President Ronald Wilson Reagan's Cold War Policy

When President Ronald Wilson Reagan was elected in 1980 not many people would understand his significance as Reagan would be Re –elected again in 1984.Reagan would be remember for many thing during his eight years in the White House but most of all Reagan would be remembered for his cold war policy. Although critics of the President past and present have looked at Reagan as a figure head nothing could be further from the truth, especially in regards to his cold war policy and The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Critics have claimed Reagan had no intention of having such a missile defense system and that it was just floated out in a political move. Reagan was criticized by democrats, the press and even some of his party members. Though Reagan
did seek advice on SDI and Cold War Policy for cabinet members and outside sources it was Reagan and Reagan alone who made all final decision. Yes SDI and some of the Cold War Policies did rub people in his administration the wrong way and cause many internal battles but again it was Reagan who set the agenda for the 1980's on the Cold War and SDI.
On March 23, 1983 President Ronald Reagan gave an address to the nation regarding his budget defense for that year. The text of his speech was about the Soviet Unions strength and the unwillingness of the congress to pass his budget. But with the following words the speech would change the course of American foreign policy and cause debate in his cabinet for years to come. "Wouldn't it be better to save lives then avenge them? Are we not capable of demonstrating our peaceful intentions by applying all our abilities and our ingenuity to achieve a truly lasting stability? I think we are. Indeed we must. After careful consultation with my advisers including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I believe there is a way. Let me share with you a vision of the future which offers hope. It is that we embark on a program to counter the awesome Soviet missile threat with measures that are defensive." With that Ronald Reagan started a course that would change U.S. arms control policy and cause a debate inside the Reagan administration.
This system he spoke of would be called the Strategic Defense Initiative. This was a system which would shoot down incoming Russian Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. Prior to this speech the United State policy with regards to nuclear weapons and attack regarding the Soviet Union had always been MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction). This meant if the United States or its allies were attacked by the Soviet Union they would respond with the destruction of the Soviet Union also. There was no defensive measure for stopping nuclear attack just reaction. This had been the policy of the U.S. since the sixties. Also playing a part in this whole program was the ABM treaty. "The ABM treat was signed was signed at Moscow on May 26, 1972 and ratified by the United State Senate on August 3, 1972. In the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems the United States and the Soviet Union agree that each may have only two ABM deployment areas, so restricted and so located that they cannot provide a nationwide ABM defense or become the basis for developing one. Each country thus leaves unchallenged the penetration capability of the others retaliatory missile forces. Precise quantitative and qualitative limits are imposed on the ABM systems that may be deployed. Both Parties agreed to limit qualitative improvement of their ABM technology." This treaty would cause severe internal debate inside the country and the administration it self in regards to SDI. So with the announcement of SDI it was felt the United States would be defying the ABM treaty but Reagan as a clever politician as he was mad sure he made the point in his speech to mention the ABM treaty "Tonight, consistent with our obligations of the ABM treaty and recognizing the need for closer consultation with our allies, I'm taking an important first step. I am directing a comprehensive and intensive effort to define a long-term research and development program to begin to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles." This was purposely done by Reagan so his critics who were to come could not use the ABM treaty against him as the Soviet Union would eventually do. Along with changing the course of American arms policy the question was out there as to whether or not it was even possible for SDI to work and whether it was just throw out there as a trial balloon for the public to react to. SDI was controversial in many ways but many people as you will see later on had different intentions for SDI. George Schultz for one had different ideas "I want to make SDI part of, and reason for an agreement with the Soviets for massive arms reductions." While the defense debate as you will see didn't want any restrictions on SDI and defiantly didn't want it involved in arms talks. With out a doubt SDI did cause many internal fights inside the Reagan White house but it was also a key component of bringing the Soviet Union back to the table for arms talk and help forge latter agreements with the Soviets. The origins of the SDI program were established well before the 1983 speech. Early in 1981, Reagan called a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the military leaders - and said to them: Every offensive weapon ever invented by man has resulted in the creation of a defense against it; isn't it possible in this age of technology that we could invent a defensive weapon that could intercept nuclear weapons and destroy them as they emerge from their silos? They looked at each other, and then asked if they could huddle for a few moments. Very shortly, they came out of their huddle and said, "Yes, it's an idea worth exploring." My answer was, "Let's do it." This would be the start of the exploration into the SDI and missile defense program. Reagan vary much before starting a missile program though wanted to strengthen the U.S. Military forces. Reagan publicly announced his administrations plans for improving strategic forces during a press conference in October of 1981 and in this conference was his first remarks in lure of defense "directed that we end our long neglect of strategic defense." This would set in motion the plans and the announcement of SDI. "In late 1981 and early 1982, the White House policy group stayed in contact with a set of outside missile defense proponents. In the middle of 1981, Daniel Graham a retired Army general, former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and erstwhile adviser to Reagan's 1980 campaign had, joined with Karl Bendetsen, a conservative democrat and Truman administration pentagon official, to form a panel to promote the issue of missile defense within the Reagan administration. They