstances necessitating submission; information reported
In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in which United States Armed Forces are introduced—
(1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances;
(2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces; or
(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation;

The President shall submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate a report, in writing, setting forth—
(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United States Armed Forces;
(B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which such introduction took place; and
(C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement. (Cornell University Law School, 2012)

President Ford, by triggering the War Powers Act and reporting same to Congress, automatically was able to have the 60 day requirement take effect, while the operation itself only lasted three days in total. Further, President Ford reported to Congress that he had unilaterally met the constitutional and full advice of consultation requirement due to the fact that he as POTUS had immediately ordered that all congressional leaders of both the majority and minority be advised and fully notified by him personally prior to the forces themselves being launched for the Mayaguez rescue.

With Speaker Albert agreeing that the congressional view on consultation was met with the President seeking not just consent, but advisement of the congressional leaders as a whole prior to the full decision to commit the forces (hence the 30 minute delay for launch), the President had met the requirements completely and that any debate on the same “must end accordingly as he has done his sworn duty itself.” (U.S. Congress. House Committee on International Relations, 1975 p. 3).
THE MODELS ADMINISTRATIONS NOW UTILIZE IN RESCUE ATTEMPTS SINCE THE INCIDENT
Strictly speaking from a political science perspective the Ford Administration decision to rescue the Mayaguez can be looked at from two models.
The first is what is known as the Rational Actor Model which is defined as:
1. Problem Recognition and Definition. "Policy-makers perceive an external problem and attempt to define objectively its distinguishing characteristics." Full information is assumed to be available.
2. Goal Selection. Policy makers "must determine what they want to accomplish." It requires that they rank "all values . . . in a hierarchy from most to least preferred."
3. Identification of Alternatives. "Rationality also requires the compilation of an exhaustive list of all available policy options and an estimate of the costs association with each alternative.
4. Choice. Selection of "the single alternative with the best chance of achieving the desired goal(s). For this purpose, the policymakers must conduct a rigorous means-end, cost-benefit analysis guided by an accurate prediction of the probable success of each option. (Kegley & Wittkopf, 2001)
President Ford and his Administration recognized the threat of the capture of the Mayaguez, had the full information on why the Khmer Rouge was acting in retaliation of the end of the Vietnam War, selected a goal of rescue of the Mayaguez and her crew, and made the rational choice, despite the possibility of failure and loss of life, and made the choice to rescue nonetheless.
The Administration can also be cited as having combined this model with what is also known as the Bureaucratic Politics Model. The Bureaucratic Politics Model is defined as:
There is no single rational actor making decisions. Central governments are complex bureaucracies. In the United States, the U.S. President shares decision-making with the National Security Council, Defense Department, State Department, Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and many other bureaucracies. Bureaucracies are formal, hierarchical organizations. (Kegley & Wittkopf, pp. 53-83).
President Ford sought out the advice and counsel of the National Security Council, Defense Department, State Department, Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Congressional leaders before any attack and rescue of the Mayaguez commenced. It was a pure Bureaucratic model example and one that has been used by virtually every Administration since Ford in the foreign policy decision making process.
CONCLUSION
The rescue of the Mayaguez and her crew was a combined military and political operation that was designed and fully carried out on relatively short notice by the orders of President Ford. While loss of life did occur, it provided for the first time a protocol by which the United States would operate in the cases of terror related activity against its people, its property and its foreign policy objectives.
By becoming the first President to have to deal with a terrorist style attack, and it coming only weeks after the fall of Saigon, President Ford also became the first post World War II president to work closely with the several different branches of the military service.
From the outset, President Ford had limited intelligence to work with; even with the fly over’s by military jets that were searching for the Mayaguez itself. With the lack of cooperation from both the United Nations and China, Ford had walked in blind while planning for the actual rescue operation itself. Those who worked with Ford in the planning of the rescue were able to effectively, despite the Khmer Rouge blowback and fierce resistance, carry out the rescue effort by utilizing the limited amount of military resources that were available in the entire region. The military and the State Department were also able, for the first time since WWII, effectively communicate with the rescue operation in a manner that had never been attempted before, with the White House being the point of origin for all commands and all orders.
Even with the tragic loss of life, The Mayaguez Incident is a completely fascinating study of how the executive branch, the legislative branch and the military branch of the United States government were able to deal with an immediate and sudden crisis that emerged while the Vietnam war was coming to an end and limited amounts of actual resources still remained in the region.
The Mayaguez Incident also marked a formal change in the technological character of war itself. It was during Mayaguez, despite the drawbacks, despite the sometimes seemingly inept lines of communications that persisted from the White House to the field, it minded marked the first time that national and military leaders possessed the ability to put into operation a new form of global field communications that allowed for the capability to control and direct armed military forces at the operational and tactical levels itself.

Mayaguez illustrated that global communications sometimes can be a "double-edged sword." Communications has the ability and the potential to work well with command and control, enhance the field operations, and provide a direct line of “sight” to the field. As exemplified in Mayaguez, accurate intelligence is not effective unless fully and completely disseminated from the command level down to the field in a rapid fashion to save time, to save lives and to save even political face. The fact that the Listening Posts themselves had to move into action to circumvent at times the neglect by COC is another prime example of how the Intelligence Community itself can benefit from cooperative control efforts overall.

Finally, from a political standpoint, the Mayaguez Incident caused the rest of the region to begin to distrust the Khmer Rouge, leading to eventual civil war amongst the Cambodian political leadership and the splintering of the Khmer Rouge beginning in 1977. The Mayaguez Incident generated a moral uplift for the American people, restored a belief in American credibility, and demonstrated a strategic resolve worthy of a great power." (Head, Richard, 1978).

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