Rawls 'Essay' The Original Position
Rawls then introduces the concept of the difference principle, and connects it with democratic equality. Rawls explains that the theory behind the difference principle is that distributions in society are primarily based upon “social contingencies” and “natural fortunes.” Rawls indicates that, determining the distribution of goods, viz., wealth and income, is morally arbitrary. Hence, if you happen to be born to a wealthy family, your prospects of living “well” are higher than if you were born into poverty. This idea is counter-intuitive to the basic structure of democratic equality. Therefore, to have democratic equality, the difference principle is necessary to ensuring it. With the difference principle, the least advantaged members
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of society are improved by a combination of the principle of democratic equality, or “fair equality,” along with the difference principle. With this connection, Rawls reasons that it would be likely the social injustices now in existence would be removed. This justifies the use of the difference principle in that those who have natural talents and abilities would still be able to use those for their own gain, while allowing the raising of prospects for those with lesser abilities and talents. Consequently, this avoids the generalized argument that if everyone gets the same thing, there is no reason to work harder than the person who does not. Ultimately, Rawls point is that, the connection of the difference principle with democratic equality has to be maintained if arguments like those against welfare are to be overcome. Rawls' objective in forwarding a feasible theory of justice is to imagine that the “original position” corresponds to the usual idea of “the state of nature” in traditional social contract theories. This original position, unlike some contractarian states of nature, is purely hypothetical. The original position is made up of people that do not know their position, social class, nor status. These people also do not know their own strengths, weaknesses, intellectual prowess, nor do they know their own natural assets and abilities. Further, the assumption is that the people in this position do not know their own specific idea of what is good, nor do they have access to an understanding of their own psychological motives. Rawls describes the peculiar circumstance of those in the original position as being under a “veil of ignorance.” Ultimately, Rawls asserts, “The original position is, one might say, the appropriate initial status quo, and thus the fundamental agreements reached in it are fair.” This modest explanation of the original position instinctively presents several critical questions that surround hypothetical theories.
A main objection, and one recognized by Ronald Dworkin in his essay, “The Original Position,” is that even if the constraints placed on those in the original position, such as the “veil of ignorance,” worked, is that enough to assume that people would come to an agreement? More importantly, would they come to an agreement and choose Rawls' principles of justice? The simple and unsophisticated answer is “yes,” but only if the characteristics described by Rawls were actually the ones that divide people on issues of justice. Nevertheless, I am confident that Rawls would scold my simple answer, and tell me I am not even close to recognizing all the intricacies inherent to the peculiar psychological construct of the human psyche. Rawls understands objections, like the one above, and gives a “presentation of alternatives” in §21 of A Theory of Justice. Specifically, Rawls clarifies that arguments about self-interest are “Egoistic Conceptions.” Under the classification of “Egoistic Conceptions,” models of justice would have the following principles: 1. First-person dictatorship: Everyone is to serve my interests 2. Free-rider: Everyone is to act justly except for myself, if I choose not
to 3. General: Everyone is permitted to advance his interests as he pleases In meticulous detail, Rawls indicates that these “egoistic conceptions” should not be considered as an alternative, because people in the original position are “rational and mutually disinterested.”
Maybe the simple words of Charles Sanders Peirce can help add support to Rawls assertion, Take, for example, the doctrine that man only acts selfishly – that is, from the consideration that acting in one way will afford him more pleasure than acting in another. This rests on no fact in the world, but it has had a wide acceptance as being the only reasonable theory.