recruited several members of Reagan's kitchen cabinet and Edward Teller." Teller who would become vary influential with Reagan "favored a missile defense system based on x ray laser, which required a nuclear explosion to generate energy. Reagan wanted a missile defense system he did not have to be encouraged, Reagan only had one question "was the technical feasibility of an extensive missile defense system?" On September 14, 1982 Ronald Reagan met with Edward Teller for the second time in regards to missile defense and this meeting would get the ball rolling toward the March 1983 speech in which the SDI program was released to the public. "During the session Reagan asked Teller if a missile defense system could work, to which the physicist replied the present indications are good." As you could imagine Reagan became very excited and intrigued by what Teller had told him. Teller kept using this meeting with Reagan to promote his idea of what should be used in missile defense. "Teller felt that X-ray Laser which would rely on nuclear detonation to generate direct energy could be deployed in space to destroy ballistic missiles." According to an interview with Paul Lettow the meeting did not go very well and Teller did not feel he came across very well to the President. As Reagan even stated he was not convinced to create SDI by scientist. "It wasn't conceived by scientists, although they came on board and contributed greatly to its success. I came into office with a decided prejudice against our tacit agreement with the Soviet Union regarding nuclear missiles. I'm talking about the MAD policy - "mutual assured destruction" - the idea of deterrence providing safety so long as each of us had the power to destroy the other with nuclear missiles if one of us launched a first strike. Somehow this didn't seem to me to be something that would send you to bed feeling safe. It was like having two westerners standing in a saloon aiming their guns at each other's head - permanently. There had to be a better way." This does clear the myth that Reagan had nothing to do with SDI and was influenced by scientist. Yes Reagan did take advice from these people but everything was ultimately up to Reagan when it came down to the final decision. The SDI System was ultimately a top down decision. The MX missile prior to the SDI program was one of Reagan's first initiatives when he came to office. A new land-based 10-warhead strategic missile the MX missile was among the most technically and politically controversial programs of the first years of the administration. The MX was more precise and more powerful but was considered by many to be a destabilizing first-strike weapon. Due to strong bipartisan opposition, the original plan to shuttle MX missiles on an extensive rail network in the western United States was scrapped. In November 1982, after considering more than 30 basing plans, the Reagan administration proposed deployment of 100 MX missiles in fixed silos. "The Mx fiasco stymied the administrations efforts to build up the number and power of American Icbm warheads, thus casting doubt upon and important element of its plan to modernize U.S. strategic forces." After this Ronald Reagan began to lean more to defensive measures in regards to nuclear weapons. What had been a victory for democrats actually helped spun on Reagan to purse more then ever the idea of missile defense. Reagan discussed this with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a December 1982 meeting. "What if… what if we begun to move away from total reliance on offense to deter nuclear attack and move toward a greater reliance on defense?" As soon as Reagan mentioned this the Joint Chiefs took this as orders to work on missile defense. The Joint Chiefs then called William Clark and asked " Did we just get instructions to take a hard look at missile defense ? Clark said yes and the Joint Chiefs now had their marching orders." This can be construed as the first time any one got direct orders from the White House to work on missile defense. This meeting was also attended by all the major players in the administration so it was no secret to what Ronald Reagan had in mind. This was Ronald Reagan's goal to challenge the Soviet Union. "We had a policy written down that said I am the President and I want to challenge the Soviet Union politically, economically, and militarily." The U. S. felt the huge imbalance of ICBM warheads compared to the Soviet Union, this was one reason Reagan felt this way and people in his cabinet also felt the same way. "We have an imbalance of warheads two thousand to six thousand and we faced a military problem and had no offensive way to deal with it" stated Mike Mcfarlane one of Reagan's key cabinet members. This began a ground swell with certain members of the cabinet like Mcfarlane that this was a great to keep up militarily with the Soviet's. Mcfarlane also believed and intended that a missile defense project could serve as an actual bargaining chip in the arms race with the Soviets." Although Mcfarlane along with other members like George Schultz wanted to use the system they tended to keep quite on the subject know Reagan would never go for it. Although Reagan would find more allies inside the military that would agree with missile defense such as Admiral James Watkins, chief of naval operations he believed this was very important to research to gain a military advantage over the Soviet Union. The next step towards the announcement of SDI would take place when Reagan would convince the joint Chiefs to hop aboard and join the pursuit of missile defense. Prior to this meeting many members of the cabinet led by Mcfarlane had all ready convinced the Joint Chiefs that the missile defense system was possible and knew ahead of time what the response to Reagan would be. One of the key players in this meeting would be General Vessey of the Joint Chiefs , he along with others knew of Reagan's dislike for MAD and played on it. In a famous quote that would later be put into the SDI speech Vessey told Reagan' "Wouldn't it be better to protect the American people rather then avenge them?" Of course well know Reagan "replied exactly" The Chiefs and everyone in the meeting also explained to Reagan that this sort of thing could not be done now meaning SDI but could possibly be done in ten to twenty years down the road of research had begun and it could be possible in the Presidents life time to have a missile defense system. Reagan later that week also started to express the idea of missile defense to other parts of his cabinet who had not been involved such as George Schultz. "He talked about the abhorrence of MAD as the center piece of the strategic doctrine. The idea of destroying each other had no appeal to Reagan. He told Schultz wouldn't it be better if we could defend our self against nuclear weapons." Up to this point nobody