Stasis Theory Essay
Stasis Doctrine as Invention
The inheritance of a stable rhetorica from the Greeks gave the Roman rhetoricians of the first century BCE, the structure on which various new appendages were attached, one of which was the theory of stasis which was first formalized by Hermagoras of Temnos in the late second century BCE. Although the notion of stasis predates Hermagoras, Antoine Braet writes that he is due credit for developing “the doctrine of stasis as a closed procedure of inventio” (79) and that later rhetoricians have tired to reap glory for themselves by inventing all sorts of variants on Hermagoras’ system (80).
Stasis theory underwent several revisions—as evidenced in the works of Cicero later in the next century and the works of Quintilian in the first century CE—until Hermogenes of Tarsus, who appeared in the second century, offered the most intricate discussion of it in his thesis, On Stasis. Although most of Cicero’s work was centered on oration, he still is identified with the doctrine of stasis. Most rhetorical historians agree Aristotle provided the antecedent elements of stasis theory. Kennedy, for instance, notes that Aristotle’s observations at 1374a probably provided a seminal source for stasis theory—particularly stasis of definition. (104) Ray Nadeau theorizes that rhetorical stasis was developed from and …show more content…
reflects characteristics of the four Aristotelian predictables of genus, definition, property, and coincident. (1959, 249) But Braet argues that compared with Aristotle’s still unsystematic doctrine of inventio, Hermagoras’ system was a considerable advance. (80). And while Wayne Thompson concurs that “the Rhetoric was a possible source for much of what” (140) Hermagoras and others later wrote, he sees only two passages of the Rhetoric—I.3 and II.13—seem to contain the seminal notions of stasis theory. He adds that in no place in Books I and II does Aristotle offer stasis as a system of analysis while stasiastic passages in Book III suggests that the doctrine was more prominent in Aristotle’s system of invention there than it was in Books I or II (135).
Yameng Liu, on the other hand, contends that the difference between Aristotle and classical theorists of stasis—Hermagoras and those who have followed—is not one of degree in the development or perfection of the model, but one in attitude toward the perception of the model. Although stasis is one of the most important elements of a generative rhetoric for such rhetoricians, for Aristotle, Liu argues, stasis is little more than a rhetorical technique to be employed occasionally in invention and arrangement (55). One probable reason stasis did not appeal to Aristotle in the same way it did to later rhetoricians because he considered deliberative speech—as opposed to forensic oratory—to be more difficult and, therefore, the norm of rhetorical invention because forensic oratory assumes that disagreement is the only kind of rhetorical relationship (56-57) Aristotle’s also considered stasiastic discourse to amount to little more than verbal sparring in which “one of the parties would necessarily be an antagonist and, therefore, need to deliberately misrepresent the case (57). There is, therefore, according to Liu, a deliberate marginalization of stasis in Aristotle’s rhetorical theory because he conceived of invention as a process of multi-dimensional interplay between ethos, pathos, logos, and topoi (58).
Stasis theory offers a method of refining one 's questions so that relevant information could be ascertained, hence its place in a discussion of invention. The word very stasis, as defined by the American Heritage Dictionary, means a condition of balance among various forces: motionlessness. Translated from the Greek, it literally means a “standstill.” Rhetorical stasis, as the ancients defined it, was that point of rest or balance between “opposing contentions in a controversy” (Nadeau, 1964, 369). Such a “balance” is the very essence of a question like, “Should the verdict be guilty?” which Hermagoras identifies as a “stock” question and characterized as a verbalization centering attention upon the arguments in an issue of culpability; in this case a crime. In Ray Nadeau’s characterization, “centering” is a fundamental term because the stasis of an argument is that point between two opposite assertions yet unresolved. Such a pair of assertions might be “You murdered the victim,” and “No, I did not murder the victim.” These sample assertions are rather simplified for the purpose of illustration, but what is particularly significant to the basic stasis theory here is that at this point in the debate or argument that neither side has gained an advantage or advanced their position. Therefore, the argument is considered to be at a “standstill.”
In its basic classical form, rhetorical stasis functioned strictly as a heuristic in forensic inquiry, although “Hermagoras considered all political problems to be susceptible to rhetorical treatment” (Nadeau, 364). But as Nadeau points out, for the ancients rhetorical inquiry was an inexact art of speculation so therefore stasis was almost exclusive to the forensic inquiry. In the Hermagorean system it consisted of four stages, or stock issues, designed to identify the fundamental issue to be addressed in a forensic speech. They were also possibly ordered in terms of importance to form a linear fourfold plan of inquiry. An issue would be tested on the grounds of each type and discarded in sequence until the relevant stasis was identified and resolved.
