The “good old days” syndrome, that’s how it was before, therefore it needs to be an option left on the table. That table is collecting a lot of dust recently because the Air Force has pushed so diligently to be more independent, if not completely autonomous, and prove its capabilities, the PTB (Powers That Be) have lost sight of the fact that micro scale is the primary means of shaping operations. You are looking at a realistic future for ARMY aviation to become more self-sufficient. The days of Air Force and Army interdependence has greatly diminished, or has become slightly one-sided. Air Force members are integrated within the Army such as Ranger units with embedded JTAC airmen, but yet all ODA Special Forces members attend the same schools the Air Force do for specific roles so they are capable of performing the exact same duty, i.e. call for fire. There are units that have purged themselves of joint support for a number of reasons; slow reaction, terms or conditions, lack of ability, or a need to “cut the red tape.” You are absolutely right, the new principles Army Aviation should shift focus on is the necessity to become self-reliant in the midst of a service that has lost relevance or become obsolete.
Support relationships are defined as the purpose, scope, and effect desired when one capability supports another (FM 3-04). Every type of Army aviation operation, whether it falls under general support or direct support, has their own unique value of assets that cater to specific types of missions or distinctive requests that may involve anything from training to VIP transport. These may be during times of peace, humanitarian, or war, and their nature can range from clandestine to high profile, and at many levels of