in the State department had been apart of any plans for a missile defense program. "Those involved including Reagan feared that the State would try to derail the idea." By Reagan so subtly brining the idea of protect up to Schultz this was a way for him to win over the State Department but in a very subtly way. Reagan who had pondered this idea for a long had finally decided that he would go forward with SDI and eventually announce it to the public, but there were still many obstacles that stood in the way of this. Admiral Clark who was an ally of Reagan's on this felt the President should discuss this with Tip O'Neil the Speaker of the house and leader of the Democratic opposition to the President. Clark also felt that our allied should be told of this, Reagan totally rejected this idea in fear of congress going public and making a circus out of the whole issue which would come to fruition once SDI was announced. Reagan stated "I want to keep this tightly under wraps. Do the work in your own staff and write the speech and let's get ready to give it." The speech itself had other underline tones in recently the congress had failed to pass an expensive defense budget which would help the United States catch up to the Soviet Union in the arms race. Reagan was upset by this and wanted to go public and to the people to explain that the U.S. needed this budget passed for the safety of the country. So when Reagan gave this Speech which was scheduled for March 23, 1983 SDI would only come up at the end of the speech and was in all actuality a very little part of the speech itself. As Reagan began to have speech writers and cabinet member prepare the speech a group of Reagan supporters did not want Reagan even making a speech on the SDI program yet. The Joint Chiefs for one were upset. "We weren't ready to announce it yet; the necessary policy ground work had not been laid." The Joint Chiefs also realized Reagan was going to give the speech regardless of what anyone else thought or suggested to him. Word about the speech started to leak out and the people who were upset the most were the State Department. Men like Richard Perle felt that Reagan should consult with everyone before he opens up a new policy. Perle expressed his feeling to Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger. He told Weinberger that this was not the way to start a new policy and started making calls opposing the speech. Weinberger and Perle had been at a NATO planning meeting in Lisbon. Weinberger though felt the announcement but did go on to tell the allies at the NATO meeting. "The next if they had read in the paper the whole strategic approach was to be upset and I had no told them any thing about it, it would have been very unfortunate." Other then telling the NATO allies Weinberger also stood by Reagan's side and stood very quite on the whole issue of the speech. Schultz on the other hand who was the Secretary of State was upset and worried such a speech would cause major friction and heightened of fear between them and the Russians. Other men such as Lawrence Eagleburger Undersecretary of State for Political affairs along with Richard Burt Assistant Secretary of European Affairs were upset and saw this as Reagan trying to rid the world of nuclear weapons. "Schultz stated to Burt the President has this idea of a world with out nuclear weapons and Burt replied He can't have a world with out nuclear weapons doesn't he understand that?" Schultz and others in the State Department also worried about the ramifications of the AMB treaty, all these men tried to get Reagan to remove this but he refuse and the speech would carry the new policy of SDI. On March 23, 1983 Ronald Reagan addressed the nation in a speech about the military budget which was three fourth's but it was the other fourth which caught the attention of the country and the world. "Wouldn't it be better to save lives than to avenge them? Are we not capable of demonstrating our peaceful intentions by applying all our abilities and our ingenuity to achieving a truly lasting stability? I think we are. Indeed, we must.
After careful consultation with my advisers, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I believe there is a way. Let me share with you a vision of the future which offers hope. It is that we embark on a program to counter the awesome Soviet missile threat with measures that are defensive. Let us turn to the very strengths in technology that spawned our great industrial base and that have given us the quality of life we enjoy today.
What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies?
I know this is a formidable, technical task, one that may not be accomplished before the end of this century.
Yet, current technology has attained a level of sophistication where it's reasonable for us to begin this effort. It will take years, probably decades of effort on many fronts. There will be failures and setbacks, just as there will be successes and breakthroughs. And as we proceed, we must remain constant in preserving the nuclear deterrent and maintaining a solid capability for flexible response. But isn't it worth every investment necessary to free the world from the threat of nuclear war? We know it is.
In the meantime, we will continue to pursue real reductions in nuclear arms, negotiating from a position of strength that can be ensured only by modernizing our strategic forces. At the same time, we must take steps to reduce the risk of a conventional military conflict escalating to nuclear war by improving our nonnuclear capabilities.
America does possess--now--the technologies to attain very significant improvements in the effectiveness of our conventional, nonnuclear forces. Proceeding boldly with these new technologies, we can significantly reduce any incentive that the Soviet Union may have to threaten attack against the United States or its allies.
As we pursue our goal of defensive technologies, we recognize that our allies rely upon our strategic offensive power to deter attacks against them.
Their vital interests and ours are inextricably linked. Their safety and ours are one. And no change in technology can or will alter that reality. We must and shall continue to honor our commitments.
I clearly recognize that defensive systems have limitations and raise certain problems and ambiguities. If paired with offensive systems, they can be viewed as fostering an aggressive policy, and no one wants that. But with these considerations firmly in mind, I call upon the scientific community in our country, those who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.
Tonight, consistent with our obligations of the ABM treaty and recognizing the need for closer consultation with our allies, I'm taking an important first step. I am directing a comprehensive and intensive effort to define a long-term research and development program to begin to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles. This could pave the way for arms control measures to eliminate the weapons themselves. We seek neither military superiority nor political advantage. Our only purpose--one all people share--is to search for ways to reduce the danger of nuclear