The four primary stages or stock issues of stases, as reconstructed by Dieter Matthes are: conjecture, definition, quality, and procedure. [5] A conjectural stasis results from an attempt to resolve whether an act took place as asserted. It could focus on an argument of motive. For example, “You murdered the victim because you wanted money,” as opposed to “No, I did not murder the victim for money because I am independently wealthy and have no need for money.” Conjectural stasis could also focus on an issue of character. For example, “You murdered the victim because you have been convicted of murder in the past. “No, I did not murder the victim because I have been rehabilitated.” Conjectural stasis could also focus on signs inherent to the act as asserted, such as circumstantial or physical evidence. For example, “You murdered the victim because you were seen leaving the premises of the house where the victim-s body was found,” as opposed to “No, I did not murder the victim because I never entered the house where the victim’s body was found.”
Definitive stasis arises when a question having to do with “what a thing is through its essence or essential qualities” has not been resolved. That is, whether a condition or act is what it is asserted to be? For example, “You murdered the victim,” as opposed to, “No, I did not because I did not intend to.” Such a dilemma creates definitive stasis because for an act to constitute murder it must both be unlawful and intentional.
Qualitative stasis, on the other hand, is concerned with those qualities of an act or condition that are not of its essence. That is, the peripheral circumstances which do not deny an act or condition, but which attempt to mitigate its severity or one’s culpability. One such tactic would be a plea of justification. For example, “You murdered the victim,” as opposed to, “Yes I did, however, it was necessary because I suspected he would have committed a series of crimes against my family.” Although the act is stipulated to, there is no wrong admitted. Another type of qualitative stasis is that which would be the consequent of a counter-proposition. Such a counter-proposition could be in the form of a counter-plea that a benefit was actually rendered as a result of the act or condition. For example, “You murdered the victim,” as opposed to, “Yes, but I did society a favor by eliminating such an undesirable person. Another counter-position could be in the form of a counter-charge that the person harmed deserved their fate. For example, “You murdered the victim,” as opposed to, “Yes, but he was cruel to old women and dogs.” Still another counter-proposition could be a shifting of the blame to another person capable of liability or incapable of liability. For example, “You murdered the victim,” as opposed to, “Yes, but I was drunk at the time,” or “Yes, but I am the victim of an abusive father.” A last counter-proposition could be a plea for leniency as a consequent of the validity of any of the above counter-propositions.
The qualitative consideration is analogous to that of tuning an electromagnetic receiver. First, one errs on the side of "less than,” then on the side of "more than", until the position of the desired frequency is achieved. But, as with all conceptions, there is a gap between this model and reality, for there exists no absolute point of stasis on any issue "out there.” What is termed "the truth,” "the good,” "the evil,” etc., has much more to do with the world-view of the rhetor rather than any sort of beingness. Cicero 's system lacks, then, what we might call, a quality control mechanism, and conceivably has led many through time to come to the exact sort of errant conclusions that drove Socrates to condemn rhetorical practices. But the salvation of stasis theory is that we have enough history to separate the useful from the misleading, and the constructive from the merely esoteric.
Finally, procedural stasis is an objection to the validity of an assertion on technical grounds.
It can best be illustrated in the American justice system by such things as the common occurrences of evidence, obtained by illegal searches and seizures, being disallowed; or by mistrials being granted on the grounds that the prosecution violated a procedure that resulted in undue bias against a defendant. In ancient Greece and Rome, procedural stasis was often invoked in situations such as when the legitimacy of a governing body bringing a charge was in question (i.e. jurisdiction) or when a charge of procedural prejudice was
made.
Such a rhetorical theory of argumentation demonstrates several significant features. First, it is not monological, but rather it is dialectical since every argument consists of an argument for and argument against. Also, it is not purely descriptive, but is also normative in the sense that it lays down norms within which interlocutors play their roles and adhere when forming their judgments. And it has its basis a critical discussion as its object insofar as the purpose of the discussion is to establish whether one standpoint is defensible against another, as all parties will “test the debate actively and systematically against universally accepted yardsticks inherent to the matter under discussion” (Braet 90).
Furthermore, the use of a given stasis is influenced greatly by the type of rhetoric one engages in—forensic, epideictic, or deliberative. And this stratification has a further overlay when one considers the temporal orientation of each. Though one may locate all three forms of stasis within a given area of rhetoric (in a legal case, one may ask productively what happened, who did it, and what were the mitigating factors), there does exist an elegant correspondence between the three concepts as follows: Past/Forensic/Conjectural; Present/Epideictic/Definition; and Future/Deliberative/Quality.
