Second, criticisms of Waltzian balancing theory will be highlighted. This brings to the discussion on bandwagoning behavior in the literature. Third, this chapter discusses two other strategic responses appeared repeatedly in the literature: engagement and accommodation. The aim of this chapter is presented the theoretical background of neorealism and its critics which lead to further discussions later in this thesis. 2.1 Balancing and bandwagoning – the dichotomous pair in international politics
Realism can be dated back to the writings of Thucydides (History of the Peloponnesian War) (Morgenthau 1973). Moving along with works of historian E. H. Carr and political theorist Hans Morgenthau , Kenneth Waltz develops the neorealist/ structural realist school which influences many until recently (Parent and Rosato 2015). This section, first, introduces a neorealist structured approach and the theory of balancing. Second, this section reviews criticisms of the original neorealist theory. Last, this section reviews refinements made by later scholars on improving the applicability of neorealist …show more content…
Power is defined in many ways; Waltz defined as “size of population, resources endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability, and competence” and Mearsheimer defined simply in military and latent, “the socio-economic ingredients that go into building military” power “largely based on a state’s wealth and the overall size of its population” (Mearsheimer 2014: 55; Waltz 1979: 131). Neorealists define two categories of powers: great powers are polar powers which impact the patterning of the international system and states’ behaviors largely; and small or secondary powers which react to great power’s capabilities and behaviors (Mearsheimer, 2014; Waltz, 1979). To Waltz, great powers have a large sum of power capabilities, military and economic; they usually go nuclear (Waltz 1993). An economically great power, in Waltz’s conception, needs to be a militarily great power. In Japan’s case in the early 1990s, Waltz argued that “[A] country to choose not to become a great power is a structural anomaly,” which means that Japan was required by the international structure to be a great power possessing sizable military forces after being powerful economically (Waltz 1993: 61-70; 2000: 33). After all, in anarchy, states need to arm themselves to safeguard them from vulnerability and conflicts. Later scholars, then, argued that great powers will try yo gain, even