war.
My fellow Americans, tonight we're launching an effort which holds the promise of changing the course of human history. There will be risks, and results take time. But I believe we can do it. As we cross this threshold, I ask for your prayers and your support." With those words the course of history, American policy and debate from with his cabinet and opposition party would occur. As you can imagine the liberals in congress where up in arms over this as were some republicans. The project quickly became know as star wars after the movies. Another important thing that actually helped Reagan publicly is the Americans had no idea until that speech that a Soviet nuclear attack could not be stopped. "Allies were also upset with this speech the urged restraint and Western Europe was confused." George Schultz though at this time saw that the United States could use this to their advantage against the Soviet Union, even though he was originally against Reagan giving the speech. He stated "the Soviets were genuinely alarmed by the prospect of American science turned on and venturing into the realm of space defense." As you could imagine key Reagan cabinet member would now begin jockeying for a position that favored them and that caught the ear of the president. This would now lead to many internal debates and fight inside the Reagan administration. On March 25 two days after the speech Reagan gave a question and answer session to the media.
The first question was why did u decided to announce this Reagan claimed he had had this idea for a long time and talked it over with the Joint Chiefs and thought it was time. Like Reagan had stated before he could not stand the idea of MAD and gave another explanation. "It is in conceivable to me that we can go on thinking down the future not only for our self and our life time but for other generations, that the great nations of the world will sit here, like people facing themselves across the table, each with a cocked gun, and no one knowing whether someone might tighten their fingers on the trigger." Reagan truly hated the idea of MAD and was determined to change policy and SDI was the route he decided to use. Reagan also wanted to create this system and give it the Soviet Union in hopes of eliminating all nuclear weapons as you have heard before this did not sit well with other members of his cabinet. "Not a single individual in his administration subscribed fully to this concept" of riding the world of nuclear
arms. After the announcement Reagan declared the United States policy towards the Soviet Union would be changing. He claim the U. S. would not be an anti this nation but would move forward and take the initiative and would promote the free market idea of the United States. Reagan again and again in public also kept making statements about a world free of nuclear weapons. People were unsure at this time whether Reagan was serious of he was just pandering to the anti nuclear movement in the United States and the world, but regardless you started to see a shift in his policy and George Schultz would play a major role. In January 1983 Schultz sent Reagan a memo urging him to open a dialogue with the Soviets. "Schultz's effort to initiate expanded talks with the Soviets was greeted with great skepticism" for people in the Pentagon. Despite all this skepticism Schultz won the day and Reagan gave him the ok to open up talks. "Schultz advocated to Reagan that talks and negotiations with the Soviets should focus on four broad areas of arms control, human rights, regional issues, and bilateral issues." With this and the build up of the American build up of the military Reagan felt it was the right time now to open up talks with the Soviets. The job devising a new policy to open up talks was not given to Schultz but to Jack Matlock who was in the NSC and was the director of Soviet affairs; this duty was cast on him by President Reagan. Reagan and other in the White House had doubts about Schultz's ability to negotiate that's why Matlock was given this duty. "Meanwhile tensions between Schultz and Clark on bureaucratic and strategic issues grew during the late spring and early summer of 1983. Schultz felt that he had been a victim of an end run with respect to SDI." Schultz was right but this was because of Ronald Reagan and not anybody else but him. Clark on the other had also had more problems with certain White House staff like Michael Deaver, who had been at the side of Reagan for nearly twenty plus years. He also butted heads on several occasions with Reagan's wife Nancy. This was just the start of the heated internal debates that would take place with SDI. Non White House staff was very upset that they were left out of the loop in regards to SDI and the boiling point had started to rise. With all this going on in June of 1983 Reagan did sign off on a new cold war policy with Schultz presented to the Senate. The two key components of the new policy were to stop the Soviet drive for power and to force a fundamental internal change in their system. Prior to this the U.S. policy had been containment and Reagan felt the only way to win this cold war was to change Soviet policy this was one of the new major changes along with SDI in the new cold war policy set for by the White House. Also part of the new policy was Reagan's now obsession with eliminating all nuclear weapons. Reagan spoke of this several time he especially expressed these feeling to Kenneth Adelman who was Reagan's director of arms control most people didn't; take the President serious and constantly push this view to the side. "Reagan often spoke of Armageddon and nuclear weapons in the same breath and saw them as link to the end of the world." Reagan also expressed this view to the Soviet leader Andropov. The matter of opening talks now with the Soviets took a strange turn September of 1983 the Soviets had shot down a Korean air liner which killed several American and even on congressman. Some in the administration had wanted to break off on going talks with the Soviets but once again Schultz won the day and convinced Reagan this would be detrimental. Schultz had begun to can the upper hand as one of Reagan's advisers and would keep on getting the Presidents ear. With this and other shake ups inside the White House such as Clark moving to the Department of Interior Reagan had to get some one to replace Clark as the deputy of NSA. Clark just grew tired of all the back door dealing and playing that went along with this job. Reagan then moved one of his key allies into this position Mike Mcfarlane. Mcfarlane was a major SDI supporter