Bibliography
Backes, James G “Aristotle 's Theory Of Stasis In Forensic And Deliberative Speech In The "Rhetoric” Central States Speech Journal 12:1 (1960:Autumn) 6
Braet, Antoine “The Classical Doctrine of Status and the Rhetorical Theory of Argumentation.” Philosophy and Rhetoric 20, 2 (1987): 79-93.
Carter, Michael. "Stasis and Kairos: Principles of Social Construction in Classical Rhetoric." Rhetoric Review 7.1 (Fall 1988): 97-1117.
Cope, Edward M. Introduction to Aristotle’s Rhetoric. London:Macmillan, 1867.
Dieter, O. A. L. “Stasis.” Speech Monographs, 17 (1950): 345-369.
Fahnestock, Jeanne. and Secor, Marie “Toward a Modern Version of Stasis,” Oldspeak / Newspeak: Rhetorical Transformations, Ed. Charles W. Knuepper. Arlington, Texas: The Rhetoric Society of America and NCTE, 1985.
Hohmann, Hanns The Dynamics of Stasis American Journal of Jurisprudence 34 (1989) 171.
Kennedy, George A. Aristotle on Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse. New York, Oxford: Oxford university Press (1991).
Kline, Susan L. “Toward A Contemporary Linguistic Interpretation Of The Concept Of Stasis.” Journal of American Forensic Association. 16, 2 (Fall 1979): 95-103
Liu, Yameng. (1991). “Aristotle and the stasis theory: A re-examination.” Rhetoric Society Quarterly, 21(1): 53-59.
Matthes, Dieter. “Hermagoras von Temnos 1904-1955,” Lustrum, III (1958) pp. 58-214
Nadeau, Ray. “Hermogenes’ On Stasis: A Translation with an Introduction and Notes,” 31, 4 Speech Monographs, (1964): 361-424.
--. "Classical Systems of Stases in Greek: Hermagoras to Hermogenes," Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies 2,1 (Jan 1959).
--. "Some Aristotelian and Stoic Influences on the Theory of Stasis." Speech Monographs 26 (1959).
Thompson, Wayne N. "Stasis" in Aristotle 's "Rhetoric" Quarterly Journal of Speech 58:2 (1972:Apr.) 134-141.
The inheritance of a stable rhetorica from the Greeks gave the Roman rhetoricians of the first century BCE, the structure on which various new appendages were attached, one of which was the theory of stasis which was first formalized by Hermagoras of Temnos in the late second century BCE. Although the notion of stasis predates Hermagoras, Antoine Braet writes that he is due credit for developing “the doctrine of stasis as a closed procedure of inventio” (79) and that later rhetoricians have tired to reap glory for themselves by inventing all sorts of variants on Hermagoras’ system (80).
Stasis theory underwent several revisions—as evidenced in the works of Cicero later in the next century and the works of Quintilian in the first century CE—until Hermogenes of Tarsus, who appeared in the second century, offered the most intricate discussion of it in his thesis, On Stasis. Although most of Cicero’s work was centered on oration, he still is identified with the doctrine of stasis. Most rhetorical historians agree Aristotle provided the antecedent elements of stasis theory. Kennedy, for instance, notes that Aristotle’s observations at 1374a probably provided a seminal source for stasis theory—particularly stasis of definition. (104) Ray Nadeau theorizes that rhetorical stasis was developed from and …show more content…
reflects characteristics of the four Aristotelian predictables of genus, definition, property, and coincident. (1959, 249) But Braet argues that compared with Aristotle’s still unsystematic doctrine of inventio, Hermagoras’ system was a considerable advance. (80). And while Wayne Thompson concurs that “the Rhetoric was a possible source for much of what” (140) Hermagoras and others later wrote, he sees only two passages of the Rhetoric—I.3 and II.13—seem to contain the seminal notions of stasis theory. He adds that in no place in Books I and II does Aristotle offer stasis as a system of analysis while stasiastic passages in Book III suggests that the doctrine was more prominent in Aristotle’s system of invention there than it was in Books I or II (135).