Peirce's claim seems an appropriate rebuttal to any consideration of an actual egoistic conception of justice. Further than this, Rawls also introduces five formal constraints to test the possibility that his two principles of justice would be chosen from a suitable list of “conceptions of justice.” The suitable list of “conceptions of justice” that Rawls has in mind is as follows. A. The Two Principles of Justice (in serial order) 1. The principle of greatest equal liberty 2. (a) The principle of (fair) equality of opportunity (b) The difference principle B. Mixed Conceptions. Substitute one for A2 above 1. The principle of average utility; or 2. The principle of average utility, subject to a constraint, either: (a) That a certain social minimum be maintained, or (b) That the overall distribution not be too wide; or 3. The principle of average utility subject to either constraint in B2 plus that of equality of fair opportunity C. Classical Teleological Conceptions 1. The classical principle of utility 2. The average principle of utility 3. The principle of perfection D. Intuitionistic Conceptions 1. To balance total utility against the principle of equal distribution 2. To balance average utility against the principle of redress 3. To balance a list of prima facie principles (as appropriate)
Rawls indicates that this list of conceptions of justice can be tested by using five “formal constraints of the concept of right.” 1. The “principles should be general.” 2. The principles must be universally applicable. 3. The principles must have “publicity” 4. The principles must “impose an [adjudicative] ordering on conflicting claims.” 5. The principles must have “finality”
When the list of conception are compared against the five formal constraints, Rawls indicates that his principle of justice are the only ones that meet the criterion imposed by the “formal constraints of the concept of right.” For succinctness, Rawls concludes that when you take into consideration all of the “conceptions of right,” elaborated previously, the “formal constraints” provide a system which correctly filter out the problematic nature of common moral theories. Consequently, Rawls’ two principles of justice are the only principles that can survive after being put to the test imposed by the formal constraints. There is an important distinction to make here between the definitions of “self-interest,” and that of “mutually disinterested.” Self-interest is defined as “concern only for getting what you need and not about what happens to other people” or, “your own interest or advantage.” Conversely, “mutually disinterested” is defined as, “not taking an interest in one another’s interests.” The distinction here is that self-interest is a recognition that comes only through a judgment towards another person. It is a foundational belief of egoistic philosophies that self-interest is what people are concerned with in their formulations of ethical beliefs. On the other hand, a mutually disinterested person has no interest in another person’s interests. This is an excellent way to establish any conception of justice, because when comparisons are made from self-interest, it is inevitable that envy creeps in and negates the fairness that could be obtained within a conception of mutual disinterest. Hence, the only way to concur on specific principles of justice would be through parties that are mutually disinterested. This avoids the sidle of envy intrinsic to self-interest. Contrariwise, people do have different conceptions of what makes their life worth living. There are indeed different beliefs in areas such as philosophy, politics, and morality. Nonetheless, Rawls vindicates his principles, because in order to categorically understand justice as fairness, the people in the original position must operate under “the veil of ignorance,” if any real principles of justice are to be obtained. As an example of the importance of the original position, the turn now is to an explanation of Rawls first principle of justice. This principle, generally represented as the “Liberty Principle,” specifies that, “[E]ach person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others.” Rawls advises that if people would choose a different principle to regulate liberty, such as from a position of self-interest, then the result would be discrimination against some people viz., those who are not like yourself. The subsequent situation would then be an approval of a reduced liberty for everyone. Therefore, by using the veil of ignorance, and justifying that the people in the original position are “rational and mutually disinterested,” Rawls is able to answer the objection of self-interest. The original position reveals that no “rational and mutually disinterested” person would ever agree with discrimination, or potential loss of liberty, if his or her own particular social position, psychological motive, etc. were unknown.
of society are improved by a combination of the principle of democratic equality, or “fair equality,” along with the difference principle. With this connection, Rawls reasons that it would be likely the social injustices now in existence would be removed. This justifies the use of the difference principle in that those who have natural talents and abilities would still be able to use those for their own gain, while allowing the raising of prospects for those with lesser abilities and talents. Consequently, this avoids the generalized argument that if everyone gets the same thing, there is no reason to work harder than the person who does not. Ultimately, Rawls point is that, the connection of the difference principle with democratic equality has to be maintained if arguments like those against welfare are to be overcome. Rawls' objective in forwarding a feasible theory of justice is to imagine that the “original position” corresponds to the usual idea of “the state of nature” in traditional social contract theories. This original position, unlike some contractarian states of nature, is purely hypothetical. The original position is made up of people that do not know their position, social class, nor status. These people also do not know their own strengths, weaknesses, intellectual prowess, nor do they know their own natural assets and abilities. Further, the assumption is that the people in this position do not know their own specific idea of what is good, nor do they have access to an understanding of their own psychological motives. Rawls describes the peculiar circumstance of those in the original position as being under a “veil of ignorance.” Ultimately, Rawls asserts, “The original position is, one might say, the appropriate initial status quo, and thus the fundamental agreements reached in it are fair.” This modest explanation of the original position instinctively presents several critical questions that surround hypothetical theories.
A main objection, and one recognized by Ronald Dworkin in his essay, “The Original Position,” is that even if the constraints placed on those in the original position, such as the “veil of ignorance,” worked, is that enough to assume that people would come to an agreement? More importantly, would they come to an agreement and choose Rawls' principles of justice? The simple and unsophisticated answer is “yes,” but only if the characteristics described by Rawls were actually the ones that divide people on issues of justice. Nevertheless, I am confident that Rawls would scold my simple answer, and tell me I am not even close to recognizing all the intricacies inherent to the peculiar psychological construct of the human psyche. Rawls understands objections, like the one above, and gives a “presentation of alternatives” in §21 of A Theory of Justice. Specifically, Rawls clarifies that arguments about self-interest are “Egoistic Conceptions.” Under the classification of “Egoistic Conceptions,” models of justice would have the following principles: 1. First-person dictatorship: Everyone is to serve my interests 2. Free-rider: Everyone is to act justly except for myself, if I choose not
to 3. General: Everyone is permitted to advance his interests as he pleases In meticulous detail, Rawls indicates that these “egoistic conceptions” should not be considered as an alternative, because people in the original position are “rational and mutually disinterested.”