and now he had a major voice inside the NSA who supported Reagan. Now with Mcfarlane in place SDI would move to the forefront of U.S. Soviet relations. In the spring of 1984 SDI started to move forward. "Weinberger decided to manage SDI through a special organization inside the Department of Defense that would be directly and solely responsible to him the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization or SDIO." This was Weinberger's and the Defense Departments first power move in trying to take over control of SDI. Weinberger put his highest priority into SDI and now would have to come up with a way to get money for it. The system as Weinberger saw it would be set up to shoot down the missiles in all three phase, take off, space and re entry into the atmosphere. Weinberger also felt this was very feasible and could happen. On the other hand George Schultz was starting to here for the Soviets and was taking a lot of heat. The Soviet ambassador told Schultz "the space issue could become the most dangerous and destabilizing factor in our relationship." SDI began to talk over in talks with the Soviets it was at the forefront of everything. This is when men like Mcfarlane and Schultz realized the power and how they could use SDI with the Soviets. This is when a major divide in the in the cabinet began in regards to SDI. Men in the State Department and NSC began the thinking of using SDI as a bargaining chip with the soviets why other like Weinberger and the Department of Defense wanted to keep it out of talks all together. This was also a time when several Soviets leaders kept on passing and away and the President was getting frustrated. Also the administration felt the Soviets were having internal problems economically at this time and this happened to be true. "U.S. officials now began to receive signals from the Soviets that they wanted to talk to prevent the militarization of space on June 29 the Soviets made a formal offer." The offer was not reject or accepted by the American but headed by Mcfarlane the U.S. agreed to hold talks with the Soviets on the START and INF Treaty. Caught off guard the Soviets declined the talks. The American pressed in trying to restart talks but again an internal debate started. Perle and Weinberger wanted to leave SDI out of any talks why the State Department along with Mcfarlane thought this approach was crazy. Paul Nitze who was the head of the INF talks felt the Americans should look into a trade off. "The United States should look into the relationship between offensive and defensive system and the linkage we might draw between them." Nitze never felt that the program would take forever and not necessarily work so Nitze saw an opportunity with SDI. " A desirable deal that would place limits on SDI as long as the Soviets reduced their ICBM and INF war heads." This was starting to draw clear lines in the divide with SDI, but everyone knew ultimately Reagan would make the final decision. Schultz and Mcfarlane at this point were worried about the Defense Department interfering with arms talks and they looked for a way to bypass them. The convinced Reagan to have an arms control czar and Nitze was appointed. They even convinced Reagan to let Nitze report to them first with any findings then the President. This now changed the balance of power from the Department of Defense and Weinberger to Schultz who wanted to use SDI to bargain with the Soviets. Schultz then made another move in gaining power in SDI by convincing Reagan that they had to include SDI in any talk with the Soviet Union and explained to Reagan that the Soviets likely wouldn't engage in any talks that did not include SDI. Reagan agreed with Schultz and Schultz got the Soviets to agree to a meeting with Schultz and the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko for early January 1985. Some in the Administration like Schultz and now Even Reagan began to realize that SDI could work in their favor in arms talks with the Soviets. Now the battle would begin in preparations for talks and what to do with SDI. " Schultz, Nitze and Mcfarlane and various other State Department officials tried to finesse an approach that would allow SDI to be part of the negotiations as an actual bargaining chip but that would be acceptable to Reagan. Weinberger and Perle argued that SDI should not even be discussed." Both sides tried to influence the cold war policy. Schultz and his gang were arguing that the Americans should take advantage of this and gain some benefit from it. Why Weinberger and his side felt that the U.S. should take the strategic advantage. Well the final decision was made again by Reagan. He instructed Schultz to break the talks down into the separate steps Start, INF then SDI. They were all to be discussed separately and by no means were they to offer to kill SDI. The whole thing continued into a fight with Schultz and Weinberger on what to do until Reagan final gave his Marching orders in regard to the Geneva Summit and SDI. "Cap we don't know where it will all come out, but we are going to engage them (Soviets). So George, go over there and get it started without giving anything up." So the now was on pace to take place January 7, 1985. The meeting actually gained nothing the Soviets wanted SDI totally abandon and Schultz knew Reagan would never go for it. Schultz though a clever man gave the hint to the Soviets that possibility of SDI was still on the table. The actually accomplished nothing accept and agreement. " The Sides agreed that the subject of negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic and intermediate range , with all the questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship. The object of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms and strengthening strategic stability." All the talks did was encourage more talks between the two super powers. It also showed that no matter what SDI some way shape or form would be involved into any new arms talks with the Soviets. In 1984 President Reagan was elected again in a major landslide where he won 49 of 50 states. This gave the President a mandate and major political power and popularity at this time. In his inaugural address the President again stress of freeing the world from the nuclear threat and again in an interview with the New York Times in February of 1985 he discussed his clear view of SDI. "We can produce it then before we deploy it, I'd be willing to sit down and internalize. In other words I would negotiate and explain this weapon was not for first strike capabilities. I see this as a system that would help us do away with all nuclear weapons." Once again Reagan was setting the tone for his administration in regards to SDI. In the meantime Reagan had two of his main cabinet and SDI people stumping for him. Mcfarlane and Nitze, they were out trying to drum up more popular support for the