Yameng Liu, on the other hand, contends that the difference between Aristotle and classical theorists of stasis—Hermagoras and those who have followed—is not one of degree in the development or perfection of the model, but one in attitude toward the perception of the model. Although stasis is one of the most important elements of a generative rhetoric for such rhetoricians, for Aristotle, Liu argues, stasis is little more than a rhetorical technique to be employed occasionally in invention and arrangement (55). One probable reason stasis did not appeal to Aristotle in the same way it did to later rhetoricians because he considered deliberative speech—as opposed to forensic oratory—to be more difficult and, therefore, the norm of rhetorical invention because forensic oratory assumes that disagreement is the only kind of rhetorical relationship (56-57) Aristotle’s also considered stasiastic discourse to amount to little more than verbal sparring in which “one of the parties would necessarily be an antagonist and, therefore, need to deliberately misrepresent the case (57). There is, therefore, according to Liu, a deliberate marginalization of stasis in Aristotle’s rhetorical theory because he conceived of invention as a process of multi-dimensional interplay between ethos, pathos, logos, and topoi (58).
Stasis theory offers a method of refining one 's questions so that relevant information could be ascertained, hence its place in a discussion of invention. The word very stasis, as defined by the American Heritage Dictionary, means a condition of balance among various forces: motionlessness. Translated from the Greek, it literally means a “standstill.” Rhetorical stasis, as the ancients defined it, was that point of rest or balance between “opposing contentions in a controversy” (Nadeau, 1964, 369). Such a “balance” is the very essence of a question like, “Should the verdict be guilty?” which Hermagoras identifies as a “stock” question and characterized as a verbalization centering attention upon the arguments in an issue of culpability; in this case a crime. In Ray Nadeau’s characterization, “centering” is a fundamental term because the stasis of an argument is that point between two opposite assertions yet unresolved. Such a pair of assertions might be “You murdered the victim,” and “No, I did not murder the victim.” These sample assertions are rather simplified for the purpose of illustration, but what is particularly significant to the basic stasis theory here is that at this point in the debate or argument that neither side has gained an advantage or advanced their position. Therefore, the argument is considered to be at a “standstill.”
In its basic classical form, rhetorical stasis functioned strictly as a heuristic in forensic inquiry, although “Hermagoras considered all political problems to be susceptible to rhetorical treatment” (Nadeau, 364). But as Nadeau points out, for the ancients rhetorical inquiry was an inexact art of speculation so therefore stasis was almost exclusive to the forensic inquiry. In the Hermagorean system it consisted of four stages, or stock issues, designed to identify the fundamental issue to be addressed in a forensic speech. They were also possibly ordered in terms of importance to form a linear fourfold plan of inquiry. An issue would be tested on the grounds of each type and discarded in sequence until the relevant stasis was identified and resolved.
The four primary stages or stock issues of stases, as reconstructed by Dieter Matthes are: conjecture, definition, quality, and procedure. [5] A conjectural stasis results from an attempt to resolve whether an act took place as asserted. It could focus on an argument of motive. For example, “You murdered the victim because you wanted money,” as opposed to “No, I did not murder the victim for money because I am independently wealthy and have no need for money.” Conjectural stasis could also focus on an issue of character. For example, “You murdered the victim because you have been convicted of murder in the past. “No, I did not murder the victim because I have been rehabilitated.” Conjectural stasis could also focus on signs inherent to the act as asserted, such as circumstantial or physical evidence. For example, “You murdered the victim because you were seen leaving the premises of the house where the victim-s body was found,” as opposed to “No, I did not murder the victim because I never entered the house where the victim’s body was found.”
Definitive stasis arises when a question having to do with “what a thing is through its essence or essential qualities” has not been resolved. That is, whether a condition or act is what it is asserted to be? For example, “You murdered the victim,” as opposed to, “No, I did not because I did not intend to.” Such a dilemma creates definitive stasis because for an act to constitute murder it must both be unlawful and intentional.
Qualitative stasis, on the other hand, is concerned with those qualities of an act or condition that are not of its essence. That is, the peripheral circumstances which do not deny an act or condition, but which attempt to mitigate its severity or one’s culpability. One such tactic would be a plea of justification. For example, “You murdered the victim,” as opposed to, “Yes I did, however, it was necessary because I suspected he would have committed a series of crimes against my family.” Although the act is stipulated to, there is no wrong admitted. Another type of qualitative stasis is that which would be the consequent of a counter-proposition. Such a counter-proposition could be in the form of a counter-plea that a benefit was actually rendered as a result of the act or condition. For example, “You murdered the victim,” as opposed to, “Yes, but I did society a favor by eliminating such an undesirable person. Another counter-position could be in the form of a counter-charge that the person harmed deserved their fate. For example, “You murdered the victim,” as opposed to, “Yes, but he was cruel to old women and dogs.” Still another counter-proposition could be a shifting of the blame to another person capable of liability or incapable of liability. For example, “You murdered the victim,” as opposed to, “Yes, but I was drunk at the time,” or “Yes, but I am the victim of an abusive father.” A last counter-proposition could be a plea for leniency as a consequent of the validity of any of the above counter-propositions.
