Stereotypes Concerns Over The Use Of Drugs In Sports

Sport is a major global industry generating billions of dollars in sponsorship, media rights and gambling funds. In recent times, a number of sports have been tarnished by doping scandals. These incidents pose threats to the integrity of sport both nationally and on a global scale. In response, sporting organisations and governments have introduced legislation and accompanying punishments to deter the use of both performance enhancing and recreational drugs. However, it could be argued that effective strategies for combating doping in sport are hindered by a lack of organisational commitment, varying opinions on how the problem should be managed and a lack of reliable information and empirical data to formulate and implement appropriate doping policy. It is timely for sport managers to focus on the topic of doping, as public concerns over the use of drugs in sport cause significant damage to the sports industry, with consequences such as reduced attendance at sporting events, reduced sponsorship and possible impacts on broadcasting rights amongst some of the most pressing concerns.
The association between corruption and sport has a long history (see Maennig 2005 for a review).
Various commentators who have examined sport and crime have described numerous examples affecting a broad spectrum of sporting codes in which an unfair advantage has been deliberately sought or collusion has occurred to produce a favourable outcome (Boniface et al. 2012; Gorse & Chadwick 2011; Maennig 2005; Transparency International 2009). In recent decades, this behaviour has seemingly become more commonplace. Corruption in sport is now documented in numerous sporting codes—from recognisable contenders (eg football (soccer), tennis, cricket, thoroughbred and greyhound racing, basketball and baseball) to less obvious targets, such as snooker and
badminton.
It involves a range of offenders who may work cooperatively and is not just confined to ‘grassroots’ participants (ie players, coaches, referees and judges; Boniface et al. 2012) but extending to intermediaries (eg agents), club and federation officials, and organised criminal entities. Further, it affects the way sport is played, managed and promoted, including:

•How matches or races are contested;
•The measures taken to enhance (or lessen) individual or team performance;
•Player transfers;
•Management of clubs and sporting federations;
•Election to governing bodies;
•The acquisition of sponsorship, media and marketing rights; and
•Bids to host large sporting events (Bures 2008).

While a diversity of sports are played in Australia, the predominant codes are, in levels of participation and public interest– Australian Rules Football, rugby league, rugby union, soccer (or ‘football’), cricket, netball, swimming, tennis, motor sports, cycling and the ‘races’—thoroughbred, harness and greyhound racing. Almost all of the listed sporting codes have been the subject of controversy in the 2009–13 period considered here and most of these have been affected by allegations of corruption/doping.

Doping Examples
Australian Football League and National Rugby League
In February 2013, the Australian Crime Commission (ACC) released the findings of a 12 month co-investigation with the Australian Sports Anti-Doping Agency (ASADA) into the use of PIEDs by professional athletes in Australia and the involvement of serious and organised crime in its distribution. The focus of the investigation was ‘two major sporting codes in Australia’ (ACC 2013a: 5), later identified as the AFL and NRL (People speaking out about sports doping: Clare. ABC News Online, 10 February. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-02-10/people-speaking-out-about-sports-doping/4510542), but the findings also included reference to intelligence gathered from other sporting codes. The investigation described ‘widespread use’ (ACC 2013a: 7) of PIEDs, specifically peptides and hormones, among players. Most of these substances are prohibited under the S1 or S2 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) Prohibited List and all but one listed under Schedule 7A or 8 of the Customs (Prohibited Imports) Regulations (Cth). The regime of administering the prohibited substances was, in some cases, identified as having occurred at the instigation or with the complicity of club officials, including coaches, sports scientists, high performance and other support staff. The use of peptides and hormones in a number of the identified clubs amounted to ‘team-based doping’ and
…linked to a culture in some professional sports in Australia of administering untested and experimental substances to athletes in the hope they will provide an advantage (ACC 2013a: 8).