project. They set out a three staged idea of how and why SDI should work. The speech was fine except for one of the last parts was Nitze said that it should be cost effective and not be able to be overwhelmed by the Soviets adding more offensive weapons. Well this gave the critics of SDI major play and they jumped on it claiming missile defense could not work. So what set out to be a play for public support in a way backfire, but this was nothing of significance because soon the whole landscape of the cold war would change in 1985. In 1985 the leader of the Soviet Union Konstanin Chernenko passed away. Following the death of Konstantin Chernenko (Andropov's successor) in 1985, Gorbachev was appointed general secretary of the party despite being the youngest member of the politburo. To the Americans and Reagan this would signal a shift in relations with the Soviets. This was based on the fact that British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher conveyed to Reagan that Gorbachev was a man they could work with. Because of speech that Gorbachev gave to the Soviet people in regards of the economy, Reagan felt very confident about where America stood with regards to the Soviet Union and expressed so "and now that they know that they have to compete with us in regard to security needs, I think they've got a healthy respect for our technology and our industrial capacity and that they, I believe are really going to try and, with us to negotiate a reduction of armaments." This was the first real sense when Reagan saw the Americans could have an advantage and it was Reagan who suggested this not his cabinet. Reagan also sent out a good will gesture to the new Soviet leader, Reagan sent VP Bush out to the Chernenko funeral and with him carrying a letter from Reagan inviting Gorbachev to the White House for a Summit. This though was done on the advice of Sec. Of State George Schultz. The U.S. ambassador at this time also noticed a change in the Soviet Union and told Schultz but he emphasized the Soviets wanted to shut SDI down. Even with this new attitude Gorbachev did not accept Reagan's invite. Many in the White House administration such as Sec. Of Defense Weinberger worried about Reagan moving in quickly and establishing a new relation with the Soviets. Weinberger also feared that men like Schultz, Mcfarlane, and Nitze may start arms talk and put SDI on the table. Weinberger was playing it close to the vest and trying to keep SDI in his corner where he would have more control and power with in the administration as the other men were also doing. In the meantime Schultz traveled to Vienna were he met with Soviet Minister of Foreign affairs Gromyko. Here the two set up a summit that would take place between Reagan and Gorbachev in a European city. In the mean time Nitze was working on a package for the Soviets in arms talks because it was understood that the Soviets wanted assurance from the Americans in regards to the ABM treaty. "This was just a form of breakout insurance against SDI being deployed for at least ten years." Nitze though would offer a proposal that linked a non withdrawal to a 50 percent reduction of offensive nuclear weapons over the same time; this would be known as the Monday morning package. Schultz, Mcfarlane and Nitze all worked together at this "it represented exactly the kind of use of SDI as a bargaining chip that they all desired and that Mcfarlane had hoped for since he had worked on the inception of SDI." As you can imagine Weinberger along with Perle objected to this use of SDI, for they would lose any power over the program that they had. Every thing was set and now The Geneva Summit was just around the corner. The Geneva Summit was held from November 19 to November 21 1985, this marked the first time in six years the two super powers leaders would meet, as you could imagine at the forefront was SDI and arms control. When the two met they went a separate meeting as recalled by Sec. Of State Schultz. "It was scheduled for 10 minutes. Twenty minutes went by, 30 minutes went by, 40 minutes went by and the White House guy who keeps the schedule going came around to me and he said, 'I should go in and let them know that they are going overtime.' And I said, 'If you do that, you should be fired! The name of the game, it shows they're getting along!" They were not really getting along at all though. Gorbachev and Reagan kept going back and forth on SDI even at one Gorbachev challenging Reagan telling him "even now due to computer technology one side could get a head of the other in space. But we can match any challenge thought you might think so." Although the one on one talks between Reagan and Gorbachev functioned around SDI and nothing else and even though nothing got done, the two seem to start a working relation. Even though SDI dominated talks U.S. officials later talked about a moment that turned the tide in the summit. They saw Gorbachev as being determined to stop SDI not matter what "but face with Reagan's fervent adherence to the cause of missile defense, the Soviet leader had realized that his counterpart would not waver and there was no way in negotiation he was going to talk the President out of SDI." So the Great summit of the superpowers ended in a dude with no deal. Although Reagan displeased he could not get a deal done along with members of his administration saw that they could work with Gorbachev in the future and that he was not as hard line as past Soviet leaders. After the summit there was also a shake up in the administration Mike Mcfarlane who was the NSC resigned in December of 85 and he was replaced with Poindexter his deputy. Schultz and Nitze did not like this at all for Mcfarlane tended to side with them on important issues. "Poindexter remained more neutral and gave Weinberger more access to Reagan then Mcfarlane" this did not sit well with Schultz or Nitze who were pretty effective in keeping Weinberger out of the loop. Another major problem with Poindexter he did not see SDI as something that could be bargained away. As the President and his administration enter into the new year of 1986 many things would change that would help arms talks and U.S. policy in regards to the Cold War. Early on in 1986 there had been no movement in the talks with the Soviets and little change in policy and how to deal with SDI and arms control. Reagan on the one hand did reach out to the Soviet leader offering to hold a summit in the summer of 1986 at the White House, Gorbachev refuse unless they could make really movement on talks and SDI. Schultz continually tried to convince Reagan to link all talks to SDI "feeling support for SDI would not increase but decrease due to the cost." Meantime Reagan who was determined to have SDI come to fruition wrote a letter and offered to share SDI with the Soviets. Weinberger on the other hand did not go for this at all and even suggested