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Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2001 ‘Those Milgram Experiments’ Ethics, Deception, and
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Ethics, Deception, and ‘Those Milgram Experiments’
C. D. HERRERA
Critics who allege that deception in psychology experiments is unjustified frequently cite Stanley Milgram’s ‘obedience experiments’ as evidence. These critics say that arguments for justification tend to downplay the risks involved and overstate the benefits from such research. Milgram, they add, committed both sins. Critics are right to point out that research oversight is often susceptible to self-serving abuse. But stating a priori how beneficial a given experiment will be is a tall order for psychologists, or anyone else. At the same time, critics themselves have difficulty in showing what is wrong with deception, and how subjects in these experiments suffer. Hence, it becomes unclear what the psychologists, including Milgram, are prone to downplay. There is also room to wonder how the Milgram studies can illuminate the debate over deception. Although Milgram probably exaggerated the scientific significance of his own work, critics who exaggerate its moral and historical significance do little to clarify the status of deception.
Rethinking the Benefits of ‘Justified’ Deception What are we to make of that unique practice associated with some psychology experiments, the intentional deception of the research subjects? Psychologists argue that they are not using malicious or garden-variety deception, but deception of the ‘justified’ kind. They are quick to assure critics that these subjects will endure minimal risks, if any, while participating. Indeed, some give the impression that there is too much fuss over deception: many of the ethical sermons being preached to social scientists seem to assume that those participating in research projects would never encounter given discomforts if they did not participate in the research . . . deceptive information is presented at every turn,
245
Ethics, Deception, and ‘Those Milgram Experiments’
C. D. HERRERA
Critics who allege that deception in psychology experiments is unjustified frequently cite Stanley Milgram’s ‘obedience experiments’ as evidence. These critics say that arguments for justification tend to downplay the risks involved and overstate the benefits from such research. Milgram, they add, committed both sins. Critics are right to point out that research oversight is often susceptible to self-serving abuse. But stating a priori how beneficial a given experiment will be is a tall order for psychologists, or anyone else. At the same time, critics themselves have difficulty in showing what is wrong with deception, and how subjects in these experiments suffer. Hence, it becomes unclear what the psychologists, including Milgram, are prone to downplay. There is also room to wonder how the Milgram studies can illuminate the debate over deception. Although Milgram probably exaggerated the scientific significance of his own work, critics who exaggerate its moral and historical significance do little to clarify the status of deception.
Rethinking the Benefits of ‘Justified’ Deception What are we to make of that unique practice associated with some psychology experiments, the intentional deception of the research subjects? Psychologists argue that they are not using malicious or garden-variety deception, but deception of the ‘justified’ kind. They are quick to assure critics that these subjects will endure minimal risks, if any, while participating. Indeed, some give the impression that there is too much fuss over deception: many of the ethical sermons being preached to social scientists seem to assume that those participating in research projects would never encounter given discomforts if they did not participate in the research . . . deceptive information is presented at every turn,