Nickells V Midland Case Study
TORTS ASSIGNMENT
DONALD
TRESPASS TO LAND
The sub-lease grants Alexis proprietary interests, hence she has exclusive possession, and locus standi for trespass to her bedroom and communal areas: Cowell v Rosehill Racecourse (1937) 56 CLR 605
ENTERING BEDROOM, PLACING PLANTS ON FLOOR
Presumably, Donald intended (Nickells v Melbourne Corporation (1938) 59 CLR 219) the direct interferences (Southport Corp v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd [1954] 2 QB 182 (‘Southport’)) of entering Alexis’s bedroom and placing plants on the floor.
Donald interfered by entering Alexis’s room without authority (Plenty v Dillon (1991) 171 CLR 635 (‘Plenty’)) as Alexis revoked consent by not listing it with the communal areas in the sub-lease. Donald aggravated interference by placing plants on Alexis’s floor: LJP Investments v Howard Chia Investments Pty Ltd (1989) 24 NSWLR 490 at 494.
Continuing injury repeats every day Donald keeps and continues the plants by failing to remove them: Konskier v B Goodman Ltd [1928] 1 KB 421 (‘Konskier). However, trespass ceases upon Alexis moving them, as plants are no longer ‘kept and continued’ on her land.
WATERMARK
The plants directly caused the watermark. Nothing suggests Donald intended the watermark, so the …show more content…
Donald threatened harm at some unspecified future time and he was separated from Alexis by a door with a clock against it, hence the issue is if the threat was present and continuing (Zanker v Vartzokas (1988) 34 A Crim R 11 (‘Zanker’)). Alexis was captive in her room, and Donald could return at any time to inflict harm. Therefore, the threat of physical harm was present and continuing in Alexis’s mind from the time Donald made it to the time it was meant to be executed. Escape was impossible; hence satisfying immanency. This constitutes
DONALD
TRESPASS TO LAND
The sub-lease grants Alexis proprietary interests, hence she has exclusive possession, and locus standi for trespass to her bedroom and communal areas: Cowell v Rosehill Racecourse (1937) 56 CLR 605
ENTERING BEDROOM, PLACING PLANTS ON FLOOR
Presumably, Donald intended (Nickells v Melbourne Corporation (1938) 59 CLR 219) the direct interferences (Southport Corp v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd [1954] 2 QB 182 (‘Southport’)) of entering Alexis’s bedroom and placing plants on the floor.
Donald interfered by entering Alexis’s room without authority (Plenty v Dillon (1991) 171 CLR 635 (‘Plenty’)) as Alexis revoked consent by not listing it with the communal areas in the sub-lease. Donald aggravated interference by placing plants on Alexis’s floor: LJP Investments v Howard Chia Investments Pty Ltd (1989) 24 NSWLR 490 at 494.
Continuing injury repeats every day Donald keeps and continues the plants by failing to remove them: Konskier v B Goodman Ltd [1928] 1 KB 421 (‘Konskier). However, trespass ceases upon Alexis moving them, as plants are no longer ‘kept and continued’ on her land.
WATERMARK
The plants directly caused the watermark. Nothing suggests Donald intended the watermark, so the …show more content…
Donald threatened harm at some unspecified future time and he was separated from Alexis by a door with a clock against it, hence the issue is if the threat was present and continuing (Zanker v Vartzokas (1988) 34 A Crim R 11 (‘Zanker’)). Alexis was captive in her room, and Donald could return at any time to inflict harm. Therefore, the threat of physical harm was present and continuing in Alexis’s mind from the time Donald made it to the time it was meant to be executed. Escape was impossible; hence satisfying immanency. This constitutes