Napoleon Bonaparte Research Paper

The Battle of Waterloo, fought on June 18, 1815, was Napoleon Bonaparte's last battle. His defeat led swiftly to his final overthrow as ruler of France. After his exile to Elba, he had reinstalled himself on the throne of France for a Hundred Days. During this time, the forces of the rest of Europe, the United Kingdom, Prussia and the Russian Empire converged on him, commanded by the United Kingdom's Duke of Wellington, and Prussia's Gebhard von Blücher.

As far back as 13 March 1815, six days before Napoleon reached Paris, the powers at the Congress of Vienna declared him an outlaw; four days later the United Kingdom, Russia, Austria and Prussia bound themselves to put 150,000 men each into the field to end his rule. Napoleon knew
that, once his attempts at dissuading one or more of the Seventh Coalition allies from invading France had failed, his only chance of remaining in power was to attack before the Coalition put together an overwhelming force. If he could destroy the existing Coalition forces south of Brussels before they were reinforced, he might be able to drive the British back to the sea and knock the Prussians out of the war.

Napoleon divided his army into a left wing, commanded by Marshal Ney, a right wing commanded by Marshal Grouchy and a reserve, which he commanded personally (although all three elements remained close enough to support one another). Crossing the Netherlands' frontier at Thuin near Charleroi, the French drove in Coalition outposts and secured Napoleon's favoured "central position" - at the junction between Wellington's Allied army to his north-west, and Blücher's Prussian to his north-east. Although the Coalition members were well informed of Napoleon's movements, Wellington did not react to the news of the outbreak of hostilities until the evening of June 15.

As Napoleon considered the Prussians the greater threat, he moved against them first, attacking their outposts at Thuin near Charleroi, before advancing through Charleroi.
His scouts reached Quatre Bras that evening. Ziethen's rearguard action held up Napoleon's advance, giving Blücher the opportunity to concentrate his forces in the Sombreffe position, which had been selected earlier for its good defensive attributes. Napoleon sent Marshal Ney, in charge of the French left, to secure the crossroads of Quatre Bras, towards which Wellington was hastily gathering his dispersed army. Once Quatre Bras was secured, Ney could swing east and reinforce Napoleon.

Advancing on June 16, found Quatre Bras lightly held by Allied troops, but having previously experienced Wellington's skill at concealing his strength, he overestimated the forces opposing him. Despite outnumbering the Allies heavily throughout the day, he fought a cautious and desultory battle which failed to capture the crossroads. By the middle of the afternoon, Wellington had taken personal command of the Allied forces at Quatre Bras. The position was reinforced steadily throughout the day as Allied troops converged on the crossroads. Finally, they were able to advance and drive the French
back.

Napoleon, meanwhile, took the reserve and the right wing of the army and defeated the Prussians, under the command of General Blücher, at the Battle of Ligny on the same day. The Prussian centre gave way under heavy French attack, but the flanks held their ground. Had Ney intervened at this point as planned, the Prussians would have been partially encircled from the west and would almost certainly have been forced to fall back to the east, along their lines of communication.

The Prussian defeat at Ligny made the Quatre Bras position untenable. On June 17, Wellington duly fell back to the north. His control of Quatre Bras enabled the Prussians to fall back parallel to his line of retreat and not, as Napoleon had hoped, away from him.

This was part of Napoleon's strategy to split the much larger Coalition force into pieces that he could outnumber and attack separately. His theory was based on the assumption that an attack through the centre of the Coalition forces would force the two main armies to retreat in the direction of their respective supply bases, which were in opposite directions.

The general retreat of the Prussian army took it to the town of Wavre, and this by default became the marshalling point of the army.
The Prussian chief of staff, General August von Gneisenau, planned to rally the Prussian Army at Tilly, from where it could move to support Wellington, but control was lost, with part of the army retreating towards the Rhine, but the majority rallied at Wavre. Here, Gneisenau decided to march upon Wellington's left flank at dawn with the I, II and IV Corps. The IV Corps, under the command of General Bülow von Dennewitz, had not been present at Ligny, but arrived to reinforce the Prussian army during the nights of the 17th and 18th. III Corps formed the rearguard, to hinder the pursuing
French.

Wellington, meanwhile, spent the 17th falling back to a previously reconnoitered defensive position at Mont St. Jean, a low ridge south of the village of Waterloo. He was followed by the left wing of the French Army of the North under the command of Marshal Ney. Napoleon joined Ney with most of the reserve which (along with the right wing of the Army of the North) had defeated the Prussians at Ligny.

Ambiguous orders by Napoleon on the June 17 to his subordinate Marshal Grouchy, to pursue the Prussians with 30,000 men, contributed to Napoleon's eventual defeat. Because Napoleon took his time issuing orders on the morning of June 17, Grouchy started the pursuit late on June 17, by which time the Prussians had disengaged. Precious time was lost locating the main body of the Prussian Army, by which time it was too late to prevent it reaching Wavre, from where it could march to support Wellington. On the 18th, with the right wing of the Army of the North, reinforced with a cavalry corps, Gérard engaged the Prussian rearguard under the command of Lieutenant-General Baron Johann von Thielmann at the Battle of Wavre.