Securitization of HIV and TB
Presentation
Securitization
In 1983, an article published in International Security by Richard Ullman brought a change in security analysis by broadening security’s perspectives. Ullman classified threats to national security as “an action or sequence of events that (1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to private, nongovernmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state.”
Years later the Copenhagen School around Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde widened this concept. According to them, security is not something that is real, but it is a “speech act”; meaning that all issues can be turned into a security problem. This is because security doesn’t need to portray a frightening reality, but is only a social and subjective construction, with which a topic is displayed as a threat.
“Security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise or naming a ship). By uttering ‘security’ a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.” (Waever).
Wæver stated that the, “[u]se of the security label does not merely reflect whether a problem is a security problem, it is also a political choice, that is, a decision for conceptualization in a special way.” Therefore, politicians can decide whether to represent HIV/AIDS as a health issue (as human security theorists prefer), a development issue, or an international security issue (as national security policy makers prefer) and construct it accordingly.
Securitization implies the construction of a danger that needs to be changed by quick action and extraordinary, even undemocratic
Securitization
In 1983, an article published in International Security by Richard Ullman brought a change in security analysis by broadening security’s perspectives. Ullman classified threats to national security as “an action or sequence of events that (1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to private, nongovernmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state.”
Years later the Copenhagen School around Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde widened this concept. According to them, security is not something that is real, but it is a “speech act”; meaning that all issues can be turned into a security problem. This is because security doesn’t need to portray a frightening reality, but is only a social and subjective construction, with which a topic is displayed as a threat.
“Security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise or naming a ship). By uttering ‘security’ a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.” (Waever).
Wæver stated that the, “[u]se of the security label does not merely reflect whether a problem is a security problem, it is also a political choice, that is, a decision for conceptualization in a special way.” Therefore, politicians can decide whether to represent HIV/AIDS as a health issue (as human security theorists prefer), a development issue, or an international security issue (as national security policy makers prefer) and construct it accordingly.
Securitization implies the construction of a danger that needs to be changed by quick action and extraordinary, even undemocratic