The qualitative consideration is analogous to that of tuning an electromagnetic receiver. First, one errs on the side of "less than,” then on the side of "more than", until the position of the desired frequency is achieved. But, as with all conceptions, there is a gap between this model and reality, for there exists no absolute point of stasis on any issue "out there.” What is termed "the truth,” "the good,” "the evil,” etc., has much more to do with the world-view of the rhetor rather than any sort of beingness. Cicero 's system lacks, then, what we might call, a quality control mechanism, and conceivably has led many through time to come to the exact sort of errant conclusions that drove Socrates to condemn rhetorical practices. But the salvation of stasis theory is that we have enough history to separate the useful from the misleading, and the constructive from the merely esoteric.
Finally, procedural stasis is an objection to the validity of an assertion on technical grounds.
It can best be illustrated in the American justice system by such things as the common occurrences of evidence, obtained by illegal searches and seizures, being disallowed; or by mistrials being granted on the grounds that the prosecution violated a procedure that resulted in undue bias against a defendant. In ancient Greece and Rome, procedural stasis was often invoked in situations such as when the legitimacy of a governing body bringing a charge was in question (i.e. jurisdiction) or when a charge of procedural prejudice was
made.
Such a rhetorical theory of argumentation demonstrates several significant features. First, it is not monological, but rather it is dialectical since every argument consists of an argument for and argument against. Also, it is not purely descriptive, but is also normative in the sense that it lays down norms within which interlocutors play their roles and adhere when forming their judgments. And it has its basis a critical discussion as its object insofar as the purpose of the discussion is to establish whether one standpoint is defensible against another, as all parties will “test the debate actively and systematically against universally accepted yardsticks inherent to the matter under discussion” (Braet 90).
Furthermore, the use of a given stasis is influenced greatly by the type of rhetoric one engages in—forensic, epideictic, or deliberative. And this stratification has a further overlay when one considers the temporal orientation of each. Though one may locate all three forms of stasis within a given area of rhetoric (in a legal case, one may ask productively what happened, who did it, and what were the mitigating factors), there does exist an elegant correspondence between the three concepts as follows: Past/Forensic/Conjectural; Present/Epideictic/Definition; and Future/Deliberative/Quality.
Bibliography
Backes, James G “Aristotle 's Theory Of Stasis In Forensic And Deliberative Speech In The "Rhetoric” Central States Speech Journal 12:1 (1960:Autumn) 6
Braet, Antoine “The Classical Doctrine of Status and the Rhetorical Theory of Argumentation.” Philosophy and Rhetoric 20, 2 (1987): 79-93.
Carter, Michael. "Stasis and Kairos: Principles of Social Construction in Classical Rhetoric." Rhetoric Review 7.1 (Fall 1988): 97-1117.
Cope, Edward M. Introduction to Aristotle’s Rhetoric. London:Macmillan, 1867.
Dieter, O. A. L. “Stasis.” Speech Monographs, 17 (1950): 345-369.
Fahnestock, Jeanne. and Secor, Marie “Toward a Modern Version of Stasis,” Oldspeak / Newspeak: Rhetorical Transformations, Ed. Charles W. Knuepper. Arlington, Texas: The Rhetoric Society of America and NCTE, 1985.
Hohmann, Hanns The Dynamics of Stasis American Journal of Jurisprudence 34 (1989) 171.
Kennedy, George A. Aristotle on Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse. New York, Oxford: Oxford university Press (1991).
Kline, Susan L. “Toward A Contemporary Linguistic Interpretation Of The Concept Of Stasis.” Journal of American Forensic Association. 16, 2 (Fall 1979): 95-103
Liu, Yameng. (1991). “Aristotle and the stasis theory: A re-examination.” Rhetoric Society Quarterly, 21(1): 53-59.
Matthes, Dieter. “Hermagoras von Temnos 1904-1955,” Lustrum, III (1958) pp. 58-214
Nadeau, Ray. “Hermogenes’ On Stasis: A Translation with an Introduction and Notes,” 31, 4 Speech Monographs, (1964): 361-424.
--. "Classical Systems of Stases in Greek: Hermagoras to Hermogenes," Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies 2,1 (Jan 1959).
--. "Some Aristotelian and Stoic Influences on the Theory of Stasis." Speech Monographs 26 (1959).
Thompson, Wayne N. "Stasis" in Aristotle 's "Rhetoric" Quarterly Journal of Speech 58:2 (1972:Apr.) 134-141.