to Reagan if we were going to give SDI to the Soviets why not agree to remove all ICMB's. Also Schultz continued to argue for giving SDI as a bargaining chip because SDI was incapable of being ready for at least eight more years. Weinberger again went head to head with Schultz over this idea. Up till now there had been no movement with new talks of a summit with Gorbachev but that would change because of an incident in April of 1986." In April 1986, an explosion ripped apart Number 4 reactor at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in Ukraine north of Kiev. Gorbachev now decided to re-examine Reagan's first-ever arms control proposal known as the 'Zero Option.' Reagan had offered not to deploy cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe if the Soviets withdrew their SS-20 rockets. Gorbachev now wanted to cute a deal." For all the work Schultz and the rest of the administration had put in to get the Soviets back to the table it was a disaster and not American diplomacy that brought them together. So now a second summit between the super powers was set. In the meantime prior to the summit the administration kept repeating to Reagan that the Soviets were economically stressed and would want to make a deal. "Reagan and nearly all his advisors thus saw SDI as an increasingly effective means of adding economic and technological pressure on the Soviet System." This is one of the few times during SDI that every one in the administration agreed. The President and many in his cabinet saw SDI as the reason the Soviets wanted to talk and cut a deal. So the summit was set for October 11, 1986 at Reykjavik Iceland. The Summit again was dominated by SDI and to nobody's surprise. In interviews with Gorbachev and Don Regan you get an idea of how the summit went. "Gorbachev Stated "I said, 'OK, let's not even leave a hundred missiles, let's abolish them completely and go for the zero option!' This came as a shock! Everyone was surprised." Reagan Replied 'Well, why didn't you say so in the first place! That's exactly what I want to do and if you want to do away with all the weapons, I'll agree to do away with all the weapons!' 'All weapons? Of course, we'll do away with all weapons!' 'Good! That's great! Now, now we have an agreement!' 'Yes! Gorbachev replied, But you must confine SDI to the laboratory!' 'No, I won't!' said Reagan. 'No way! SDI continues! I told you that! I am never going to give up SDI!" Gorbachev pressed and pressed and, at one moment, President Reagan, who was very clear in his mind about this, wrote a little note and pushed it over to Schultz . It said, 'George, am I right?' I read this note and I said 'Absolutely!' and passed it back." This was a moment when Schultz could have influenced the President because he always wanted to use SDI as a chip but decided not, basically because he knew Reagan would not budge on this issue. the only thing that came out from the summit was a possible agreement on the INF treat which would come later in 1987which did not include SDI. The Soviet Union announced that it was prepared to reach a separate INF agreement. On March 4, 1987, the United States tabled a draft INF Treaty text, which reflected the agreement reached at Reykjavik, and submitted a comprehensive verification regime. In April the Soviet Union presented its own draft Treaty, and by July, it had agreed in principle to some of the provisions in the U.S. comprehensive verification regime, including data exchange, on-site observation of elimination, and on-site inspection of INF missile inventories and facilities. In a major shift, however, the Soviet side proposed the inclusion of U.S.-owned warheads on the West German Pershing IA missile systems. The United States responded by restating that the INF negotiations were bilateral, covering only U.S. and Soviet missiles, and could not involve third-country systems or affect existing patterns of cooperation. On December 8, 1987, the Treaty was signed by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev at a summit meeting in Washington. At the time of its signature, the Treaty's verification regime was the most detailed and stringent in the history of nuclear arms control, designed both to eliminate all declared INF systems entirely within three years of the Treaty's entry into force and to ensure compliance with the total ban on possession and use of these missiles. This would be the last major arms dealing with the soviets and for the rest of the Reagan presidency SDI would remain idle and have funding cut. Other issues such as White House scandals that derailed Reagan's goal of SDI After Ronald Reagan left the White House in 1988 many things were said right or wrong. Critics would call Reagan a figure head and claim he was not smart and was being run by the people around him. Ronald Reagan by no means was a puppet to the people around him. Reagan came into office regarding the Soviets with a clear policy although he took suggestions from people around him Reagan led the way. He proposed a build up of arms to compete with the Soviets and he alone pursued the idea of SDI. People in his cabinet may not have like the idea of SDI but it was Reagan's and Reagan's alone. Yes Reagan did take advice from people when he first brought up SDI on how to go about doing it and when to announce but Reagan ultimately made the final decision. Once SDI was announced it was Reagan who set forth the agenda for SDI. Reagan as you saw never intended to use SDI as a bargaining chip. Although Reagan listened to men like Schultz and Weinberger and took advice it was Reagan who set forth the part for SDI. Reagan approved or disapproved everything in regards to SDI. Yes SDI cause many fights internally as men in his cabinet were trying to gain control over SDI but again Reagan made the final decision and what and how to do it. When Reagan finally began to talk to Gorbachev and the Soviets in regards to arms control and SDI, Reagan did listen to his advisors, but he was the one who negotiated. When Reagan was being pressured from the Soviets and some people in his administration to give up SDI in a way to get an arms deal he was not influenced by either of them. Reagan had a goal to make America safer and he felt SDI was the way and would not budge from his principles no matter how much pressure or scrutiny he took. So as you can see Ronald Wilson Reagan was the leader of the troops not the puppet. When it came to SDI Reagan thought of it and controlled every aspect of it regardless of the internal power plays or strife that happened in his administration. It was ultimately Reagan who made the final decision. http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/061287d.htm (accessed 21, March 2006) Http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/abmt http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/061287d.htm (accessed 21, March 2006)

