National Security Directive (NSC)

There have been many changes to the National Security Council (NSC) since 1949, but the creation of the Deputies Committee (DC) with the National Security Directive (NSD) 1 reorganization in 1989 resulted in a national security system commonly recognized as the “Gold Standard.” The driving force behind this reorganization stems from lessons learned during the Iran-Contra affair and from recognition of a poorly functioning crisis management system. This change incorporated new mechanisms to handle crises and inspired trust among members of the system. The DC has become a vital addition of the national security system and plays a key role in the formation of national security policy today.
In order to discuss the changes incorporated with
NSD 1, it is important to understand the basic structure of the NSC in 1949 following the National Security Act of 1947. The National Security Act of 1947 established the NSC as a mechanism by which the President could consolidate information and advice from multiple agencies on matters related to national security, and in turn, make informed decisions on matters related to international strategy and policy. The intent of the NSC as stated by Congress was “to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the US and to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the government relating to the national security.” In the 1949 NSC structure, the President served as the chairman and the members of the council included the Secretaries of State (SecState), Defense (SecDef), the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the chairman of the National Security Resources Board. Other government officials, such as the Secretary of the Treasury were also regularly invited to the Council. This Council, as mandated by law, served the function of advising the President, but in no way was designed to determine policy itself.
The NSC of 1949 had a small functioning staff, which was headed by the executive secretary and resided in the Old State Department Building, separate from the White House. The staff was comprised of staff members, the secretariat, and consultants. The departments and agencies that served as council members would send a representative to work with the NSC staff, and this provided a knowledge base and communication link from each agency. The Council would generate reports, which would examine a situation and provide information and recommendations to the President. These Council reports were normally generated at the request of a participating agency, such as the State Department or Defense Department. Regular meetings were conducted to discuss these reports as well as other matters of national security, but the President would often refrain from attending to allow freedom of thought and discussion for the other members. Once the Council completed the report, it would be sent to the President for a decision and resultant action.
Since this original design, Presidents have altered the composition of the Council and incorporated changes such as the institution of the National Security Advise to assist in management of the NSC.
These changes have normally been driven by some key world event or failure within the system. In 1986, the Iran-Contra affair was a devastating blow to the Reagan administration and his NSC. When reports came to light that this secret operation was being driven by the NSC from within the White House, it was evident that changes needed to be made. This drove the creation of the Policy Review Groups (PRGs) which were designed to help review and coordinate policy positions for the President. When President George H.W. Bush took office, he eliminated these PRGs in his NSC system. When the administration was faced with the next major crisis, the Panamanian leader General Manuel Noriega in 1989, it became clear that the crisis-management process was still broken. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) at the time, Gen Powell, observed the crisis-planning in action and assessed that the elimination of the PRGs was a mistake. In coordination with Brent Scowcroft, the National Security Advisor at the time, the PRG was re-implemented in the form of the
DC.
The DC was formally established with NSD 1, which also instituted the Principles Committee and the Policy Coordinating Committees. The PC was composed of the SecDef, SecState, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), CJCS, Chief of Staff to the President, and the National Security Advisor (who was also the chairman). The DC was composed of second-ranking officials and chaired by the Deputy National Security Advisor. Finally, the Policy Coordinating Committees were chaired by senior officials from departments and from staff members of the NSC. The DC was designed to be the instrument by which day-to-day crises were handled. Their responsibility was to step outside of the realm of merely analyzing options and making recommendations. The DC was to meet regularly and remain apprised of current events and situations that would require important national security decisions by the President. The DC soon became the soul of the policy process. Records from the George H.W. Bush library maintain that the DC met 433 times between February 1989 and January 1993. The success of the organization was quickly solidified in the few years following its inception,
Robert Gates was the Deputy National Security Advisor and Chairman of the DC during its original creation, and he implemented several principles, which contributed to the enduring success of the DC concept. They can be summarized as follows: there will be regular and announced meetings; there will be an agreed upon agenda and participants will be able to review it before the meetings; discussion papers will be provided at least 48 hours prior; every meeting will end with a clear agreement on what was and was not decided; each agency will be represented by relevant members plus one other representative; representatives must be able to speak for their agency; and deputies should be able to speak for their Principles. These concepts promoted trust and structure to the DC system and have played a vital role in its success.
Since its inception, the DC has continued to play an instrumental role in policy formulation.
There are several good historical examples of how the DC has contributed to policy formation during crisis management. When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, the DC was intricately involved in the planning process. The meeting schedule during this crisis began each day with a meeting of internal State Department members, followed by a meeting of the PCCs. Subsequent to those meetings were a minimum of three DC meetings to discuss the crisis. The DC was constantly prepared to provide direction and guidance as needed. Another example of the DC involvement during a crisis can be seen in the days following 9/11. When President Bush was faced with the challenge of determining a course of action following the attacks, the DC met and prepared multiple actions and strategies for the President’s consideration. These are just two examples of the important role that the DC has played in the national security process throughout the
years.
Today, the DC is highly relied upon by senior leaders in the national security environment for trusted advice and policy guidance related to national security matters. Under the Obama Administration, the DC was given three responsibilities: “Review and Monitor” the work of the interagency process, to include the PCCs, and ensure issues are being properly analyzed and prepared; implement policy of major foreign policy initiatives to ensure they are being implemented in a timely and effective manner; and day-to-day crisis management. These responsibilities show how intricate the DC is to the national policy formulation process. With events ranging from Desert Storm to the tsunami in Japan, the DC has provided the sound advice and policy guidance necessary for policy makers. There have been many changes to the NSC, but the implementation of the DC with NSD 1 is one that has endured multiple administrations and has proven its value time and time again.