Maybe the simple words of Charles Sanders Peirce can help add support to Rawls assertion, Take, for example, the doctrine that man only acts selfishly – that is, from the consideration that acting in one way will afford him more pleasure than acting in another. This rests on no fact in the world, but it has had a wide acceptance as being the only reasonable theory.
Peirce's claim seems an appropriate rebuttal to any consideration of an actual egoistic conception of justice. Further than this, Rawls also introduces five formal constraints to test the possibility that his two principles of justice would be chosen from a suitable list of “conceptions of justice.” The suitable list of “conceptions of justice” that Rawls has in mind is as follows. A. The Two Principles of Justice (in serial order) 1. The principle of greatest equal liberty 2. (a) The principle of (fair) equality of opportunity (b) The difference principle B. Mixed Conceptions. Substitute one for A2 above 1. The principle of average utility; or 2. The principle of average utility, subject to a constraint, either: (a) That a certain social minimum be maintained, or (b) That the overall distribution not be too wide; or 3. The principle of average utility subject to either constraint in B2 plus that of equality of fair opportunity C. Classical Teleological Conceptions 1. The classical principle of utility 2. The average principle of utility 3. The principle of perfection D. Intuitionistic Conceptions 1. To balance total utility against the principle of equal distribution 2. To balance average utility against the principle of redress 3. To balance a list of prima facie principles (as appropriate)
Rawls indicates that this list of conceptions of justice can be tested by using five “formal constraints of the concept of right.” 1. The “principles should be general.” 2. The principles must be universally applicable. 3. The principles must have “publicity” 4. The principles must “impose an [adjudicative] ordering on conflicting claims.” 5. The principles must have “finality”
When the list of conception are compared against the five formal constraints, Rawls indicates that his principle of justice are the only ones that meet the criterion imposed by the “formal constraints of the concept of right.” For succinctness, Rawls concludes that when you take into consideration all of the “conceptions of right,” elaborated previously, the “formal constraints” provide a system which correctly filter out the problematic nature of common moral theories. Consequently, Rawls’ two principles of justice are the only principles that can survive after being put to the test imposed by the formal constraints. There is an important distinction to make here between the definitions of “self-interest,” and that of “mutually disinterested.” Self-interest is defined as “concern only for getting what you need and not about what happens to other people” or, “your own interest or advantage.” Conversely, “mutually disinterested” is defined as, “not taking an interest in one another’s interests.” The distinction here is that self-interest is a recognition that comes only through a judgment towards another person. It is a foundational belief of egoistic philosophies that self-interest is what people are concerned with in their formulations of ethical beliefs. On the other hand, a mutually disinterested person has no interest in another person’s interests. This is an excellent way to establish any conception of justice, because when comparisons are made from self-interest, it is inevitable that envy creeps in and negates the fairness that could be obtained within a conception of mutual disinterest. Hence, the only way to concur on specific principles of justice would be through parties that are mutually disinterested. This avoids the sidle of envy intrinsic to self-interest. Contrariwise, people do have different conceptions of what makes their life worth living. There are indeed different beliefs in areas such as philosophy, politics, and morality. Nonetheless, Rawls vindicates his principles, because in order to categorically understand justice as fairness, the people in the original position must operate under “the veil of ignorance,” if any real principles of justice are to be obtained. As an example of the importance of the original position, the turn now is to an explanation of Rawls first principle of justice. This principle, generally represented as the “Liberty Principle,” specifies that, “[E]ach person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others.” Rawls advises that if people would choose a different principle to regulate liberty, such as from a position of self-interest, then the result would be discrimination against some people viz., those who are not like yourself. The subsequent situation would then be an approval of a reduced liberty for everyone. Therefore, by using the veil of ignorance, and justifying that the people in the original position are “rational and mutually disinterested,” Rawls is able to answer the objection of self-interest. The original position reveals that no “rational and mutually disinterested” person would ever agree with discrimination, or potential loss of liberty, if his or her own particular social position, psychological motive, etc. were unknown.