Shultz, George P. Turmoil and Triumph: My years as Secretary of State. New York: Charles Scribner's Son, 1993. 576

http://w ww.ronaldreagan.com/sdi.html Public Papers of the President of the United States: Ronald Reagan, October 2, 1981. Washington, D.C. U. S. Government Printing Office.879

Lettow, Paul. Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. New York: Random House, 2005.58 Ibid. 58 Anderson, Martin. Revolution: The Reagan Legacy. Stanford, Ca: Hoover Institution Press, 1990. 96. Lettow, Paul. Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. New York: Random House, 2005. 81

Teller, Edward, with Judith Shoolery. Memoirs: A Twentieth Century Journey in Science and Politics. Cambridge, Mass: Perseus Publishing,2001. 527-528

http://w ww.ronaldreagan.com/sdi.html Lettow, Paul. Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. New York: Random House, 2005. 86

Anderson, Martin. Revolution: The Reagan Legacy. Stanford, Ca: Hoover Institution Press, 1990. 97 Ibid.97 Lettow, Paul. Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. New York: Random House, 2005. 88

Ibid.89 Cannon, Lou. President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime, New York: Public Affairs,2000. 281 Baucom, Donald R. The Origins of SDI, 1944-1983. Kansas: University Press of Kansas,1992.192 Morris, Edmund. Dutch : A Memoir of Ronald Reagan. London: Harper Collins,1999.471 Shultz, George P. Turmoil and Triumph: My years as Secretary of State. New York: Charles Scribner's Son, 1993. 246

Lettow, Paul. Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. New York: Random House, 2005. 101

Mcfarlane, Robert C. and Zofia Smardz. Special Trust. New York: Cadell & Davies, 1994.230
Lettow, Paul. Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. New York: Random House, 2005. 106

Weinberger, Casper. Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon. London: Michael Joseph,1990. 213

Smith, Hedrick. The Power Game: How Washington Works. New York: Ballantine Books, 1988.614

http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/061287d.htm (accessed 21, March 2006)

Pressler, Larry. Star Wars: The Strategic Defense Initiative Debates in Congress. New York: Praeger, 1986.144 Shultz, George P. Turmoil and Triumph: My years as Secretary of State. New York: Charles Scribner's Son, 1993. 258

Public Papers of the President of the United States: Ronald Reagan, March 25, 1983. Washington, D.C. U. S. Government Printing Office.879

Lettow, Paul. Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. New York: Random House, 2005. 120

Shultz, George P. Turmoil and Triumph: My years as Secretary of State. New York: Charles Scribner's Son, 1993. 162

Ibid.265 Lettow, Paul. Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. New York: Random House, 2005. 125

Ibid.132 Weinberger, Casper. Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon. London: Michael Joseph,1990. 216 Shultz, George P. Turmoil and Triumph: My years as Secretary of State. New York: Charles Scribner's Son, 1993. 472, 478

Mcfarlane, Robert C. and Zofia Smardz. Special Trust. New York: Cadell & Davies, 1994.229 Nitze, Paul H. From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At Centre of Decision, A Memoir. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson,1989.402

Talbott, Strobe. Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control. London: Picador,1984.210 Lettow, Paul. Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. New York: Random House, 2005. 141

Oberdorfer, Don. From the Cold War to A New Era: The United States and The Soviet Union 1983- 1991. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1998.102 Lettow, Paul. Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. New York: Random House, 2005. 152

Public Papers of the President of the United States: Ronald Reagan, February 11 1985. Washington, D.C. U. S. Government Printing Office.159

Public Papers of the President of the United States: Ronald Reagan, March 14, 1985. Washington, D.C. U. S. Government Printing Office.285

Lettow, Paul. Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. New York: Random House, 2005. 161

Shultz, George P. Turmoil and Triumph: My years as Secretary of State. New York: Charles Scribner's Son, 1993. 264

http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/22/script.html Lettow, Paul. Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. New York: Random House, 2005. 181

Oberdorfer, Don. From the Cold War to A New Era: The United States and The Soviet Union 1983- 1991. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1998.149-150

Ibid. 172-173 Shultz, George P. Turmoil and Triumph: My years as Secretary of State. New York: Charles Scribner's Son, 1993. 690

http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/22/script.html Lettow, Paul. Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. New York: Random House, 2005. 216

http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/22/script.html