Mukasey V. Balachey

An individual possesses culpable knowledge only if he knows or strongly suspects the results of his actions will cause harm to another. Balachova v. Mukasey, 547 F. 3d at 379. In Balachova v. Mukasey, the alien was in the military and aided his fellow soldiers in rounding up several young women from a village and placing them in transport vehicles. Id. He physically placed the young girls, against their will in the vehicles, the military unit proceeded to take the girls to a different location where several of the other soldiers, not the alien, raped the young women. In evaluating the alien’s credibility, the court determined that the alien knew with little doubt that placing the women in the vehicle was for "no good means other than to do
Serrano-Serra got in the car that evening only under the premise that the two gang members were going to pick up “a friend,” and nothing more. His resistance was predicated upon not wanting any association with gang activity, even if this statement by the gang member were the truth. If they were going to pick up drugs or steal from a home or quarrel with a rival gang, he did not wish to be present for this. His resisting was not predicated upon his knowledge that the gang members intended to solicit his assistance in persecuting any victim that
In order to choose to be willfully blind of the persecution, Serrano-Serra would have needed full knowledge of the persecution or general knowledge of a patterned behavior by the gang. He neither knew the plan for that evening nor knew or had reason to know that the gang often engaged in pick ups like this where they took individuals to abandoned houses and harmed them. This was his first time present for such an event so not knowing what would unfold that evening is a valid claim. Serrano-Serra’s actions are most comparable to the hypothetical offered by the court in Castillo which said the following: “[T]he bus driver who unwittingly ferries a killer to the site of a massacre can hardly be labeled a ‘persecutor,’ even if the objective effect of his actions was to aid the killer's secret plan.” Id. at 20. Here, even if the objective effect of Serrano-Serra’s driving the car resulted in persecution, because he did not possess culpable knowledge of the persecution, he cannot be labeled a persecutor. Willful blindness would have existed if Serrano-Serra picked up individuals each day and took them to the abandoned house as a part of his job for the gang. Such repetitive behavior as this, witnessing the results and continuing to perform the duty each time all the same, would constitute willful blindness, but these