Australian Rules football Essendon Football Club
One club that became the focus of attention around systemic doping regimes immediately following the release of the ACC/ASADA findings was the Essendon Football Club. A ‘sports science program’ that operated at the club in 2012 allegedly involved the frequent administration of undefined supplements, including a ‘supplement’ banned by WADA, to Essendon players (McKenzie & Baker 2013a). The program was overseen by the club’s high-performance coach and a sports scientist hired by the club as part of the program. However, other officials—notably the coach, assistant coach, football manager and club doctor—were also alleged to have been, at the very least, aware that supplements were being administered to players (Essendon Bombers out of 2013 AFL finals as James Hird accepts 12-month suspension. ABC News Online, 23 September. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-08-27/essendon-bombers-out-of-2013-afl-finals/4915888; Baker & McKenzie 2013a)
At the behest of the club, ASADA began an investigation of the program in early 2013; an interim report was delivered in August 2013. The club also commissioned an independent inquiry. The resultant report—the ‘Switkowski report’—was delivered in May 2013 and criticised the culture at the club, which allowed such a program to both develop and persist, despite concerns raised by several club officials (Switkowski 2013)

Horse/Dog Racing
While recent inquiries into the Victorian and Western Australian thoroughbred-racing industries did not confirm widespread corruption (ORIC 2013) but this industry, as well as the harness and greyhound racing industries, have historically been identified as hotspots for corrupt activity. There are likely to be multiple reasons to account for this, notably that racing and wagering are ‘mutually interdependent’ operations and hence wide open to the temptation to manipulate results. Other factors, however, may be equally relevant and certainly featured in the alleged and substantiated cases affecting various state racing industries. These include:

• The use of an easily controlled competitor (ie indiscriminate doping of animals);
• Easily manipulated processes (eg drugs testing and ‘swabbing’ balls);
• Historically lax oversight; and
• Strong, often-familial interconnectedness that promotes discussion and subsequent tolerance of unethical behaviour

Risks to Australian sport
One of the themes that emerged from the cases outlined above is the absence of clearly defined guidelines and practices to prevent and detect corruption (Anderson, 2011). At the club or code level, codes of conduct and integrity oversight were underdeveloped or inconsistent and management structures disorganised. For example, the Switkowski (2013) report to the Essendon supplements case highlighted a lack of probity and due diligence in the selection and recruitment of club staff (in particular, contractors), poor administrative compliance (in this case, record keeping on the administration of supplements), inadequate internal controls and general failure to confirm whether instructions were acted upon. The ACC (2013a) also noted the risk attached to codes of conduct that do not cover all potential personnel attached to a sporting body, with contractors and consultants a notable omission, and the inconsistent application of integrity oversight across and within codes. Indeed, integrity oversight was assessed as particularly problematic due to the insular environment sport inhabits and the propensity to recruit and recycle from within the code.

In Australia, oversight and the comprehensiveness of investigatory powers have been criticised and tellingly by persons in such roles. For example, the Integrity Auditor for the NSW Greyhound Racing Industry, David Landa, resigned from his position in 2012, claiming the oversight model for the industry was a ‘fraud on the public’, which left the designated authority with little or no independence and rudimentary powers to observe the functions of the role (O’Brien 2012a: np). Further, changes to the industry’s legal status resulted in it falling out of the purview of the NSW Independent Commission Against Corruption (Humphries 2013).

Protections in place
Sustained international focus on corruption in sport, combined with a reassessment of the risks to Australian sport has seen the introduction of a range of protections by both government and national sporting bodies. These comprise the:
- Endorsement of national polices on match-fixing and sports doping;
- Establishment of sport integrity units both at the national level and by individual sporting codes;
- Inclusion of specialist intelligence units in law enforcement agencies; and
- Creation of relevant criminal offences in state and territory legislation.

Sport integrity units
The Commonwealth Government established the National Integrity of Sport Unit (NISU) in 2012. The NISU has a broad range of coordination, monitoring, compliance auditing and advisory roles with respect to:
- Anti-doping legislation and policy;
- The development of integrity strategies and frameworks to prevent and respond to doping and match-fixing, and
- The promotion of information-sharing arrangements between relevant bodies.